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ABSTRACT
This research is focused on the position of a marine insurance broker in a 
changing environment. As a result of a number of recent cases, the obligations of the 
broker have been made more onerous and this constitutes a significant departure from 
the previously obtaining legal position. The thesis examines the major obligations of 
the marine insurance broker in the context of these developments and against the 
backdrop of other changes in the industry’s self -regulating mechanisms.
In chapter 1 some aspects of Lloyd’s organisation are examined like the 
monitoring and the investigations and regulatory proceedings. Very relevant is also 
chapter 2. This is dedicated to the latest developments in respect of the position of 
brokers. The introduction of the General Insurance Standards Council reform is one of 
the factors that make the whole area a changing environment.
In Chapter 3 the role of brokers is examined; aspects of both insurance and 
reinsurance are dealt with. In the part dedicated to premium the recent change by the 
Lloyd’s Insurance Broker’s Committee according to which a broker will not be held 
liable in respect of a premium when there is no fault on his part is discussed. The last 
part is about liens. Very important are chapters 4-6, which are dedicated to the duties 
of insurance brokers, the duty of the utmost good faith and the issue of proposals, 
slips, policies and renewals.
Chapters 7 deals with binding authorities and other special arrangements. 
Chapter 8 relates specifically to the liabilities of insurance brokers and examines 
generally their legal obligations. In chapters 4 and 8 very significant case law is 
discussed in relation to the duties that a broker may owe towards his principal or other 
parties.
Chapter 9 contains the conclusion.
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1Introduction
The aim of this research is to examine the legal position of insurance brokers 
in the modem insurance market. As a starting point it needs to be said that great 
reference is made to Lloyd’s regulations and the reason for this is that Lloyd’s is the 
most influential organisation in the U.K in respect of brokers. This is the reason why 
in the first chapter of this research a reference is made to Lloyd’s organisation, 
dealing with a few very important things such as the governing bodies of Lloyd’s and 
other aspects like monitoring, authorisation and regulatory proceedings.
The other thing that needs to be said is that at present the position of brokers is 
one affected by a changing environment. The reason for this is that there is a 
significant reform -  the General Insurance Standards Council regime -  that will 
influence the whole regulatory environment around brokers. The second chapter of 
this research is dedicated to this reform. The General Insurance Standards Council 
will be a self-regulated body and it will have nothing to do with legislation. The 
practical effect will be many activities that are now carried on by Lloyd’s will pass on 
to the General Insurance Standards Council. All the members of GISC will have a 
contractual relationship with it. However, as I explain in the second chapter, there are 
quite a few problems that need to be resolved. One of them has to do with the 
Competition Act 1998. The problem derives from the fact that the members will be 
allowed to do business only with intermediaries that are members themselves. It 
remains to be seen how the market will react to these changes and how significant the 
differences will be.
The other chapters of the research are dedicated to the important aspects of a 
broker’s activities while performing his duty to his principal. One of the main 
chapters -  chapter 5 - deals with the duty of utmost good faith, something that is 
related to fraud on the part of brokers, imputation of knowledge and the conflicts of 
interest that a broker may find himself involved quite often. The Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 is very important in respect of this because in all the cases the main issue 
was to try and elaborate on what was the exact meaning of the relevant sections of it. 
Quite a large number of cases arose on the basis of an allegation of breach of utmost 
good faith because it was quite a common argument. But, as it is shown by case law 
there are a number of circumstances that a court will have to examine before
upholding that a breach of utmost good faith could be found, such as the relationship 
of the parties and the particular facts of each case.
A reform also took place as to the liability of brokers in respect of premiums. 
The Lloyd’s Insurance Broker’s Committee decided in 1997 that in respect of every 
premium after 31st of August, the brokers will not be held liable by the underwriters 
when the fault is on the part of the assured. In the chapter about premium there is also 
a reference to non-marine risks when the Marine Insurance Act does not apply and to 
a number of recent cases.
The most important, however, chapters of my research are dedicated to the 
duties and liability of brokers. In the chapter about duties of insurance brokers I refer 
to most of the activities that a broker is involved in order to do his job properly. For 
example, when he obtains or places the cover. Something that needs to be said is that 
a broker owes a duty of care not only to his principal. There can be instances where he 
owes a duty of care to other parties as well. Through case law I made an effort to 
make clear what is the exact duty of care that is required by a broker under the 
circumstances of each case. Finally, in the end of the chapter about duties a reference 
is made to the Code of Conduct that regulates the brokers industry. This is the 
theoretical background of what a broker is expected to do, although deciding whether 
or not a code can be enforced in the reality of a commercial world is always a difficult 
task.
In respect of the potential liability of a broker I have concentrated, first of all, 
on what are the requirements for liability to exist. As a result, the principles of law of 
contract and tort are mentioned. Many cases are mentioned in both chapters -  duties 
and liability- because they are interrelated. Also, very important aspects of 
reinsurance such as the spiral business and pools and fronting are mentioned always in 
accordance with the relevant cases.
Finally, parts of this research are dedicated to binding authorities, liens and 
umbrella arrangements. The purpose of these chapters is to try and cover all the 
activities of a broker ever under special arrangements like binding authorities and 
umbrella arrangements. The last thing I want to submit is that the law of reinsurance 
proved to be very significant since things are sometimes more complicated and the 
broker can find himself in a difficult position. Also, I mentioned a number of non­
marine cases as well because a number of important principles have developed in 
these cases and I tried to cover the whole scope of the profession of broking.
Ch a p t e r
Lloyd’s Organisation
j L ^ i u y u  a  v s i g a u i d a u u i i W i l l .  I J t U J  X J l l A / V U  MXVlkJ
1.1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss Lloyd’s organisation. Although my research is 
generally dedicated to insurance brokers, Lloyd’s remains one of the most vital 
aspects. A very large number of insurance brokers and insurance contracts are 
governed by Lloyd’s regulations. Especially before the new system -  GISC scheme -  
to which I will refer in the next chapter, Lloyd’s role was even more important. Most 
of the disciplinary and other proceedings involved Lloyd’s. This is the reason why a 
reference to Lloyd’s in the beginning of this research is essential.
1.2 Governing Bodies
The first governing body I need to refer to is the Council o f Lloyd’s. This was 
established under the Lloyd’s Act 1982 and it has 18 members. Six o f them are elected by the 
working membership. Another six are elected from the external membership and six are 
individuals. It must be said at this point that the members have no business relation with the 
Lloyd’s market and they are not Names1. The Lloyd’s Market Board has 15 members. It is
chaired by the Chairman of Lloyd’s who is co-operating with the Chief Executive Officer. Its
responsibility is the overall development o f the Lloyd’s business2. Thirdly, we have the 
Lloyd’s Regulatory Board. This is responsible for the development and the monitoring o f  
the regulatory procedures within Lloyd’s. Its activities are now overseen by the Financial 
Services Authority. Finally, we have the Corporation o f Lloyd’s. This actually provides 
support to Lloyd’s in a variety of ways3.
1.3 Monitoring
Monitoring is one of the main activities of the regulatory division. From the 1 * 
October 1999, the two departments, which were responsible for the monitoring of 
underwriters and brokers, became one single department. It is now called the  
Business C onduct R eview  D epartm ent -  BCRD - 4. The main reason for the change
1 lHlp:/ / \\ \v \v .l loNds.com /regiik)l io i i /govcrnance.l ilni .
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 h llp: /A \\v \v . l loyds .co in /reaula lion /corc.h lir i .
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is that, as I have already cited before, the whole insurance market is a changing 
environment. In ten years time, the number of syndicates was significantly reduced 
together with the number of managing and members’ agents. The same thing 
happened to the number of individual members5.
The effect of all the above changes is a new supervisory approach to the 
insurance market. This new approach has some key features. The first one is that each 
underwriting agent has now a dedicated supervisor responsible for the monitoring of 
his activities. The aim of this is actually to improve precision. Also, the degree of 
monitoring by the supervisors depends very much on how “risky” an agent or a 
syndicate is. The department’s automated transaction monitoring system is the main 
source of information. Another important thing is that the quantity of information 
asked before each visit is reduced on the basis that supervisors hold certain pieces of 
information in their portfolio6.
For the more effective operation of the department supervisory meetings are 
being held between the senior management of the department and the management of 
each agency7. If an agent receives an unsatisfactory monitoring review, this means 
that the members of a syndicate like that must put an additional amount of capital. But 
monitoring requires also a great degree of research. I am going to make a very brief 
reference to the monitoring projects that took place in 1999. One of them had to do 
with m arket liquidity. This is a very important aspect because liquidity is one of the 
key elements of the insurance market. Very significant was also the fact that every 
agent had different approaches towards liquidity. For example, only a few included 
realistic disaster scenarios in their plans8. The second project I will refer to is that 
about political risk  exposure. After quite close examination, it was concluded that 
although there is no real reason for immediate concern, it is a factor that will have an 
important role in the following years because of the large losses that it may cause. 
This is the reason why this project will be repeated in the following years9.
5 Ibid. Page 9.
6 Ibid Page 10.
7 Ibid Page 11.
8 Ibid Page 12.
9 Ibid Page 13.
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Another very important part of monitoring is the business conduct review10. 
Its importance derives from the fact that many of the practical problems that the 
insurance market has to deal with are being examined very closely and effective 
solutions can be found. For example, in the handling of binding authorities by Lloyd’s 
brokers the most common problems were the absence of written procedures in respect 
of binding authorities, the fact that the coverholder had bound risks under a binding 
authority that are not yet placed properly by the broker and the failure of the brokers 
to be positive that binding authorities agreements are in place11. Other areas that were 
examined were controls over consortium underwriting arrangements, controls
over proportional treaty underwriting, controls over line slips and marine open
10cargo covers and review of Internet sites .
More specifically about brokers, the results of monitoring in 1999 were very 
useful. Lloyd’s brokers were responsible for more or less the control of 19 billion 
pounds. More than 50 per cent of them made a pure operating loss with a turnover of 
less that 3 million pounds. GISC -  the scheme that is in force now -  has to deal with 
quite effectively since it is an area of great concern13.
Finally, the priorities for 2000 were as follows. In respect of monitoring the 
areas that it was going to be focused on is the impact of market conditions, the 
accuracy of syndicates’ results and the review of all agents14. In relation to business 
conduct review, reviews would take place in credit management at syndicates, cash 
flow in the market, long term insurance contracts and on how effective reinsurance 
security arrangements are at managing agents15. In respect of brokers the main issue 
was that all the UK brokers are going to be regulated by the General Insurance 
Standards Council. The effect and some details of this change are discussed in the 
next chapter.




14 Compliance with the 300 per cent rule -  the requirement for separate individuals for the posts of 
managing director and financial director, lit ip:/Awv\v.llovds.com/rcgiilation/corc.him. Page 19.
15 lnip:/Av\vwJlovds.com/rcpiilation/corc.htin. Pages 19-20.
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1.4 Investigations and Regulatory Proceedings
Quite relevant to all the regulatory aspects of monitoring mentioned above are 
the actions of the Investigations Department and the Regulatory Proceedings 
Department. The first one is responsible for the examination of allegations of 
misconduct and other breaches. If there is evidence of misconduct, a formal inquiry is 
directed. The second one is responsible for these formal inquiries and the prosecution 
of these disciplinary cases 16. Some examples of disciplinary cases have to do with 
brokers misleading their clients on purpose in relation to the placement of the cover, 
the “grossing up” that brokers had conducted and the failure to take or give proper 
inducements 17.
The priorities for 2000 were the following. The whole disciplinary 
arrangements would be reviewed. External investigations were also to be reviewed so 
that their usefulness is maximised. The third area of concern would be the Financial 
Services Authority. Under the Competition Act 1998, FSA has the authority to 
oversee Lloyd’s enforcement processes. The same happens in respect of managing 
and members’agents and the Society of Lloyd’s. The exact role of FSA would be 
clarified over 200018. The last aim is that minimising the cost, so that the defendants 
in every case know exactly what to do in order to achieve this. This would be done 
through guidance notes19.
Finally, something that has to be mentioned is the role of the Lloyd’s 
Disciplinary Board. The aim of this board is to perform disciplinary procedures, 
which came into effect under Lloyd’s Act 1982 and byelaws. These functions include 
the dealing of proposals of summary and formal disciplinary proceedings, the 
selection and appointment of Disciplinary Tribunals and the imposition of fixed 
penalties20.
16 Ibid. Page 31.
17 Ibid. Page 32.
18 Ibid. Page 33.
19 Ibid
20 Ibid. Page 34.
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1.5 Authorisation
This department is separated in three areas, authorisation, individual 
registration and correspondents and developm ent. The first area is actually 
responsible for the authorisation of agents and syndicates and the granting of certain 
conduct of business permissions. The second one has to do with the approval of 
coverholders and correspondents. The third area is focused on how the reaction of the
•  91insurance market should be because of the changes such as the involvement of FSA . 
In 1999, according to the formal information provided by Lloyd’s there have been 
improvements in some areas like the documentation for the admission of corporate 
members, the introduction of an advance consent process and also a process that can 
be used by managing agents when they deal with transactions where a breach of a 
fiduciary duty may be involved 22. Other areas in which this department focused on in 
1999 are agents’ fees and profit com m ission, financial resource requirem ents for  
agents, captives and alternative risk  transfer products, individual registration
9 ^and coverholder and correspondent approval .
The development area -  mentioned above - was concentrated on the process of 
the agent’s fee increase applications, the regulatory approach of fronting and on a 
review of the whole regulatory structure24.
The priorities for 2000 as these were set had to do first of all with raising 
standards. This means that only top quality entries would be permitted and scrutiny of 
all the applications would be granted. Secondly, the boundaries with FSA would have 
to be clarified. This is quite a vital aspect according to the new regulations. Finally, 
accreditation of intermediaries and agent’s fees and charges are areas that would be
• 9 cexammed as well .
20 Ibid Page 34.
21 Ibid Page 21.
22 Ibid Pages 22-25.
23 Ibid
24 Ibid Pages 25-26.
25 Ibid Pages 26-27.
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1.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is the reference to a few aspects of how Lloyd’s 
operates. Many of the regulatory departments mentioned above will be faced with a 
significant change now that the General Insurance Standards Council is 
responsible for the regulation of the UK brokers. As I cited above, details about GISC 
are given in the next chapter. However, I submit that the reference to how Lloyd’s 
operates will make clear why the position of the insurance brokers and the insurance 
industry generally is such a changing environment.
Ch a pt e r
Latest Developments
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2.1 Introduction
The position of the insurance brokers in the insurance market has been the 
center of discussions and research over the years. The reason is that there have been 
quite a few problems with brokers not doing their job properly. The most common 
problems have to do either with the duty of disclosure, to which I have referred to 
earlier, and with the premium that sometimes was much higher than what it should 
have been. The result is that this whole area is now a changing environment. In order 
to make things more clear, I will make a brief reference to the factors that made this 
need for change compulsory1.
Until 1977, things were relatively simple. There were no formal qualifications 
for somebody to be an insurance broker. Everything was a matter of talent and 
experience. Only Lloyd’s imposed a number of criteria that a broker had to meet, in 
order to be able to co-operate with Lloyd’s. In 1977, however, things started to 
change. There was an immense need to “professionalise” the business of insurance 
broking2. This led to the passing of the Insurance Brokers Registration Act 1977. 
The effect of this Act was really significant. It was the first effort to regulate those 
who acted as insurance brokers. Of course, the brokers that did business for Lloyd’s 
continued to be regulated by Lloyd’s. This was done after a while through the 
Lloyd’s Byelaws. This was a codified system, which dealt with registration, conduct 
of business and other important aspects of the insurance broking business3. The result 
of all these was that Lloyd’s and the Insurance Brokers Registration Council 
addressed a few very important principles that a broker had to follow, in order to do 
his job properly. Although, the effort was very important, various problems existed in 
the conducting of the business. The main problem was that brokers always tried to 
maximise their brokerage. This is in a way logical, if we take into consideration the 
fact that, most of the times, everybody in the chain of intermediaries had to be paid 
from this brokerage. However, there have been many instances, where there was no 
real disclosure of the expenses involved and the brokerage was increased without the 
consent of the client. This procedure followed by the brokers was called “grossing
1 Pincott Andrew & Elbome Mitchell. London Insurance Brokers. A Changing Environment. Shipping 
and Trade Law. November 2000, Volume 1- Number 2.
2 Ibid Page 1.
3 Ibid
up”. It is something, which would be completely right if consent was given, but this 
rarely happened4. The problems continued to remain unsolved and the disciplinary 
proceedings against the brokers increased. Another very significant aspect of the 
problems that had arisen was the fact that the 1977 Act dealt only with those acted as 
insurance brokers and not with any other kind of intermediaries, who as a result were 
not regulated at all5.
2.2 The Reform
The Insurance Brokers Registration Act 1977 will be repealed on 30 April 
2001 and a whole new system will be introduced. The differences will be very 
important. First of all, the Insurance Brokers Registration Council will be 
abolished. Its duties will pass on the General Insurance Standards Council -  GISC- 
. This will be a self-regulated development by the insurance industry and not a system 
based on legislation. Another aspect of GISC will be that all the members will have a 
contractual relationship with it, and everybody who is involved in the insurance 
industry will be free to join. Also, everything will be regulated from branches in the 
United Kingdom irrespectively of where is the location of the risk of the customer6. 
Of course, customer codes will exist that will try to regulate the relationship between 
the parties. I am going now to make a brief reference to the obligations imposed by 
the Commercial Code in question7. The first obligation had to do with marketing. It is 
cited in paragraph 3 of the GISC Commercial Code that all advertising must be done 
in clear terms and not be misleading8. The others deal with the actual arrangement of 
insurance. One of the main issues is that the members must provide their customers 
with certain and accurate pieces of information. This information might have to do 
either with details of the proposed insurance or the customer’s requirements. It is also 
stated that members should not in any case impose any additional fees other than the 
premium. Finally, there is also a duty of disclosure of the members to their 
commercial clients9.
4 Ibid. Page 3.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. Page 4.
7 Ibid Pages 4-5.
8 hltir/Avww. uisc.co.uk. Paragraph 3 of the GISC Commercial Code.
9 lnip:/Avww.t>isc.co.uk. / Pincott Andrew & Elbome Mitchell. London Insurance Brokers. A Changing 
Environment Shipping and Trade Law. November 2000, Volume 1- Number 2. Pages 4-6.
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Moving on, it is cited that under the GISC scheme, the members must provide 
their customers with written details of the insurance in question. And the members 
will have to provide an on-going service to their customers; namely they will have to 
help their customers with the confirmation and the amendments of the policy. In 
respect of claims, it is stated that members have to give their guidance, so that their 
customers are fully informed. The same applies to possible complaints10. The next 
thing that needs to be said is that there are two Codes that are imposed under the 
GISC, the Private Customer Code and the Commercial Customer Code -  
mentioned above. I will make a reference to them later on11.
It must be understood that the system has to overcome the problem of the 
Competition Act 1998. The reason for this is that GISC members will have to do 
business only with intermediaries, who are themselves, members of the GISC. This, 
of, course contains, an anti-competitive idea for which the system must be granted an 
exemption 12. Also, the support of the London insurance market is essential for the 
system to operate. Groups of brokers such as the Institute of Insurance Brokers had 
opposed and expressed the indication to keep a separate regulatory system. However, 
uniformity is essential if GISC is to work properly13. Very important as I mentioned 
above is also the fact that the insurance business will be conducted from branches in 
the United Kingdom. It must be understood that brokers will have to comply both 
with the requirements imposed by CISC and by Lloyd’s in order to be registered as 
Lloyd’s brokers. The same procedure will apply for the brokers that conduct their 
business in Europe. Finally, it must be said that a few responsibilities will remain with 
Lloyd’s such as a number of disciplinary proceedings14.
10 Ibid
11 Ibid
12 Pincott Andrew & Elbome Mitchell. London Insurance Brokers. A Changing Environment. Shipping 
and Trade Law. November 2000, Volume 1- Number 2. Pages 5-6.
13 Ibid14
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2.3 General Insurance Standards Council (GISC) System
It will be interesting at this point to look at the GISC in quite a more detailed 
view15. The Newro Executive Committee announced the creation of the General 
Insurance Standards Council by saying that it will be responsible for the regulation of 
the whole insurance business. It is obvious only from this kind of announcement how 
important this self-regulatory body is considered to be. This is how Anthony Howland 
Jackson, the chairman of the Executive, addressed his thoughts about GISC: “the first 
consultation exercise addresses key questions about the GISC regime and will be 
central to shaping its future. GISC will stand fo r effective, independent, 
straightforward regulation with minimum bureaucracy. It will aim to ensure that all 
general insurance customers, from holiday makers buying travel insurance to 
commercial corporations considering the placement o f  their insurance programmes, 
are properly protected”16. We can also look at the key objectives of the new scheme 
as these were announced by the Committee: “ to establish and enforce principles and 
rules designed to ensure that general insurance customers receive the appropriate 
degree o f  protection, taking account o f  the type o f business and in particular the 
customer’s knowledge and experience” 17. In a more specified way, it was also 
mentioned by the GISC that the regime will "establish, promote, monitor and enforce 
high standards o f  integrity, financial soundness, fair dealing and competence for  
those it regulates ”, “ensure that, as fa r as possible, policies which are proposed are 
suitable to the needs and resources o f customers, and that customers are informed 
about the product they are buying and its p r ice”1*. Finally, it will “ensure that 
adequate systems are in place for dealing with consumer complaints and ensuring 
that redress is available ”19.
15 http :/A \w A v.ab i.org .uk /lio tlop ic /n rl 7 7 .a sp . News Release -  3 November 1998 -  General Insurance 
Standards Council. General Insurance Standards Council to be set up.
16 Ibid. Page 1.
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2.4 Commercial Customer Code20
Some of the things mentioned in the Code, I have already talked about when 
dealing generally with the reform. As I said also above, this is not the only Code, 
since there is the Private Customer Code to which I will refer to after. Hence, the 
first part of the Commercial Customer Code is dedicated to the principles under which 
the Code operates21. The basis of these principles is that commercial customers must 
be happy with the service provided by the GSIC members. Some of their duties are to 
act with due skill and care and to conduct their business in a prudent manner22. After 
the theoretical principles there are a few practice notes23.1 will just mention in which 
areas the practice notes are focused on. The first area is marketing24. After that, there 
are some very important details about arranging the insurance25. These are about 
Commercial Customer relationship, Commercial Customer requirements, and 
information about proposed insurance. Also, there is guidance about advice and 
recommendations, information about costs and remuneration, the duty of disclosure, 
quotations and placement. The next areas are that of the confirmation of the cover and 
the provision of an ongoing service, to which I have referred briefly earlier26. Finally, 
there are principles that are related to claims, documentation, conflicts of interest, 
confidentiality and security, complaints and the Commercial Code itself27.
Introduction to the Private Customer Code28
The explanation of the Code starts with the products of general insurance, 
njqy cpv^f?4- tyesf prompts someone can find insuranpe fpr his home, 
legal expenses insurance, travel insurance and other areas where an individqqj ptqy 
require protection. Pensions and life assurance are excluded. After this there is a brief
20 hitp://\\\\\v.cibi.org.uk/liottopic/nrl77.asp. Part dedicated to the Commercial Customer Code.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. Paragraphs 1.1 to 1.8.
23 Ibid
24 Ibid. Paragraph 3.
25 Ibid. Paragraphs 4-24.
26 Ibid. Paragraphs 25-34.
27 Ibid. Paragraphs 35-50.
28 hllp://\\\v\v.abi.oru.uk/lioltopic/nrl77.asp. Part dedicated to the Private Customer Code.
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explanation of what kind of protection is offered. Emphasis is given to the fact that 
the individual customer has the right to complain if he believes that he did not receive 
the adequate standard of service and that all the members of GISC are monitored, in 
order for GISC to be positive that they follow the principles of the Code. Finally, 
there is a section focusing on what an individual must expect from GISC members. 
For example, they must expect to be given unambiguous and correct information, to 
be sure that the members will handle their claims effectively and correct any kind of 
mistakes29.
2.5 Private Customer Code
I am going to refer now to the Private Customer Code in a more detailed way. 
What this Code is, according to the definition given, is the setting of the minimum 
standards of good practice that the members of GISC must follow when they have to 
deal with private customers30. There is also a special part, which is dedicated to the 
understanding of the Code, although it is very small in length31. The formation of the 
Code is very similar to this of this of the Commercial Customer Code. The Code starts 
with the commitments of the GISC members . The first area is again marketing . 
After, there is a part dedicated to the finding of an insurance that will meet the 
customer’s needs34. This is quite extensive and quite a few details are mentioned such 
as the explanation of the service given, the matching of the requirements given by the 
customer, the giving of accurate information in relation to products, services and costs 
and the “cooling-off period”- which means that under the Private Code, the space of 
14 days will be given to customers from the day they receive the information about 
the requested insurance. Within these 14 days customers have the right to cancel their 
insurance cover and get all their money back35. The fourth part is about the 
confirmation of the cover36. This contains information about the actual confirmation
29 Ibid.
30 h l[p ://\v \vw .ab i.or.i> .iik /]io ttop ic /nr l77 .asp . Introduction of the Private Customer Code.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. Paragraph 1.
33 Ibid. Paragraph 2
34 Ibid. Paragraphs 3.1-3.10.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
of the cover, the proof of payment and the documents of the policy. Moving on, we 
have information about the provision of the service by the GISC members. Here, 
someone can find information about how changes can be effected to a policy, notice 
of renewal and expiry or cancellation37. Afterwards, we have the parts that are about 
provision of service by the GISC members, claims, documentation and confidentiality 
and security38. Finally, the last two are dedicated to complaints and other relevant 
information. If someone reads all the pieces of information given, he will see that 
although it is not very analytical, it is very helpful for the customer. Especially when 
we talk about private customers this is very important because their level of expertise 
cannot be expected to be high.
2.6 GISC Dispute Resolution Facility
According to the GISC scheme, its members are under an obligation to 
maintain membership of the Dispute Resolution Facility. This facility is actually 
operated by GISC Complaints Department. The only circumstance when such an 
obligation does not exist is when they are members of any of the eight dispute 
resolution schemes that will be brought together under the Financial Ombudsman 
Service 40. However, there are some rules and some procedures that have to be 
followed. First of all, the complaint must be made on behalf of a private customer and 
concern the activities of a member with whom the complainant has direct dealings. 
And the complain could only go through only when the activities in question have 
occurred after the member has joined GISC. The GISC had the option to deal with the 
complain if it is not within the jurisdiction of the GISC Dispute Resolution Facility, to 
submit that it can be better dealt with by another complaints procedure or that is 
considered frivolous or vexatious 41. As to the procedures that must be followed it is 
cited in the explanatory guide that the Dispute Resolution Facility must operate from 
GISC premises, provide an Advice desk for information and act as a counsellor in 
order to solve any problems. The appendix of the GISC deals first of all with the
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. Paragraphs 5.1-8.2.
39 Ibid.
40 http :/A v \\\v.n b i.o rg .u k /lio tto p ic /n r  177.asp. Part dedicated to the GISC Resolution Facility.
41 Ibid.
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aspect of jurisdiction. The second paragraph is dedicated to the functions of the 
Resolution Facility. Finally the last two are about the duties and the powers given by 
the GISC scheme to the GISC Resolution Facility42.
2.7 Conclusion
It is necessary to examine at this point -  after mentioning above a few basic 
things about how the General Insurance Standards Council Dispute Resolution 
operates -  what are the procedures when a broker is reported to have misbehaved. 
GISC through monitoring visits and investigations tries to keep an eye on its 
members. Hence, when there is something that leads to the conclusion that there is an 
act of misconduct on the part of the GISC member an investigation may take place 
and it must be noted that part or all the costs should be borne by the member. 
Moreover, GISC has the right to require from the member in question any kind of 
information that is considered to be relevant43. The second aspect that needs to be 
examined in relation with misbehaviour from a member is that of enforcement. If 
GISC submits that there are grounds that a member has committed an act of 
misconduct, then the case is referred to the Enforcement Committee, which must 
decide within 20 business days whether or not to take disciplinary action against the 
member after serving both on him and GISC a Warning Notice44. This Notice 
contains a statement and particular facts of the misconduct, details about the 
member’s disciplinary record and the proposed penalty. When the meeting of the 
Enforcement Committee takes place a Decision Note is served on the member. If 
however the member does not agree with it, he has the right to refer the case to the 
Disciplinary Tribunal where the burden of proof is on the part of the GISC. The 
chairman of the Tribunal must decide the exact procedure that will be followed in the 
Disciplinary Tribunal hearing. Of course there is a permission to appeal by any party 
within 10 business days45. Finally, GISC has the right of intervention. This means that 
when GISC believes that a member has committed or is likely to commit an act of 
misconduct or cannot engage in his activities, it can intervene in order to stop or limit
42 Ibid.
43 lm p:/Av\vA v.u isc .co .u k . Section H -  Monitoring and Investigation.
44 litlpV A vuw . Risc.co.uk. Section I -  Enforcement.
45 Ibid.
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the member’s activities46. An Intervention Order will make specific the particular 
steps that a member is forbidden from taking, the date and time that the Order will 
take effect, the period that it will operate and the reasons for it. Again, the member 
has the right to apply for a stay of or appeal in respect of the Order47.
We can clearly see from the above that the GISC scheme is an effort to 
improve the previously existing situation. I mentioned above quite briefly some of the 
problems that have to be faced. Insurance broking is a very complex job. A number of 
factors such as personal relations, experience and unprecedented events can influence 
an insurance policy. It is very important that quite a lot of pressure is moving from 
Lloyd’s to GISC. The theoretical part of the scheme seems to be quite well 
established. The problem is how this theoretical background will be addressed in 
practice. This will be the decisive factor according to which an improvement may take 
place or everything will remain the same but for the theoretical background that will 
make no difference at all. It is up to everybody that is concerned with the operation of 
the insurance industry to try and make it work.
46 htlp:/A vw w . g isc .c o .u k . Section J -  Intervention.
47 Ibid.
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3.1 D u a l R o le  o f  B r o k e r s
3.1.1 Introduction
The field of reinsurance is quite a complex one in the maritime world. The 
first thing that needs to be mentioned is that quite relevant to it are some basic 
concepts of agency law. I am going to make a very brief reference at this point to 
them, in order for the relationship between the parties- broker, insured, and reinsurer -  
to be easily understood. It is quite clear that in a marine contract of insurance the 
broker is in the beginning the agent of the insured although there are exemptions to 
this general rule. There are some types of contract in which a broker can enter with 
his client. The contract can be for a particular purpose and when this purpose is 
achieved, the contract is terminated. Also, it can be for all insurance purposes. His 
duty is to exercise his activities with due care and skill. What an agent can or cannot 
do during the transaction where the contract comes into existence is a matter of 
authority. It all depends on the extent of authority that is given by the principal to his 
agent. This authority can arise either from the direct orders given by the principal or it 
can be implied authority. Also, it can be apparent or ostensible authority or agency of 
necessity. Another rule that needs to be mentioned is that it is not necessary that an 
agent should not have contractual capacity in contrast with the principal who must 
have full contractual relationship. However, I do not intend to analyse this here. 
Perhaps, the only thing that must be said now is that when we deal with reinsurance, 
the problem is that there is a chain of parties that a broker is related to and it is 
possible for him to change principals from one time to another l. An example is, when 
a broker is asked to place a retrocession cover, he suddenly becomes the agent of the 
reinsurer.
3.1.2 Differences between direct insurance and reinsurance
It is time now to cite some differences between reinsurance and direct 
insurance as far as the role of the brokers is concerned. First of all, in reinsurance, 
there is no consumerism and both sides are professionals 2. This means in simple 
words that the procedure becomes quite more complex, but on the other hand
1 O’Neill P.T & J.W Wolonieski. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell. Chapter 9.
2 Ibid
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mistakes are not made so often, because of the expertise of the parties that are 
involved 3. Secondly, there is a difference, in respect of liability. In cases of 
reinsurance, there is no liability on the part of the broker for the payment of the 
premium 4. In direct insurance, so far as marine cases are concerned, the brokers are 
liable in relation to premiums 5. In non-marine cases, things are not so clear. It 
depends again on arrangements between the parties 6. Thirdly, as I have already 
mentioned above, in the context of reinsurance, although the broker will place the 
original insurance as the agent of the insured, afterwards he becomes the agent of the
7 • Xreinsurer in placing the reinsurance cover . A relevant case is Vesta v Butcher . It 
was a case about fish farms. The facts were as follows. A fish farm in Norway was 
insured with the plaintiff Norwegian insurance company that actually reinsured 90 per 
cent of the risk in question with Lloyd’s underwriters. Two were the important aspects 
of the reinsurance policy. The first one was that the reinsurance policy was arranged 
to be “back to back” with the original insurance policy. This simply means that the 
two insurance policies needed to be on identical terms. The second aspect was that in 
both the original insurance policy and the reinsurance policy an identical provision 
was contained that a 24-hour watch should be kept on the farm. This did not happen 
but the problem was that under Norwegian law this could not provide the insurer with 
a defence. The position was very different in English law under which the insurer was 
entitled to repudiate liability. As a result, Vesta brought an action against the 
reinsurers and the firm of the brokers. In respect of the action about the 24-hour watch 
clause, it was held that since the two policies were “back to back” the reinsurance 
policy had to be governed also by Norwegian law, which did not provide the Lloyd’s 
underwriters with a valid defence and not according to English law that would render 
the policy null and void. This case, at the court of first instance and the Court of 
Appeal , dealt also with aspects of contributory negligence, breach of the warranties
3 Ibid. Paragraph 9-13.
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and breach of duty by the brokers. In the court of first instance, in respect to the action 
against the brokers, it was held that although the brokers were under a professional 
duty to Vesta, their breach did not cause the actual loss. On cross-appeal by the 
brokers, it was decided that there was no doubt that the brokers were acting in a dual 
capacity and that it would not be concluded that the brokers were not authorised to act 
on behalf of the reinsurer. Sir Roger Ormrond stated: “in he first place, the brokers 
were not acting in the conventional role o f  Lloyd’s brokers- exclusively as agents for  
the client (Vesta)... They designed the form o f  words and they negotiated with 
underwriters fo r  the approval o f  these words...the inevitable and obvious conflict o f  
laws seem to have been completely overlooked” 9. From the above case, it is obvious 
that it can be easy for a broker to become involved in a situation where he can be in a 
kind of conflict with his principal(s). Whether his dual capacity is accepted or not by 
courts or by insurance practice and if so under which circumstances is something that 
will be discussed below. Fourthly, in the context of reinsurance there is a difference in 
the standard of the duty of the utmost good faith that is required by the broker. This 
will probably be higher, because all information that is given is the result of 
expectation and facts 10. Finally, there are two more differences that I must refer to. 
The first one is that when we have a reinsurance open cover-1 will analyse this later 
on 11 - the broker has the right to bind both the reinsurer and the reinsured 12. The
second is that in a reinsurance contract, the ability of the draftsman that deals with the
* •  1 ^wordmg is much more relevant .
9 Ibid. Page 33. Per Sir Roger Ormrond.
10 O’Neill P.T & J.W Wolonieski. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell. Chapter 9. 
Paragraph 9-13.
11 Look at the chapter about Binding authorities and Brokers.
12 O’Neill P.T & J.W Wolonieski. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell. Chapter 9. 
Paragraph 9-13.
13 Ibid
L J l ia i  IVUIC U l  D lU K C ld V ^ I U I M U D  l M U U U i a M d
3.1.3 Dual Capacity o f the Brokers
So, what about the dual capacity that a broker may have? It is more or less 
accepted that brokers can be involved in several kinds of activities. It is possible for a 
broker either to place direct insurance for the insured or while acting for his principal 
to become involved with a reinsurance contract and place cover with the reinsurer. 
Even, if a retrocession contract takes place, a broker can become the agent of the 
reinsurer. Also, a broker may act under a binding authority or be an intermediary 
through whom claims, premiums and accounts are settled. In the case of Vesta v 
Butcher that I referred to in the introductory part, it is obvious how difficult this can 
be. Sometimes, a broker even without fraud or any other misconduct on his part can 
get confused with the number of principals he may have during each stage of a 
transaction. It would be quite helpful to look at some of the cases. In Trading and 
General Investment Corporation and another v Gault Armstrong and Kemble 
Ltd 14 -  or briefly the Okeanis case -  the main question that was addressed to the 
court related as to whether an Italian company acted as sub-brokers or as agents of 
Italian underwriters and if there could be recovery for the plaintiffs from the brokers. 
Actually, the plaintiffs owned the vessel in question -  Okeanis -. GAK were Lloyd’s 
brokers and they were the placing brokers for the marine risks of the owners of the 
vessel in question. Italrias, an Italian company, was the company whose role has to be 
discussed. GAK approached Italrias in order to place the risk in respect of the vessel 
Okeanis in the Italian insurance market at rates lower than those prevailing in the 
London insurance market. As a result, 15 per cent of the whole risk was placed 
through Italrias in the Italian market and a cover note was issued by GAK to the 
plaintiffs in 1976. At renewal, after one year, another company called Mutuamar Ltd. 
agreed to take up the 15 per cent mentioned above, because the Italian underwriters 
did not agree to a renewal at the reduced rates that the plaintiffs wanted. Again a 
cover note was issued to the plaintiffs. In January 1978 Okeanis suffered damage to 
her engines. When the time for renewal came again, Mutuamar Ltd. declined to renew 
but Italrias agreed to place a smaller percentage with another Italian underwriter. 
However, by the time that Italrias placed the percentage, a payment was made by
14 (1986) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 195.
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London underwriters in respect of the damage in the engines of Okeanis. The result 
was that GAK asked Italrias for an amount of money in respect of a second payment 
made by London underwriters and in respect of Mutuamar’s 15 per cent share. The 
Italian company denied to pay and submitted that they were not obliged to pay. The 
plaintiffs on their part brought an action against GAK and the issue that arose was 
whether Italrias acted as sub-agents for GAK. The court held that Italrias could not be 
accepted to act as a sub-agent of GAK. According to the facts the Italian company 
was deemed to act as agents of Italian underwriters. If one reads the judgement of 
Bingham J., the complexity of the relationship between the parties of the contract is 
not surprising. In his own words he concluded that “although the evidence is not 
entirely satisfactory, I  find myself in little doubt but that the Italrias should be 
regarded as agents o f  the underwriters. The evidence on which the plaintiffs relied to 
show a sub-agency was not very convincing... It does on the other hand seems clear 
that GAK on the other hand regarded Italrias as agents fo r a number o f  Italian 
underwriters and not as agents on their own behalf’. In order to be proved that 
Italrias were the sub-agents of GAK, it should be shown that Italrias had received 
cash or credit or settled in account with Mutuamar. This was not proved to be the 
case. However, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the premiums held by GAK on 
behalf of them and never paid or settled in account with Mutuamar 15. The importance 
of this case lies on the fact that it is quite usual, even if this is not the intention of the 
parties, for a broker, although he performs his duty, to have to face problems about 
whom he is acting for.
The next case I am going to refer to is a non-marine one: Kelly v Cooper 16. 
Here, the situation was quite different and the defendants were estate agents. The 
argument that was raised by the plaintiff had to do with the duty of disclosure of all 
material facts that an agent has towards his principal. More precisely, the estate agents 
dealt with the sale of two adjoining properties. These were both sold to the same 
buyer, something that the agents failed to disclose before the sale to the second 
vendor. The decision was in the court of first instance that the defendants were in 
breach of their duty of disclosure, so, they could not recover their commission. This 
outcome was reversed on appeal. Lastly, on appeal by the plaintiffs again, the appeal
15 Ibid Page 198. Per Bingham J.
16 (1993) A.C. 205.
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was dismissed 17. The reasoning of the decision was very much based on public policy 
concerns. In brief, the court stated that the nature of the business of the estate agency 
is such that it is expected that the agents will act on behalf of a number of principals. 
Therefore, since this situation is quite known to everyone, it would not be fair and 
reasonable for estate agents to impose on them, under implied terms of the agency 
agreement, a duty to disclose facts, which are related to other principals. This case is a 
classic example of how difficult the role of an agent can sometimes be. Although, on 
this occasion, the brokers were not agents of both the insured and the insurer in the 
same time, it was just the nature of their business that put them in such a difficult 
position.
Quite interesting in respect of all the above about the role of the brokers is the 
decision of Hirst J. in the case of IGI Insurance Co.Ltd v Kirkland Timms Ltd 
OBD. Commercial Court (unreported) where it is stated in the judgement that 
“when the broker administered claims and premiums between underwriters and 
brokers, while holding a binder he was an intermediary with agency obligations to 
both parties” 18.
3.1.4 Conclusion
There are actually quite a few difficulties in relation to the position of brokers 
and one of the reasons is that the relationship between the brokers and the others is 
usually governed by what is implied by law and not by written documents. This 
means that in each case different rules may apply. It is a matter of business and legal 
practice. Another reason is that the law of agency is not a part of any code. And this 
creates practical and theoretical obstacles. An example will make things much more 
clear: it is very common in Lloyd’s for underwriters to use brokers for claims assessor 
or loss adjusters without the insured’s knowledge. In the case of North & South 
Trust Co. v Berkeley 19. the court held that this was completely unacceptable and 
could not be justified to be a legal custom. This can only happen if the insured gives 
his consent. This case played a very significant role in the Kelly v Cooper case at the 
court of first instance. The principle that was upheld as it is directly quoted from the
17 Ibid
18 O’Neill P.T & J.W Wolonieski. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell.
19 (1971) 1 W.L.R. 470.
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decision is “ an agent cannot lawfully place himself in the position, in which he owes 
a duty to another, which is inconsistent with his duty to his principal, but i f  
nevertheless he does so, his action is not a nullity. Thus his unlawful act provides him 
with no defence to a claim by his true principal for compensation o f loss resulting 
from the agent’s inability, due to the conflict o f duties, fully to discharge his duty to 
that principal ” 20. This was the exact principle that was followed in the court of first 
instance in Kelly v Cooper case, but it was reversed on appeal21.
20 Ibid Page 471.
21 (1993) A.C 205.
3.2 Pr em iu m
3.2.1 Introduction
The payment of the premium is one of the factors, which is pivotal to the 
relationship between the parties of an insurance contract. It is also one of the areas, 
where significant changes are taking place. This means that some of the traditional 
cases, which are going to be mentioned, will have to be viewed with a different scope. 
The basic reason for the changes is a decision that was taken by the Lloyd’s Insurance 
Broker’s Committee in October 19971. It related to the payment of the premium and 
according to it, it was said that underwriters would not hold brokers liable for 
premiums where there is a fault on the part of the assured. This was to take effect for 
every premium after 31st August 1996. I am going to refer to the significance of all 
these later on together with some of the cases, which were the direct result of this 
change.
3.2.2 Marine Insurance Act 1906
I will start with the traditional view of the law towards the premium. MIA 
1906 deals with this in quite a detailed way. The main section is 53(1): “Unless 
otherwise agreed, when a policy is effected on behalf o f the assured by the broker, the 
broker is directly responsible to the insurer for the premium, and the insurer is 
directly responsible to the assured fo r the amount, which may be payable in respect o f  
losses or in respect o f  returnable premium ” 2. According to subsection (2), “unless 
otherwise agreed, the broker has, as against the assured, a lien upon the policy for  
the amount o f  the premium and his charges in respect o f  effecting the policy; and 
where he dealt with the person who employs him as a principal, he has also a lien on 
the policy in respect o f  any balance on any insurance account which may be due to 
him from such person, unless when the debt was incurred he had a reason to believe 
that such a person was only an agent” 3. The importance of section 53(1) is obvious, 
since it regulates the responsibilities that arise between the parties. So, the broker is
1 Lloyd’s Insurance Broker’s Committee. LIBC No. 69/97.
2 Chalmers D. Mackenzie. (1966). MIA 1906. 6th edition. Page 70.
3 Ibid
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deemed to be directly liable towards the underwriter for the premium. It must be 
stated that this was the position of the insurance market before the commencement of 
the MIA 1906. In the case of Power v Butcher 4 Beyley J. said: “according to the 
ordinary course o f trade between the assured, the broker and the underwriter, the 
assured does not in the first instance pay the premium to the broker, nor does the 
latter pay it to the underwriter. But, as between the assured and the underwriter, the 
premiums are considered as paid. The underwriter, to whom, in most instances, the 
assured are known, looks to the broker for payment, and he to the assured. The latter 
pay the premiums to the broker only, who is a middleman between the assured and the 
underwriter. But, he is not merely an agent: he is a principal to receive the money 
from the assured and to pay it to the underwriters”5. This statement exactly shows 
what is the mechanism according to which the relationship between the broker, the 
assured and the underwriter is governed.
Moreover, section 54 provides that “where a marine policy effected on behalf 
o f the assured by a broker acknowledges the receipt o f the premium, such 
acknowledgement is, in the absence o f fraud, conclusive as between the insurer and 
the assured, but not as between the insurer and the broker”6. This section is very 
significant in respect of the effect of the receipt of the premium.
It is time now to deal with the classic case of Universo Insurance Co. of 
Milan v Merchants Marine Insurance Co. 1. The action here was brought by an 
insurance company against the assured. The main argument of the case had to do with 
the question whether the custom, according to which, the broker and not the assured 
was liable, was to be followed or not. There was a dictum by Collins J., which has 
been proved to be very influential: “it is a very well-recognised practice in marine 
insurance for the broker to treat himself as responsible to the underwriter for the 
premiums, by a fiction he is deemed to have paid the underwriter, and to have 
borrowed with him the money with which he pays ”8. This statement seems to explain 
in quite an adequate way why the custom of the liability of the broker exists as it is.
4 (1829) B and Cr. 329.
5 Ibid Page 340.
6 Chalmers D. Mackenzie. (1966). MIA 1906. 6th edition. Page 71.
7 (1897) 1 Q.B. 295; 2 Q.B. 93.
8 Ibid. Page 101.
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3.2.3 Non-Marine Risks
I will talk about the situation where the risk that is placed is a non-marine one. 
The provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 do not apply here. However, it is 
not so clear whether the broker is liable under these circumstances. The case of 
Wilson v Avec Audio -Visual Equipment Ltd. 9 is very relevant. The broker was 
instructed to obtain cover against burglary and goods in transit for the defendants. The 
plaintiff in the case was the broker who effected the insurance policies. The policies 
were arranged with a company, which was eventually wound up. The result was that 
the defendants submitted that they would pay the amount of premiums until the 
liquidation of the company, so, that this amount would be passed to the liquidator, but 
nothing after that period. Despite this, the liquidator asked the plaintiff to pay the 
whole amount and they did so. After that, the argument on behalf of the plaintiff was 
that he should be indemnified by the defendants on the basis that he was personally 
liable to the company, which was liquidated in relation to the premiums. The decision 
of the court was that it could not be accepted that the plaintiff was personally liable. 
The broker was wrong to believe this and as a result, the judgement was for the 
defendants. Simply, he assumed to be in the wrong legal position vis-a-vis a third 
party. For an agent to become personally liable there must be very special 
circumstances, which must exist. These circumstances have to do with the relationship 
between the agent and the principal. John Butler wrote a paper, which dealt with the 
Wilson case and it will be quite interesting to try and understand what his conclusions 
were by assessing his thoughts and quoting some extracts of the paper10. The first 
thing that he concluded was that the case was not fully argued in the court of first 
instance and this could create problems to the analysis of the case. He then quoted 
himself a part of the judgement of Lord Justice Edmund Davies: “it requires clear 
and precise evidence o f  a very special relationship before an agent can be rendered 
personally liable in respect o f  a contract entered into on behalf o f his principal The 
sole basis o f  the claim brought in the present case that such a relationship existed. 
There was no clear or precise evidence”11. It is obvious that it is not easy at all for
9 (1974) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81.
10 Shaw Gordon. (1995). The Lloyd’s Broker. Lloyd’s London Press. Pages 103-105.
11 Wilson v Avec Audio -Visual Equipment Ltd. (1974) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81. Per Lord Justice Edmund 
Davies.
such a relationship to be established. And this is one of the reasons why the situation 
is not so clear when there are non-marine contracts that need to be concluded. When 
we are dealing with Lloyd’s brokers it can be ascertained that they are liable to 
underwriters: “The Lloyd's broker hereby undertakes that it will at all times 
indemnify the underwriters ...against non-payment ...not-withstanding that the Lloyd's 
broker may...be unable to collect ...payments from assureds or from the non-Lloyd's 
intermediary ” 12. The position of a broker is very difficult according to this statement, 
because it seems that it does not matter whether it is the broker’s actual fault or not in 
respect of the premiums. He will still be liable. Whether an insurer would bring an 
action against a major broker, when he knows for example that it was important for 
him to collect the premiums, this is another matter. The insurance market has 
sometimes its own risks in practice and when an insurer needs quite often the services 
of a broker; he would not bring an action against him on every occasion.
3.2.4 The Position of the Assured
What is the position of the assured? According to the custom, he is liable to 
the broker whether or not the money he gave for the premium has in fact been paid off 
or not. The payment of the premium by the assured or the broker is a concurrent 
condition with that of the insurer to issue the policy. Section 52 of the MIA 1906 
provides that “unless other wise agreed, the duty o f  the assured or his agent to pay  
the premium, and the duty o f the insurer to issue the policy to the assured or his 
agent, are concurrent conditions, and the insurer is not bound to issue the policy until 
payment or tender o f  the premium”13. So, because of this section, no policy can be 
issued if the premium is not paid. The solution, which was found in order for the
12 Hodgin Ray W. Insurance Intermediaries and Regulation. Lloyd’s of London Press. 1992. (Revised 
to May 1995). Page 5-815. May 1995). Page 5-815.
13 Chalmers D. Mackenzie. (1966). MIA 1906. 6th edition. Page 70.
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conclusion of insurance contracts to flow in a proper way, was that the premium was 
considered to be paid14. It must be said however that as the assured was liable to the 
broker immediately, the same applied when the assured was entitled to claim the 
return of premiums. He was more or less immediately entitled to recover them from 
the underwriter. However, it must be said that there can be circumstances under which 
the liability of intermediaries - and in respect of the payment of premium - and the 
position of the assured can become a much more complicated issue. An example of 
this is where an umbrella arrangement takes place. In the case of John v Kelly that is 
mentioned in detail in chapter 7 the liability of intermediaries under an umbrella 
arrangement was the main issue. The Lloyd’s broker in this case was held to be liable 
for the actions of the non-Lloyd’s broker. In respect of the payment of premium, if for 
example a non-Lloyd’s broker becomes insolvent and fraudulently keeps the 
premium, the Lloyd’s broker will be liable to the assured in tort. Finally, when there is 
illegality, again things change. The underwriter or any other party is not entitled to 
recover any money for premiums that have to do with insurance or reinsurance 
contract, which is illegal15.
Conclusively, everything depends on the authority -  implied, or actual -  that 
the agent has and on the facts of each particular case.
3.2.5 Recent Cases
I am going to make a reference to a few recent cases to examine how the 
courts have reacted to cases where the premium was one of the main issues. The first 
case I am going to refer to is Figre Ltd. v Mander16. The facts were as follows. CBC 
was a firm of Lloyd’s brokers, which was instructed to obtain reinsurance for a US 
insurer called PMMI. The cover, which had to be obtained, was for the year 1984. The 
broker obtained a quotation for retrocession cover for any potential reinsurers. On 
March 1984, the plaintiff wrote a 5 per cent for the reinsurance of PMMI. However, 
this was subject to the retrocession cover. After four days CBC sent a cover note to 
the plaintiff -  the insurer of the retrocession cover - for the confirmation of the terms
14 Shaw Gordon. (1995). The Lloyd’s Broker. Lloyd’s London Press. Chapter 12.
15 Ibid
16 (1999) Lloyd’s Law Rep. 193.
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of the retrocession cover. And on March 22, the defendant -  PMMI - gave an effect to 
an amendment to the slip. According to it, the plaintiff was classified as a party. And 
on January 1985, CBC sent debit notes to the plaintiff in relation to the deposit 
premium due. On November 1985, 1985, the plaintiffs agents wrote to CBC seeking 
confirmation of the balances due. After a calculation of the adjusted premium due 
from PMMI to the plaintiff, another firm -  J & H -  approached the defendant and 
tendered the original premium plus interest on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendant 
did not accept this proposal17. The final reply of the defendant was that no 
retrocession contract existed. The result was that the premium could not be accepted 
after such a long period. The Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office was given instructions 
accordingly. There was a commencement of proceedings by the plaintiff. The main 
issue was a declaration that the contract of retrocession really existed and the sum 
claimed was the outstanding claims. On the other hand, the argument on the part of 
the defendant was that there was a repudiation of contract by the plaintiff that was 
accepted by the defendant18. The plaintiff was deemed to be entitled to the 
declaration.
The next case I am going to mention is Society of Lloyd’s v Jaffrav 19. This
case was concerned with Lloyd’s Names. The proceedings were for the recovery of
premium. The allegation on the part of the Names was that from 1980 and onwards
they became members of Lloyd’s by fraudulent inducement. Also, they argued that
the renewal of their membership each year took place because of a fraudulent
misrepresentation by Lloyd’s20. Finally, they submitted that one of the consequences
of their membership was that because of a Reconstruction and Renewal Agreement
where a “pay now sue later” provision was included, the Names had to pay premium
91for covers obtained without set-off in relation with sums owing to them . Hence, as a 
result of all these, the Society made an application to have the proceedings stayed but 
this was not upheld. In respect of the recovery of the premiums and costs it was held
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
19 (1999) Lloyd’s Rep. 182.
20 Ibid
21 Ibid
that Lloyd’s was entitled to ask for the premiums and all the relevant costs and orders
“JOthat were made in favour of Lloyd’s earlier could not be changed .
3.2.6 Set -  Off
This is quite a common practice in the insurance market between two parties 
although sometimes especially in the reinsurance field an intermediary can be 
involved. For example if A is sued by B for a sum of money but at the same time B 
owes to A another sum of money, then, set-off is requested. It must be said at this 
point that legally, set-off is a defence to the original claim. One quite common 
category of cases is when an insurance contract results in unliquidated damages. This 
creates problems because a right of set-off cannot be utilised. The reason for this is 
that damages have to be liquidated. However, the whole matter is not as vital as it 
used to be in older times, because now the parties have the alternative solution of 
counterclaiming. This will have merely the same effect, as the only significant 
difference is that relating to costs23. In the case of set-off, the costs must be calculated 
in relation to the net sum recovered as in the case of a counterclaim where the plaintiff 
is entitled to the costs of the claim and the defendant to the costs of the counterclaim, 
following, of course, the court’s discretion24.
The only situation, where it can be submitted that the right to set-off is still 
important is in the case of bankruptcy of the parties. The relevant act is the 
Bankruptcy Act 191425. The significant section of the Act is section 31, according to 
which someone has the right to set-off, only if there was some kind of mutuality 
between the parties. This, in other words, means those mutual debts, credits or any
22 The cases of Society of Lloyd’s v Fraser (1998) CLC 127, (1999) Lloyd's Law Reports IR  156 
(CA) and Society of Lloyd’s v Leighs and Others (1997) CLC 1012, (1997) CLC 1012 (CA) were 
discussed and applied.
23 O’Neill P.T & J.W. Woloniecki. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell. Paragraphs 11- 
54.11-72
24 Ibid
25 See also the Insolvency Act 1985 and Insolvency Act 2000.
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other similar agreements have to exist26. From the things that are discussed above,
someone can see that it is not easy at all for such a kind of mutuality to exist.
I am going now to compare two cases that deal with the aspect of mutuality.
First of all, Wilson v Creihton27. The action was brought by the assignees of a
bankrupt underwriter. The defendant was an insurance agent and the point of the
action related to premiums. On his part, the defendant tried to set-off losses and
28premiums. It is important to mention that the defendant had not acted del credere , 
but as a usual agent acting for his foreign principals. It was held by the court that set­
off could not be established, because simply there was no mutuality29. On the other 
hand, in Grove v Dubois 30 the facts were quite similar. The only difference was that 
the agent acted del credere, but this seemed enough for the defendant to be entitled to 
set-off under a mutual credit clause. It must be said at this point that a right of set-off 
can exist also in respect of premiums.
3.2.7 Conclusion
This is the position as it was established in very old and authoritative cases. 
But as I said above, the situation is not the same any more. After discussions between 
Lloyd’s and Lloyd’s Insurance Brokers Committee, it was decided that after 31st of 
August 1996, underwriters would not hold brokers responsible for premiums, when 
the assured is at fault. There are some requirements that need to be fulfilled in order 
for the brokers not to be held liable. These requirements were the result of 
discussions. One of the aims was actually to try and change the position as it was until 
this agreement, but at the same time without interfering with the provisions of the
26 O’Neill P.T & J.W. Woloniecki. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell. Paragraphs 11- 
54-11.72.
27 3 Dougl. 132.
28 An agent acting del credere is when he agrees to protect his principal against the other party’s 
insolvency.
29 For more details see judgment.
30 (1786) 1 T.R. 112.
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Marine Insurance Act 1906. A Code of Conduct had to be established. This Code 
was based on the following principles: (1) Brokers and underwriters should not 
knowingly do business with clients likely to default (2) Brokers should inform the 
leading underwriter without delay when knowledge of a likely default is known. (3) 
Brokers should make any endeavour to collect the monies owing and pass them to 
underwriters without delay. Underwriters to be supportive of these endeavours”31. 
These principles are very significant in order for this agreement to work properly. 
However, there were also some undertakings, which had to be combined with above 
principles. These were (1) Underwriters acknowledge and accede to the terms and 
intent o f David Rowland -  the President -  letter o f 31st July 1996. (2) The brokers 
acknowledge section 53(1) o f the Marine Insurance Act 1906 where insurance 
policies are governed by English law, but no broker will be held liable for premium 
unless it is evidenced that the broker has been in breach of any the three broad 
principles. (3) I f  a broker has been in breach of the three broad principles and the 
insurance policy is governed by English law, underwriters have the option to invoke 
section 53(1) o f the Marine Insurance Act 1906, in respect o f that insurance. (4) A 
small panel o f one underwriter, one broker and an independent chairman (none of 
whom shall be party to the insurance concerned) shall adjudicate on compliance 
with the three broad principles. (5) In the event of any of the foregoing imposes on 
a broker obligations which conflict with his duties of agency to the assured, 
underwriters acknowledge that those duties of agency shall prevail31.
This is the theoretical basis for the new agreement. The main question now is 
how the insurance market will react to this change of rules.
31 Lloyd’s Insurance Broker’s Committee. LIBC No. 69/97.
32 Ibid.
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3.3 Liens
3.3.1 Introduction
A very important part of an insurance broker’s rights is his entitlement to a 
lien. This is actually reflected in section 53(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906: 
“unless otherwise agreed, the broker has, as against the assured, a lien upon the 
policy fo r  the amount o f the premium and his charges in respect o f  effecting the 
policy; and where he has dealt with the person who employs him as a principal, he 
has also a lien on the policy in respect o f  any balance due on any insurance account 
which may be due to him from such person, unless when the debt was incurred, he 
had reason to believe that such person was only an agent” l. This lien is general. 
There are some circumstances, under which this may change, but I am going to refer 
to them further down. First of all, I will try to summarise the background of Hens 
generally, in order to ascertain and clarify the position of brokers in relation to them. 
The thing that needs to be said is that insurance brokers are not the only ones, who are 
entitled to a lien. There are also other persons that are related to the marine industry 
and they have a right to make claims, which are secured by a lien. These people range 
from, for example the crew of a vessel to the person who simply repairs a ship.
3.3.2 Types o f Liens
A lien is nothing more than a type of legal security. And it is something, which 
is created not by agreement between the parties but by operation of law. As a starting 
point, we need to say that there are several types of liens 2. The first type of liens is a 
possesory legal lien 3. It is thought actually to be the most important class of all. 
What must be noted here is that possession is a very vital factor for a legal lien to be 
constituted. An example where a legal lien is created is by stockbrokers or bankers. 
There is also a non-possessory lien 4. This can exist in equity, by statute or under a 
court order. Examples of this kind of lien are that of a trustee on a trust estate or that
1 Ivamy E.R. Hardy. (1966). Chalmers’ Marine Insurance Act 1906. Butterworths, London. 6* edition. 
Pages 70-71.
2 Halsbury’s law’s of England. (1983) Volume 28: Liens.^ edition. / Goode Roy, (1995), Commercial 
Law. Penguin Books. 2nd edition. Pages 668-670.
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
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of a solicitor as a security for his costs. The difference between the two is that in the 
latter one possession is not essential, although the right that is conferred is analogous 
to that of a legal lien. The third type of lien is an equitable lien 5. It operates by law 
and not by contract. By its nature it can be exercised over both personal and real 
property but it is inapplicable to a contract of sale of goods. Next one is the 
statutory lien. This simply arises by statute and an example is that of an unpaid seller 
under the Sale of Goods 1979.Moving swiftly on, we have the contractual lien. The 
main thing that needs to be said about it is that it is very much influenced by the terms 
of its particular contract. And there is also another kind of lien, the subrogatory lien 
6. This takes place when there is a primary and secondary liability of two persons for 
the same debt. Finally we have the maritime liens 7. The effect of the maritime lien is 
that it remains attached to the property even if there is a change in the ownership. It 
does not as well depend on possession.
3.3.3 Brokers’ Liens
It is time now to move on and focus on insurance brokers’ liens. Generally, as 
I mentioned above, a broker enjoys a general legal lien. The only reason when this is 
not applied is when a broker discovers that he is a sub-agent 8. Under these 
circumstances, he will have a general hen until the moment of the discovery and a 
specific lien afterwards 9. The case in point is Near East Relief v King. Chasseur & 
Co. Ltd I0. I will summarise quite briefly the facts of the case. The plaintiffs were an 
American corporation, which were interested in a certain amount of money. This 
amount was the result of seven cases of goods shipped by them. The defendants 
effected a marine insurance policy as insurance brokers at the request of the Marine
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
7 For more details see: Hill Christopher. Maritime Law. (1998). Lloyd’s Practical Shipping Guides. 5th 
edition. Pages 121- 129.
8 Bennett Howard. (1996). The Law of Marine Insurance. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Page 102.
9 Ibid
10 (1930) 2 K.B. 40,46.
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and General Insurance Agency, acting on behalf of the plaintiffs, the Argonaut 
Marine Insurance Company. The claim from the plaintiffs was that the defendants 
effected the insurance on their behalf and as a result, it was their property. On the 
other hand, the defendants based their claim on the argument that they had a lien on 
the policy in relation to the premiums that were owing to them. Wright J. was quite 
analytical in his reasoning for the decision. The first point he focused on was the fact 
that in respect of a particular lien that could arise for a certain amount of money -  
41.9s. -, the claim could not be established, because the debt has been paid off. The 
precedent for this conclusion was in the case of Levy v Barnard n , in which 
payments had been made and although there was no appropriation, a running account 
was considered to have been paid off. However, the main issue was “whether or not 
there is a general lien o f which the defendants can avail themselves against the 
plaintiffs? ” 12. The question is directly relevant to section 53(2) of the MIA 1906. It 
must be noted, that the language that is used in the statute is not very straightforward 
and as a result the crucial question is whether or not the brokers had reason to believe 
that their employers were only agents and not principals. In the case of Maans v 
Henderson 13, it was held that this question could be answered by inference. Anyway, 
in respect of that question and after the reviewing of the evidence, Wright J. decided 
that the Marine and General Insurance Agency were only agents and as a result the 
defendants were not entitled to a lien.
The second question deals with the fact that the defendants sent the insurance 
policy to the Argonaut Marine insurance Company, which after a couple of months 
returned the policy to them. According to the judge, this event makes it clear that the 
defendants were positive that the Marine and General Insurance Agency were agents 
and not principals. This argument was actually raised by the plaintiffs and was based 
on the general fact that “if after possession is parted with, before possession is 
resumed, the lien cannot revive i f  the person that claims his entitlement to a lien is 
aware that the person he is directly dealing with is only an agent ” 14. It can be 
inferred by that principle that when there is a sub-agent, if possession, which he 
voluntarily parted, returns to him again, he will not be entitled to a hen, if he knew
" (1818) 8 Taunt. 149,2 Moo. 34
12 (1930) 2 K.B. 40,46. Page 42.
13 (1801) 1 East 335.
14 (1930) 2 K.B. 40,46. Page 44.
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that his employer was an agent. Emphasis must be given to the fact that there is no 
express decision upholding that principle and reference is made only in Amould on 
Marine Insurance, 11th edition, section 134 and in Lew v Barnard 15. According to 
all these, it was held in our case that this was also an element for the defendants not to 
be entitled to a lien.
Finally, a last point was raised, as I mentioned above that the whole amount 
has already been paid off. The court also upheld this and it was held that the 
defendants did not have a lien.
The next case I will analyse is Fisher v Smith 16. This case is about the 
situation when the assured has an intermediate agent, who has failed to pay the 
broker. In the introductory part of the case it is mentioned that it is possible for a lien 
that a broker has to be superseded by a special arrangement or a particular contract. 
Fisher was a shipowner. Mr. Smith was an insurance broker who worked at Liverpool 
in connection with a Mr. Brand. On the other hand, Mr. Skinner and Co. of Barrow -  
in- Furness were employed by Fisher. So, in 1974 Fisher instructed Skinner to get for 
him insurance cover and this took place through Smith. The course of business was 
the following: Skinner always used an account in respect of charges, such as 
premiums and brokerage, and Fisher settled this account every month. Smith knew 
that Fisher was principal in this transaction, but when the loss occurred in respect of 
cargo on the vessel Eliza S. Milligan, Skinner could not comply with the demand of 
Fisher, because Smith had possession of the insurance policies. It must be noted here 
that Fisher had no idea about the arrangements between Skinner and Smith. So, he 
brought an action against the right of Smith to keep the policies. According to Lord 
Chancellor, these were three questions that had to be answered: (I) was there a lien in 
the Respondent from the nature o f the transactions? (2) Did any contract or course o f 
business inconsistent with it supersede that lien? (3) Was it discharged by any 
payment, which was a payment to the Respondent17?
In respect of the first question, he decided that there could be no serious doubt 
that a lien really could be claimed, because the Respondent was the person, who
15 (1818) 8 Taunt. 149, 2 Moo. 34.
16 (1878) 4 App. Cas. 1.
17 Ibid Page 5.
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effected the insurance policies and paid the premiums for them. The second question 
was certainly more complicated. As his Lordships concluded, the answer was a 
question of fact. Everything depended on the course of dealing. In a similar case a 
person who received payment at the end of every six months or at the end of every
1 ftyear for receiving goods was held not to have a lien . But, the circumstances m our 
case were quite different, since there was no necessity to deliver the policies 
immediately when they were effected, the court held that the lien could not be 
superseded. Thirdly, in relation to payments, again the lien could not be discharged, 
because their Lordships agreed that it was impossible for the appellant to find out that 
Skinner were the agents of the Respondent. If Skinner had not paid the premium 
because of fraud on his part, the situation would be different. No imputation of 
knowledge would be established because of the fact that Fisher knew nothing about 
the arrangements between Skinner and Smith and Skinner would be guilty of fraud.
I will refer now to a quite more recent case where section 53(2) and the exact
rights that it confers to those who claim under it are being examined, Eide U.K v
Lowndes Lambert 19. The facts of the case are as follows. The first plaintiffs were
actually the owners of the vessel in question- the Sun Tender- and the second
plaintiffs were the bank where the vessel was mortgaged. This vessel was chartered to
Colne Standby Ltd. for whom the defendant brokers had obtained two hull and
machinery policies for a period of twelve months. The charter-party provided that
“during the charter period the vessel shall be kept insured by the charterers at their
expense ...insurances shall be arranged by charterers to protect the interests o f both
the Owners and the Charterers and mortgagees (if any)...All insurances shall be in
20the joint names o f the Owners and the Charterers as their interests may appear ” .
Something else that needs to be mentioned is that this was a demise charter, which 
meant that the charterer had frill possession and control of the ship. As a result of the 
negotiations, the Sun Tender had been added to the policies and a month later there 
was an assignment by the owners of their interests to the bank. After a few months, 
the vessel had sustained damage and there were claims by both Colne Standby and the 
bank as an assignee of the owners in respect of this damage. The broker collected 
from the underwriters a sum of money in respect of the insurance policy but Colne
18 Crawshay v Hompray 4 Band A. 50.
19 (1998) 1 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 389.
20 Ibid Page 389.
Standby owed to the brokers a large sum of money, which was related to other 
insurance policies. Relying on section 53(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the
brokers argued that they were entitled to a general lien because of the amount owed to 
them. Hence, the main issue for decision was whether the brokers were entitled to 
retain the claims proceeds as part satisfaction of Colne Standby’s liabilities under the 
insurance account. It was held by the court of first instance that the right to Hen under 
section 53(2) applied only to the policy itself and not generally. Another aspect of the 
decision was that the right of the brokers to use claims proceeds arose by virtue of the 
principles of set-off and not by statute and also the brokers could not exercise a lien 
against one co-assured for the Habihty of another. There was however an appeal by 
the brokers. The Court of Appeal decided that the brokers were entitled to retain the 
claims proceeds as a result of their lien as long as far as it was necessary to secure the 
debt under the lien. According to the court, the meaning of section 53(2) was simply 
to create a type of security under which somebody could retain possession of physical 
property until the debt to him is paid. If the decision of the judge would be considered 
as correct, this would destroy the security afforded by a lien. It was also held that 
section 53(2) did not apply to composite insurance and that no one can create a Hen 
beyond his own interests. The appeal was allowed although it was submitted that the 
brokers were not entitled to proceeds collected by the bank just because Colne 
Standby owed to them under other insurance policies. This would be contrary to 
principle and it could not be supported by authority21. It would be interesting to look 
at the exact words of Lord Justice Phillips: “where as is usual a broker collects under 
the policy which is procured for the assured the broker will normally have a right to 
set o ff moneys received for a particular assured against any indebtedness o f the 
assured. To this extent, i f  earlier market practice or contractual agreement places the 
broker in a position to insist on collecting under a policy, the broker will enjoy a 
degree o f security. This case demonstrates, however, that in a case o f composite 
insurance such security falls short o f that which would be provided by a general lien 
over policy and proceeds ” 22.
21 See: Eide U.K. v Lowndes Lambert (1998) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 389.
22 Ibid. Page 402. Per Lord Phillips.
3.3.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, it is submitted that the operation of a lien is interrelated with the 
duties and rights of brokers. Section 53(2) creates difficulties quite often and most of 
the times it is up to the courts to examine the course of dealing and business together
• • • • 23with other factors in order to ascertain whether or not a broker is entitled to a hen .
23 For a view of how entitlement to a lien for brokerage or marine insurance is confronted in the U.S 
see: Daingle Paul N. & Jerome C. Scowcroft. (1987). Payment for Services and Supplies Furnished in 
Maritime Commerce. Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 2, April.
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4.1 Introduction
The duties that are imposed upon insurance brokers are to a substantial extent 
those imposed by the law relating to agency. It is generally accepted that the broker acts 
as the agent of the assured. However, this does not mean that it is impossible for a broker 
to owe a duty of care to other parties. There can be circumstances where he acts as the 
agent of the insurer under a binding authority or where he even owes a duty of care to 
third parties.1 The other thing that needs to be mentioned is that the same principle 
applies to both reinsurance and original insurance. For example, the broker acts as the 
agent of the reinsurer when he operates in order to obtain a retrocession cover.
A case where it was held that a broker is primarily the agent of the assured is 
McNealv v Pennine Insurance Co. Ltd. 2.The facts of the case were as follows: the 
plaintiff was a property repairer and also a part-time musician. He decided to go to Italy 
together with a singer to join a band there and go for a six-week tour. Where insurance 
comes in is that he had a car and he wanted to place insurance cover, so that he travelled 
in it when he returned back. The problem was that when he had his insurance cover, there 
was an exclusion clause, which excluded quite a big class of persons. This class included 
part-time musicians, jockeys and journalists, press photographers and others. The broker, 
of course, who consulted the plaintiff, knew about all these categories but he did not 
inform the plaintiff. The reason for this was that when he asked about the plaintiff’s 
occupation, he answered simply “property repairer”. Hence, an accident happened when 
he returned home and the insured brought an action both against the insurance company 
and brokers. The claim was for damages in the car and for the injuries of the singer, who 
travelled with him. It was established that the broker was the agent of the assured. Lord 
Denning stated that no liability could be incurred by the insurance company because the 
broker is only the agent of the assured: “at the trial o f the case, it was accepted by both 
sides that the insurance company was not liable. The reason for their non-liability was 
because the broker is the agent o f the assured and the assured only” 3. The other
1 See below to this chapter.
2 (1978)2 Lloyd’s Rep. 18.
3 Ibid. Page 20, per Lord Denning.
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important aspect of the case related as to whether the insurance broker, in failing to 
disclose the existence of the exclusion clause which included part-time musicians, had 
used reasonable care and skill. In respect of that, Lord Denning said: “it is clearly the 
duty o f the broker to use all reasonable care to see that the assured, Mr. McNealy was 
properly covered...Iam afraid that the broker did not do his duty. He did not go through 
that list with Mr McNealy at all” 4. Lord Denning’s argument was that the broker should 
have asked the plaintiff about all these categories, which were excluded, in order to 
satisfy the requirement of reasonable care and skill 5. In the end the broker was held 
liable for the whole amount of the claim.
The rule that the broker is primarily the agent of the insured has its routes at 
common law. I will refer now to the case of Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v 
Boardman Insurance Brokers. 6. This is an Australian case and I will deal with its 
result as this was put by an Australian writer7. It must be mentioned at this point that the 
outcome of this case was quite important as to the balance of the Australian insurance 
market. The reason is that in the past decade, the Australian government had passed a 
number of statutes and regulations with the aim that the imbalance in the bargaining 
power between the insurer and the insured would be redressed 8. However, there was a 
tendency among international and domestic insurers that with the application of these 
regulations commercial reality was not followed and the balance was too far in favour of 
the insured 9. The facts of the case were the following. Metrot Pty Ltd. was the insured 
and through its broker -  John H. Boardman Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd. -  insured its 
Newcastle premises with Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd. When the existing policy 
was about to be renewed, the insurer sent a renewal notice to the broker, who forwarded 
it to the insured. The insured on his part agreed with the renewal and sent to the broker a 
cheque for the payment of the broker and the commission. So, the broker was properly 
paid, but afterwards he failed either to communicate the insured’s decision for renewal or
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 1 (1994) 120 ALR121.
7 Alroe Simon. Insurance Brokers. Agents. Australia. International Law Review 3 (3). 1995. Pages 98-99.
8 Ibid. Page 98.
9 Ibid.
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to forward the cheque for the premium to the insurer 10. This case dealt specifically with 
section 14(2) of the Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act 1984. This section provides 
that “payment to an insurance intermediary by or on behalf o f an intending insured o f 
moneys in respect o f a contract o f insurance to be arranged or effected by the 
intermediary, whether the payment is in respect o f a premium or otherwise, is a 
discharge, as between the insured and the insurer, o f any liability o f the insured under or 
in respect o f the contract, to the extent o f the amount o f the payment” n . In the court of 
first instance the argument of the insured was actually upheld. It was held that section 14 
(2) of the Act should be interpreted as to mean that that the payment of the premium to 
the broker gave effect to the renewal of the policy in question 12. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed with the interpretation given by the judge but the decision was again in favour 
of the insured. The reasoning was that there was a manifestation of an intention by the 
parties that acceptance could be effected by payment of premium to the broker. As a 
result the insurer appealed to the High Court of Australia. As a starting point the High 
Court observed that the broker is deemed to be the agent of the insured and not of the 
insurer. This can change under two special circumstances. Namely, where there is an 
express agency agreement like a binder between the parties or when there is really a 
manifestation of intention as stated above 13. It was beyond doubt that there was no 
binder in effect. As to the second aspect, the majority of the court decided that the policy 
was impossible to be renewed without express notification to the insurer. Since, the 
payment of the premium was never done to the insurer; the renewal of the policy never 
came into effect, so no actual contract came into existence. The result of all these was 
that no liability could be discharged under section 14(2) if no contract was concluded. On 
the other hand, the minority of the court took a much narrower approach and held that 
renewal was effected through payment of the premium to the broker14. The practical 
significance, according to the writer was that there must be, as a result of that decision, an 
encouragement of the insurers, who believe that legislation imposes such a heavy burden
10 Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v Birdman Insurance Brokers. 1 (1994) 120 ALR 121.
11 Alroe Simon. Insurance Brokers. Agents. Australia. International Law Review 3 (3). 1995. Page 98.
12 Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v Birdman Insurance Brokers. 1 (1994) 120 ALR 121.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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on them, because it seems like there are circumstances where courts will not adopt a 
narrow approach, which seems to follow the purpose of legislation, if this is not 
upholding commercial fairness and reality 15.
4.2 Avoidance o f Conflicts o f Interest
The duties that a broker owes to the assured include also a duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest. A case, which deals with this, is Anglo African Merchants Ltd. v Bavlev 16. 
The case was about a quantity of 20-year old army leather jerkins. The intention of the 
plaintiffs was to insure these clothes against “all risks”. An important part of the case was 
that the plaintiffs -  the insured - did not mention that the jerkins were 20 years old and 
that they were to be used for army purposes. They described them simply as new and 
they submitted that they were the government’s property. Part of them was lost from the 
warehouse storage and as result an action was brought. The underwriters actually denied 
liability on the ground that there was a material non-disclosure. The argument on behalf 
of the plaintiffs was that there was a waiver of more information about the exact nature of 
the goods. The decision of the court in respect of these two arguments was: (1) “that the 
use o f the word new did not, on the evidence, amount to a misdescription o f the clothing, 
but the fact that it was 20 years old was a material fact and since they had not been 
disclosed the underwriters were entitled to disclaim liability. (2) The failure to make 
further inquiry as to the precise nature o f the goods did not give the plaintiffs ground for 
a successful plea o f waiver” 17. But these were not the only issues of the case. The 
questions that arose in relation with the rights and the duties of the brokers came up 
because of the following fact: the brokers during the case had shown crucial information 
to underwriters and also had obtained a report, because the underwriters asked to do so. 
The problem was that when the assured asked him to have a look and inspect these 
documents the brokers refused. Hence, it was argued that the brokers did not have the 
right to do this. The decision of the court was the following. “An agent who has accepted 
employment from one principal cannot in law accept any engagement inconsistent with
15 Allure Simon. Insurance Brokers Agents Australia. International Law Review 3 (3). 1995. Page 99.
16 (1970) 1 Q.B311.
17 Ibid. Page 311-312.
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his duty to the first principal, unless he makes the fullest disclosure o f all he material
18facts to both principals and obtains their informed consent to his so acting” . Hence,
the behaviour of the brokers was proved to be wholly unjustifiable. It derives from all 
that that the vital concept is that of consent.
4 3  Inspection o f documents
A case, which was related to that, is North and South Trust Co. v Berkeley 19. 
The Lloyd’s brokers in question acted for the plaintiffs, in respect of the transit of goods, 
which was arranged by Lloyd’s underwriters. However, the quantity of goods was quite 
short, when the cargo arrived and as a result there was a claim by the plaintiffs against the 
underwriters. One member of the underwriters’ syndicate, who was the actual defendant 
in order to avoid liability, asked the brokers to obtain an assessor’s report. This was done 
but this report was never shown to the plaintiffs. Also, when the plaintiff asked the 
brokers to inspect the report and other relevant documents they refused. Their argument 
was that when obtaining the report, they acted as agents of the underwriter, therefore, the 
plaintiffs did not have a right to look at the documents. The underwriters denied liability 
under the insurance policy. The result was that an action was brought against the member 
of the syndicate of the underwriters both in a personal basis and in a representative way, 
in order to include the other members in the action and against the brokers submitting 
that they were entitled to the possession and the inspection of the documents. Moreover, 
an action was brought against the insurance brokers and by the defendants in order for an 
injunction to be granted. The result would be that the brokers would be restrained from 
delivering the documents 20. The decision of the court was that “although the practice o f 
Lloyd’s underwriters to use Lloyd’s insurance brokers, who placed business with 
them... was a practice which was wholly unreasonable and incapable o f being a legal 
usage or custom, nevertheless, since the insurance brokers, in acting for the defendant, 
had not acted in the discharge o f their duty towards the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were not 
entitled to possession and inspection o f the documents, which the insurance brokers had
Ibid.
19 (1971)1 W.L.R470.
20 Ibid. Pages 470-471.
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obtained in a confidential capacity” 21. But, part of the judgement and the reasoning of 
the court was dedicated to the matter of consent: “fully informed consent apart, an agent
cannot lawfully place himself in a position in which he owes a duty to another, which is
22inconsistent with his duty to this principal ” .
Moving on to another case I am going to mention Kelly v Cooper 23. This case 
concerned a firm of estate agents. The facts of the case are mentioned in the chapter 
dealing with dual capacity of brokers, so, I will mention here only what was the basic 
issue for the court and what was the outcome. The action was brought by the plaintiff 
against his estate agents for breach of their duty towards him, because they did not inform 
that the buyer who bought his house has made actually a double offer to buy the adjacent 
premises at the same time. In the court of first instance, it was held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to an amount of damages and that the estate agents could not get their 
commission. On appeal, it was decided that the appeal should be allowed and the 
commission was lawful 24. Finally, the Judicial Committee held that “since it was the 
business o f estate agents to act for numerous principals, several o f whom might be 
competing and whose interests would conflict...and since the plaintiffs knew that the 
defendants would be acting for other vendors o f comparable properties and would 
receive confidential information from them...the defendants were not in breach o f their 
duty in failing to inform the plaintiff o f the agreement to buy the adjacent house ”25. But, 
how was the North and South case 26 dealt with? It was said by the court that the 
principle which was recognised in the above case was that “an agent for principal A who 
has chosen to act for principal B on whose behalf he acquires information cannot be 
forced to divulge such information to principal A but can be held liable to principal A for 
breach o f duty” 21. Then, the judge continued by saying that everything depends on the 
type of the contract between the principal and the agent. For example, the terms of the
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid
23 (1993) A.C 205.
24 Ibid
25 Ibid Page 206.
26 (1971) 1 W.L.R470.
21 Ibid Pages 213-214.
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contract must be different between those who deal with general agency business and 
those who do something more specific28.
Finally, I am going to refer to one more recent case, which dealt with inspection 
of documents. The case is FAI General Insurance Company v Godfrey. 21/12/98. 
(Unreported) 29. FAI General Insurance Company Limited made an application to 
inspect copies and take copies of a number of documents, which were referred in an open 
court at a trial to which FAI was not a party. Despite this, they were really interested in 
these documents and the reason was the following. They were defendants in action 
brought by Ocean Marine Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association and Ocean Marine 
Mutual Association Europe OV -  OMM- in respect of reinsurance contracts, which were 
concluded in 1993, 1994 and 1995. In that case, FAI tried to avoid liability on the ground 
of non-disclosure and misrepresentation. The contracts were concluded actually through a 
chain of brokers in London and Australia. The common thing with the trial from which 
they asked for the inspection and the copying of the documents was that the chain of 
brokers was the same. In this trial the situation was that an Australian reinsurer, GIO, 
tried to avoid reinsurance contracts where the reinsurer was Liverpool & London 
Steamship Protection and Indemnity Association -  Liverpool & London. There was a 
settlement between these parties before the trial and London & Liverpool also tried to 
settle against the Third Party -  GMR -. So, in the present action the plaintiff was GMR 
and an action was brought against sub-brokers Chapman & Co and GAK Re. As the trial 
proceeded, GMR and GAK Re settled and proceedings continued only against Chapman 
& Co who did not appear. On their part, FAI, before the opening of the proceedings, 
asked GMR for the copies of (a) the skeleton arguments lodged by counsel, (b) the trial 
bundles and (c) daily transcripts as they become available 30. FAI tried to uphold their 
application on the basis that they were “a member of the public” and they needed the 
documents in order to follow the case. Walker J. rejected the application because he 
submitted that the motive of FAI was completely different from that mentioned in the 
application. It must be noted that the application was done pursuant to RSC Order Rule
28 Ibid.
29 http://www.casetrack.com.
30 FAI General Insurance Company v Godfrey. 21/12/98. (Unreported). Page 1. Per Lord Justice Potter.
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38 2A(12)31. On appeal, FAI made an application to inspect only documents referred to 
witness statements and any written opening skeleton argument or submissions. As to the 
first ones access was denied. The reason was paragraph (11) of Rule 2 A, which states that 
access must be denied unless there is consent by the party serving it, by the leave of the 
court or lastly if it has been put on evidence. None of the above applied in this case 32. As 
to the second ones, the appeal was allowed. It was found by Lord Justice Potter that the 
judge of the court of first instance was wrong in declining FAI access to them on the 
ground that “the appropriate judicial approach to an application o f this kind in a 
complicated case is to regard any member o f the public who for legitimate reasons 
applies for a copy o f counsel’s written opening or skeleton argument, when it has been
y y  33accepted by the judge in lieu o f an oral opening, as prima facie entitled to it” .
4.4 Duty of Care of the Broker towards the Assured and Other Parties
I will firstly refer to the reinsurance case of the Zephyr. General Accident Fire 
and Life Assurance Corporation and Others, Peter William Tanter and Other 34.
This case is very significant in respect of a lot of topics. Again, I have referred to its facts 
in a very detailed way in the chapter, which deals with the liability of insurance brokers. 
So, now I will only make a summary of them. The whole matter was about the insurance 
of a vessel called Zephyr. The problem was that a broker gave a signing indication, which 
-proved to be completely wrong and also the reinsurance contract was placed before the 
original insurance. The claim that arose was whether the broker was liable for a breach of 
a duty of care and what was the exact legal effect of signing indication. The whole aspect 
of the case was a possible tortious or contractual liability. At this point, I will deal only 
with the position of brokers in relation to their potential principals: they are considered to 
be the agents of the reinsured and not of the reinsurer. As it was mentioned in the Zephyr 
case: “it was held that the broker was the agent o f the reinsured, not the reinsuring 
insurance company... all risks underwriters and total loss underwriters... it is in my view
31 Supreme Court Practice 1999. Vol. 1. Paragraph 38/2A/8.
32 FAI General Insurance Company v Godfrey. 21/12/98. Page 5. Per Lord Justice Porter.
33 Ibid. Page 13. Per Lord Justice Porter.
34 (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 58.
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very impractical and mistaken that with regard to a single reinsurance slip he was acting 
partly as the contracting agent o f the reassured and partly as the contracting agent o f the 
reinsurer. He is the contracting agent only o f the reassured” 35.
Of course the above principles do not mean that this is always the case. There 
may be circumstances under which the brokers owe a duty of care to other parties of a 
certain transaction other than the assured. An example is the case of Punjab National 
Bank v de Boinville 36. Again, the facts are mentioned in the chapter of liability, so, I will 
try to focus on the parts of the judgement which deal with the topic of where the agent 
owes a duty of care. Actually, what happened is that four insurance policies had been 
carried out in respect of gas oil. The insurance brokers, who were involved changed firm 
during the transaction. Also, some other important changes were incorporated into the 
policies. The case was quite complicated and quite a few issues were resolved as 
preliminaiy issues. It was decided that “it was a justifiable increment to an existing 
category to hold that an insurance broker owed a duty o f care to a specific person, not 
being a client, who he knew was to become an assignee o f an insurance policy, at least 
where to the broker's knowledge, that person had actively participated in giving 
instructions for the insurance” 37. It must be noted that everything depends on the 
circumstances. It does not mean that insurance brokers always owe a duty of care to third 
parties; everything starts from the relationship between the broker and the third party. 
This is shown in the case of MacMillan v A.W Knott Becker Scott Ltd. 38. The facts 
were as follows. Knott Becker Scott were insurance brokers at Lloyd’s but they were in 
liquidation. There were certain allegations that they were negligent towards quite a few of 
their clients, but the problem was that since they were liquidated, it was impossible for 
them to discharge their liabilities. The solution for the claimants and a syndicate that was 
involved was to claim under the Errors and Omissions Insurance. This insurance cover 
was obtained by another firm called Nelson Hirst and March Ltd. (NHM). These were 
also defendants in the claim. The insurers that undertook that E and O insurance denied 
liability on the basis that the insurance was invalid and that the notifiction of the claim
35 Ibid.
36 (1992) 1 W.L.R 1138.
37 Ibid. Page 1139.
38 (1990) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 98.
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was too late. The issue that arose was: whether the E and O brokers (NHM) were 
liable for their negligence not only to their clients, the insured brokers, but also 
towards the clients of the insured brokers (KBS) and other persons (Syndicate 420) 
to whom the insured brokers were liable for their own negligence 39. The claim on 
behalf of the claimants had to do with the fact that that they could recover loss, because it 
was foreseeable and logical to happen, as a result of the broker’s negligence. The 
decision had three parts. (1) The first part had to do with what is the purpose of an E and 
O insurance. Hence, the purpose is to indemnify the broker against his liability for 
claims, which are like the plaintiffs claim. (2) According to the second part, an E and O 
insurance policy actually protects the claimants in case where the broker is financially 
unsound and the necessary degree of proximity is established. (3) Finally, the third part of 
the decision was about the relationship between the defendant broker and their client. The 
court held that the liquidator represented their client now and there was a contractual 
relationship between the brokers and the liquidator, while there was no element of 
liability towards the plaintiffs. It must be understood that the real basis for the decision 
was the doctrine of privity of contract, because tortious liability could not overcome 
privity of contract. The plaintiffs could not be allowed to have a direct claim in tort40.
4.5 Duty of the broker to obtain cover.
A broker must, according to his duties, undertake the obligation to obtain cover. 
This undertaking is important as to the fact to understand the nature of the duty of a 
broker. A case, which deals with this point, is Hood v West End Motor Packing Co.41. 
This case involved a car, which was carried on a ship. According to the bill of lading, the 
car was carried on shipper’s risk. Also, it was carried on the deck. However, this was not 
notified to the underwriters. They learned it only after the loss had occurred. It was 
submitted that if the underwriters knew about it, the cargo might have been insured but 
certainly with an unusual high premium. It was held that the assured was not protected,
39 Ibid. Page 98.
40 Ibid.
41 (1917)2 K.B 38.
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because “it was an implied term that notice should be given to the underwriters within a 
reasonable time after the assured knew that the car was being carried on the deck; that 
such notice was not given; and that, therefore, the risk was not covered by the policy ” 42. 
It is obvious that no proper cover was obtained by the broker. Of course, the court 
recognised that an undertaking to obtain cover was recognised on the part of the broker. 
This duty is really so important that it is considered to be the broker’s primary function. It 
was analysed in the case of Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd. V National 
Westminster Finance Australia Ltd. 43. According to this analysis “their duty was to 
use all reasonable care and skill in seeking to obtain the cover in London which had been 
sought by their principals, and if  for any reason, notwithstanding that they had used that 
reasonable care and skill, their efforts failed, it was then their further duty to report their 
failure, and if necessary, to seek further instructions. But they did not undertake that 
cover would be procured” 44. It is obvious from the above definition that that a broker 
must use his reasonable care and skill in order to fulfil his duty of care. The degree of 
care that is owed is generally thought to be that of an average competent broker. In 
section 13 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 provides that “the supplier 
will carry out a service with reasonable care and skill” 46. Of course, the content of this 
provision is not specifically directed to the obligations and duties of the brokers but it 
shows what is usually the standard of care that is required by a professional 45. Another 
way of putting the matter is that the degree of which is expected is the specialist 
knowledge that a broker has in respect of a particular risk. The case that needs to be 
mentioned is Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance p.l.c (the Moonacre) 47. The facts of the 
case are analysed in the part where I am talking about the effectiveness of exclusion 
clauses. However, in a part of a judgement brief reference was made to the degree of care 
that is required by a broker. It was decided there that “...it is rather the standard o f the 
broker who has general knowledge o f the yacht insurance market and the cover available
42 Ibid. Page 38.
43 (1985) 58 A.L.R 165.
44 O’Neil P.T & Woloniecki J.W.(1998). The law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell, 1st edition. Page 
381.
45 For more details see: Davies Iwan. Sale and Supply of Goods. Pearson Professional Limited. 1996.2nd 
edition. Page 67.
46 Bolam v Frien Barnet Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 W.L.R. 582.
47 (1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 501.
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in it as to be able to advise his client on all matters on which a lay client would in the 
ordinary course o f events need advice, in particular in the course o f the selection o f the 
market and the completion o f the proposal” 48. This statement generally shows what the 
market most of the times expects from a broker.
4.6 Ambiguous Terms
The next issue I am going to deal with is that of “ambiguous terms”. This as it is 
logical makes the job of a broker more difficult, because there is always a possibility that 
although the broker will use his best endeavours to obtain the appropriate cover, his client 
will not explain to him the exact kind of cover he needs. In that case, the general rule is 
that he is more or less free from liability. A case where a broker used his best endeavours 
is United Mills Agencies Ltd. v Harvey, Bray and Co. 49. There, the insured were the 
plaintiffs in the action and the defendants were the insurance brokers. The brokers 
obtained an insurance cover in respect of the insured’s goods. It must be noted that there 
was no clause at all to provide for the attachment of any risk, while the goods were out at 
packers. Part of the goods was destroyed by fire while they were at packers. The 
insured’s allegation was that “the brokers were negligent in failing to effect an insurance 
o f the goods while at packers when so instructed, or, alternatively in failing to advise the 
insured that the insurance cover goods in the hands o f packers at insured’s risk after 
having clear notice that the insured had goods in that situation ” 50. The other argument 
that they used was that “the brokers were negligent in that they delayed in sending them 
a copy o f the cover for some days after the insurance had been placed, thereby, depriving 
the insured o f the opportunity o f examining it and seeing whether it complied with their 
requirements” 51.
On behalf of the brokers, it was submitted that “if the cover note had been sent in 
due time, they would have had the opportunity o f ascertaining that it did not cover the
48 Ibid. Page 523.
49 (1952) 1 All.E.R225n.
50 Ibid. Page 225.
51 Ibid.
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goods in circumstances that existed” 52. The reason that this argument was used was 
because perhaps they would be able, if this fact was notified, to examine if the 
appropriate cover was obtained. The court held “that the insurance brokers had no 
knowledge that the goods...were uninsured and that they were not negligent in not 
insuring them or in not informing the insured that they had not so insured them ” 53. The 
basis for the decision was that a duty on the part of the broker existed to notify legal 
information about the cover, but legal liability could not be involved. It can be a factor, 
which can show the practice of a prudent broker but nothing more than that.
One of the basic rights that the broker has in respect of all that is that he can ask 
his assured for clarification if he notices any kind of ambiguity. In the case of European 
Asian Bank v Punjab and Sind Bank (No 2 )54 this was the main point. The example of 
a banker who has received strange instructions was used in this case. He could either 
follow them or ignore them but always at his own risk. In relation with agency 
agreements, it was submitted that “it is understandable that he should expect to act under 
those instructions without more; but if for example, the ambiguity is patent on the face o f 
the document it may well be right to have his instructions clarified by his principal if  time 
permits, before acting upon them ” 55.
I am going to make a reference to reinsurance. The principles that are applied are 
essentially the same. The only thing that changes is that sometimes a broker may have 
some additional duties in respect of the placement of the reinsurance. Most of the times, 
the position is that a broker may have to effect reinsurance that will have exactly the 
same terms at the original insurance. However, this is not always the case. When the 
courts have to deal with clauses, which simply do not make sense, the approach that is 
usually followed is to try to figure out what is the commercial purpose of the reinsurance. 
This is the reason why sometimes terms have not been held not to have a legal effect at 
all. However, when a broker undertakes to arrange a back-to-back cover in the same 
terms as the original insurance- if he fails to do so, then, it is almost certain that he will 
be in breach of a duty of care to his principal.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 (1983) 1 W.L.R 642
55 Ibid
Duties o f Insurance Brokers 58 Christos Tsibourakis
In Icarom Pic, v Peek Puckle (International) Ltd. 56, a broker was asked to 
place reinsurance after the loss had occurred. According to the court, this reason was 
enough in order to decide that the broker could not be held liable. Another possibility is 
that the broker may undertake to place reinsurance in any event. This undertaking means 
that, whatever the circumstances, he has put himself in the position to find the appropriate 
cover. This, as it is logical, imposes quite a heavy burden upon the broker. This was 
examined in the Zephyr case to which I have referred several times. It was held that in 
respect of that, since the broker had undertaken such an obligation, he is under a duty to 
obtain the appropriate cover57. Finally, I am going to refer to the case of Youell v Bland 
Welch and Co, Ltd. (No 2) 58. Again, this case is mentioned in a detailed way in the 
liability chapter, so, I will try to focus on the points that are related to the duties of a 
broker. The policy contained a 48-months clause, which meant that any cover in respect 
of the vessel was terminated 48 months after its construction. It was submitted that no 
prudent insurer would have agreed to the insurance if they knew about the existence of 
the clause. It was held in the end that the broker were in breach of their duty for failing to 
inform the insurers about the exact cover and failed to take any reasonable precautions 
after the 48 months had expired 59. The reasoning of the judge was that the brokers 
should have been proactive when obtaining the cover, so a duty of care was recognised 
on the part of the brokers. The other thing that was said about the duties of the brokers 
was that they were not absolute duties: “the general duty will normally require a broker 
to perform a number o f different activities on behalf o f the client, but the performance o f 
those activities constitutes no more than discharge o f the duty to exercise reasonable 
care and skill. Failure to perform one o f the activities will normally constitute a breach 
o f that duty o f care, not a breach o f absolute obligations ”60.
56 (1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 600.
57 The Zephyr, General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation and Others, Peter William Tanter 
and Other, (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 58.
58 (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 431.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. Page 458.
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4.7 The broker’s duty to investigate the risk and advise upon the cover.
This duty is equally important to that of obtaining the cover. It has a lot of 
similarities as well, since again the exercise of reasonable care and skill is required. The 
first case I am going to refer to is a Canadian one. Hence, in Fine’s Flowers Ltd. v 
General Accident Assurance of Canada 61, a distinction was made between the duty of 
the broker to obtain a specific cover, when his instructions are putting him in that position 
and the situation where he just has to exercise his general degree of a duty of care: “in 
many instances, an insurance agent will be asked to obtain a specific cover o f coverage 
and his duty in those circumstances will be to use a reasonable degree o f care and skill in 
doing so...where the client gives no such specific instructions but rather relies on his 
agent...then he cannot afterwards when an uninsured loss arises, shrug off the 
responsibility he has assumed” 62. So, according to this case, whether a broker is under a 
duty to advise his principal and figure out whether the risk is high or not, depends on the 
circumstances of each case and the instructions that he has received.
In Mitor Investments Pty Ltd. v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
ATCorp. Ltd. , an Australian case, the plaintiff invited on his premises an insurance 
broker and asked him to arrange an insurance cover. Actually, the plaintiff owned a hotel 
that was adjoining the sea. The cover that was obtained by the broker was a common 
form policy that excluded “damage caused directly or indirectly by the sea”. Damage 
occurred when because of a cyclone seawater entered the premises. As a result, the owner 
sued the broker on the ground that he could not rely on his insurance cover. It was held 
that the broker was liable “because the exclusion contained therein introduced a 
qualification to the cover inconsistent with the instructions given ” 64. And secondly, “a 
broker who is brought on site to assess the risks and to advice his client upon appropriate 
cover must...take reasonable care in assessing the particular risks to which the property
61 (1977) 81 D.L.R (3d) 139.
62 Ibid. Page 149. Per Wilson J.A.
63 (1984) W.A.R 365.
64 Ibid. Page 374.
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to be covered was exposed” 65. It is obvious from the above that the fret that the broker 
went to see the premises increased the extent of his obligations. Perhaps if the cover was 
arranged without seeing the premises, the result would be different.
The next case I am going to refer to is really very significant and has application 
in quite a few aspects that are related with the operation of insurance broking: Aneco 
Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd (in liquidation) v Johnson & Higgins Ltd. 30/7/1999. 
(TJnreported)66. The reason why I have put this case primarily under this heading was 
that the negligent advice given by the brokers in the first place was the reason that all the 
issues were raised. It is true that large sums of money were really involved in this case. I 
am going to deal in detail with the decision of the Court of Appeal. In the Court of first 
instance, there was a judgement for the plaintiffs -  the insured - for a sum of around 
U.S.$ 10.000.0 00 with interest. On appeal, they made a claim of around $30,000,000. 
This very large amount actually reflected the losses that the appellants had suffered 
because of entering in a reinsurance contract with a syndicate of Lloyd’s underwriters 
known as Bullen Syndicate. One of the vital facts of the case is that the appellants had 
entered into the reinsurance contracts with the Bullen Syndicate on the basis that the 
respondents would obtain reinsurance for the liabilities undertaken by them as reinsurers 
under the treaty. This kind of cover is what is called retrocession, which simply means 
further insurance of reinsured risks. And the type is known as “excess of loss on excess 
of loss”- XL on XL-. The underwriters had the right to avoid the policies, according to 
the arbitration tribunal. But, on appeal the major issue was, as I said above, the amount of 
damages. The submission of the respondents was that the amount of damages would be 
the value of the cover when the cover was avoided. On the other hand, the appellants’ 
argument was that the reinsurance that they were looking for was not available in the 
London insurance market, so, if there was full disclosure about the implications of 
entering the Bullen treaty, they would decline to enter it. As a result, according to the 
argument, the respondents were entitled, as I already mentioned above, to the whole loss 
suffered by them 61. The Court of Appeal said that the risk was impossible to be
65 Ibid.
66 http://www.casetrack.com.
67 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd (in liquidation) v Johnson & Higgins Ltd. 30/7/1999. (Unreported). 
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reinsured. It will be very interesting at this point to look at the law, which was applied to 
the case. One of the most important cases cited by the court was Banque Brusselles S.A. 
v Eagle Star Co. 68. The correct measure of damages was the main point for decision. 
The first thing that was mentioned in the Court of Appeal was that there was a different 
test applied in case of negligence and a different one in case of fraud. When there is 
negligence, the damages are restricted not only by remoteness but also by the meaning of 
legal cause. What this means is that compensation must be awarded on the basis of the 
loss effectively caused by the breach. Also, considerations of common sense are taken 
into account. When fraud, on the other hand, exists, the fraudulent person is liable for all 
the loss directly caused by the fraudulent conduct 69. In the House of Lords, a slightly 
different approach was followed. It was held that for damages to be awarded, it should be 
that a duty existed “in respect o f a kind o f loss in respect o f which a duty was owed” 70. 
Hence, the outcome of the case was that the defendant -  a valuer who had given a false 
valuation -  was not liable for consequences, which would have happened even if the 
advice given had been correct 71. The legal position arising out of this case as it was 
summarised by Lord Justice Evans was that “the fact that the claimant would not have 
entered into a contract, under which the loss has been suffered, if the information or 
advice he received from the defendant and acted upon had not been negligent, does not 
mean that the defendant is liable for the whole o f that loss. He is only liable for this part 
o f the loss, which is regarded as a consequence o f the information or advice being 
wrong. The link is only established if there is a sufficient factual connection between the 
loss in question and the wrongness o f the information or advice” 72. It is also worth 
noting a distinction that was drawn from Mr. Hunter who appeared for the appellants in 
the Aneco case. Thus “the principle stated distinguishes between a duty to provide 
information for the purpose o f enabling someone else to decide upon a course o f action 
and a duty to advise someone as to what course o f action he should take. I f  the duty is to 
advice whether or not a course o f action should be taken, the adviser must take




72 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd (in liquidation) v Johnson & Higgins Ltd. 30/7/1999. (Unreported). 
Page 7. Per Lord Justice Evans.
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reasonable care to consider all the potential consequences o f that cause o f action. I f  he is 
negligent, he will therefore be responsible for all the foreseeable loss, which is a 
consequence o f that course o f action having been taken. I f his duty is to supply 
information, he must take reasonable care to ensure that the information is correct and if  
he is negligent, will be responsible for all the foreseeable consequences o f the 
information being wrong” 73. I will make now a quite brief analysis to the lacts of the 
case where the above legal background was applied. As I said above the appellants -  
Aneco - were approached by a number of syndicates called Bullen to conclude a number 
of reinsurance contracts. This was done through a firm of brokers called J & H. In the 
decision of the court of first instance, J & H were not parties. The nature of the 
reinsurance contracts was facultative obligatory. This meant that Bullen could decide 
which risks to declare under the treaty and the appellants were bound to accept them, if 
they were within the limits. It must be said that this kind of contracts is not very attractive 
in the insurance market for the insurer. The reason is that the insurer is obliged to insure 
good or bad risks, because he does not have a real choice. This is the reason why Aneco 
asked for retrocession cover. Another factor, which made the attitude of the insurance 
market towards facultative obligatory treaties even more complicated, was that the Piper 
Alpha disaster had occurred earlier that year. This made the reaction of the market quite 
difficult to be assessed. The fact that J & H submitted that retrocession cover would be 
obtained for Aneco was the reason, which actually induced them to conclude the 
contracts. The issue on appeal was “whether J  & H could have obtained reinsurance for 
Aneco if  they had made full disclosure o f all the material facts ” 74. The judge in the court 
of first instance had found that that even if full disclosure was made, cover would still be 
available75. On appeal, the burden of proof was put on the appellants to prove that 
alternative security was not available. It was held that “the evidence is clearly sufficient 
to discharge the burden o f proving that on the balance o f probabilities, alternative 
security, meaning reinsurance cover o f the kind which Aneco required, could not be
73 Ibid. Page 6. Per Mr. Hunter for the appellants.
74 Ibid. Paragraph 42.
75 See above.
Duties o f Insurance Brokers 63 Christos Tsibourakis
found in the London market” 76. The risk, as I said above, was said to be uninsurable. As 
to the measure of damages the decision was the following. As to the losses it was decided 
that “the losses would not have been incurred, if the respondents had acted with 
reasonable skill and care ” 11. The problem, however, was how the principle of the 
Banque Brusselles case would be applied in this case. It was held by the Court of 
Appeal that “that Aneco is entitled to recover damages for the whole o f the losses, which 
it suffered in consequence o f entering into the Bullen treaty, acting on J  & H advice with 
regard to the availability o f reinsurance (retrocession) and therefore on the current 
market assessment o f the risk” 78. Conclusively, the principle of the BBL case was not 
applied in this case. The reason was primarily that the broker who had been instructed by 
J & H to effect the insurance had took it upon himself to advise Aneco in respect of the 
reinsurance contracts 19. Since causal connection could be justified liability could be 
imposed. The Court of Appeal actually approached the matter on the basis that facultative 
obligatory nature of the treaty was a material fact and this is what affected its decision 
most80.
Another case that can be mentioned and that is related with the duty to advise is 
Jones and Marsh McLennan v Crawley Colosso 81. J -  the insured - had acquired two 
islands in Bahamas and he wanted to develop them into holiday resorts. As a result, he 
instructed his United States brokers, MM, to obtain cover. However, it was not possible 
for MM to obtain the appropriate cover in the United States, so, they approached CC, 
who were London brokers to obtain the cover. They managed to do so, but the policies 
contained an exclusion clause, which disclaimed the insurers’ liability for loss of or 
damage to any part of permanent works “for which a certificate o f completion had been 
issued” 82. When MM checked the policies, they did not object to these clauses. 
Afterwards, when the marina was complete and a document of substantial completion
76 Ibid. Paragraph 71.
77 Ibid. Paragraph 74.
78 Ibid. Paragraph 84.
79 Ibid. Paragraph 83.
80 Deighton Andrew & Peter Gregoire. (2000). Broker’s negligence and measure of damages. Barlow Lyde 
& Gilbert. Pages 18-20.
81 (1996) Lloyd’s List, 1 August, Insurance Law Monthly. Volume 8. Issue 12.
82 Ibid.
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had been issued, it was destroyed by Hurricane Andrew. J brought an action against CC 
and assigned to MM his rights. The court held that the combined negligence of both firms 
of brokers caused J’s loss. The responsibility for the loss was apportioned two-thirds to 
CC and one-third to MM. It is obvious that the main issue of this case was the 
relationship between the principal, its brokers and the sub-brokers. It is submitted that if 
the brokers and sub-brokers are solvent, there are two possibilities. (1) The assured can 
sue his own broker alone for the whole amount of the loss and the broker subsequently or 
in joined proceedings recovers contribution from the sub-broker 83. (2) The assured sues 
his own broker and the sub-broker for their respective breaches of duty84. If, on the other 
hand, either broker is insolvent, the assured is still entitled to recover his loss under joint 
and several liability rules 85.
The general duty to advise also exists in the reinsurance field. For example, it was 
held in Youell and Others v Bland Welch & Co. Ltd. and Others (The Superhulls 
Cover No 2 case) 86 that it is the duty of the broker to read the reinsurance contract and 
tell him whether his cover is appropriate or not. The materiality issue here is also at stake. 
I have dealt with it when talking about the utmost good faith requirement, so I will make 
a very brief reference at this point. Generally, subject to the issue of inducement, as to 
what is regarded, as material, no subjective opinion would be accepted. What a prudent 
and reasonable underwriter sees as material is usually that which would be considered to 
be material. The only thing that needs to be mentioned is that an average broker is not 
required to have the knowledge of a lawyer. If for example, a legal issue is deemed to be 
very complicated, the broker has the right to refuse to give advice or to give it but say 
that it is doubtful whether this piece of information is correct or no t87. A case, which is 
quite illustrative about all that, is Sarginson Brothers v Keith Moulton and Co. Ltd 88. 
This case took place during the Second World War and the issue was whether a stock of 




86 (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 431.
87 O’Neil P.T & Woloniecki J.W.(1998). The law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell, 1st edition. Page 
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information that was given by the brokers was that they could not but this was proved to 
be wrong. It was cited down in the judgement that “one has a great deal o f sympathy, I  
suppose, with every professional man nowadays ...emergency legislation, regulations and 
rules...pour out in an unceasing flow...there is always a danger o f being caught out by 
something. I  do not for one moment say that they are bound to be acquainted with 
everything”89. In a brief analysis of the degree of care, according to the court, the vital 
point is that there is an effort by the courts to try and modify the application of legal 
principles according to the needs of the present market. This simply means that perhaps 
before the development of such a balanced insurance system, the standard of care and 
knowledge, which would be required by a broker, would be higher, because the market 
was more complex. In addition, the persons with expert knowledge were only quite a few 
and as a result the clients relied much more on their opinion.
4.8 Proper Presentation of the Risk
Another duty that needs to be mentioned is that proper presentation of the risk by 
the brokers must be achieved. Since, the chapter of utmost good faith deals with this duty, 
because of its importance, I am going to refer to it quite briefly and not in detail. The duty 
of the utmost good faith is very significant, because it is what the whole transaction is 
based on. If for example, a broker does not disclose to the insurer material facts, then the 
insurer has the right to avoid the insurance policy for non-disclosure. And this is logical, 
because where there is non-disclosure, it is impossible for an insurer to ascertain whether 
a risk is high or not. More illustrative are the cases and the relevant sections of MIA 1906 
but these are mentioned in the utmost good faith chapter90.
89 Ibid.
90 Bennett Howard. The Law of Marine Insurance. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
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4.9 Duty of the broker in placing the cover
In respect of reinsurance, some aspects of placing the cover were mentioned in the 
part that is related with obtaining it. So, I will refer only to the cases, which deal with 
original insurance. The issue is one relating as to whether the broker acted with sufficient 
speed to place the cover. For example, in the case of Cock» Russell and Co. v Bray, 
Gibb and Co. Ltd.91, instructions were received to obtain insurance of a cargo of wine. 
There were actually great difficulties in obtaining the cover and since the instructions 
were received on Friday afternoon, nothing could really be done. On Saturday, there was 
an effort for the cover to be placed, but there was no success at all. On Monday, it was 
discovered that much of the cargo was lost. It was held that the brokers were not liable 
and the reason for this was that they did not delay in any of their activities in an 
unreasonable way 92. One more case that needs to be mentioned is that of Lewis v 
Tressider Andrews Associates Ptv Ltd.93. The outcome of the case was that a broker 
was held liable for not using his best endeavours to find out through the financial 
statements he had, what was the exact financial position of an insurer who was new in the 
field94.
I will refer in quite a more detailed way to the case of Osman v J. Ralph Moss 
Ltd.95. The case related to motor insurance. When the plaintiff, who was the owner of the 
car, wanted to obtain insurance for his vehicle, the insurance company, which was 
recommended by the brokers who were instructed by the plaintiff, was known to be in 
financial difficulties. The first claim against the brokers was for damages for breach of 
contract or negligence. The second one was related with the breach of the brokers of the 
duty to inform their client that he was in fact uninsured. The next allegation against the 
brokers was that the brokers actually incurred liability for the costs and the fines that the 
plaintiff had to bear and also liability to third parties. Finally, there was a claim in 
relation to the recommendation by the brokers to insure with this particular insurance 
company. In the court of first instance, it was decided that "the defendants were liable,
91 (1920)3 Ll.L.Rep.71.
92 Ibid.
93 (1987)2 Qd.R 533.
94 Ibid
95 (1970) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 313.
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but the plaintiff was entitled only to the amount o f the premium, which he paid, and that 
any further damage suffered by the plaintiff was too remote ” 96. There was an appeal by 
the plaintiff, which was in fact allowed. The Court of Appeal held that it could be found 
that the brokers were negligent in recommending this particular insurance company to the 
plaintiff. The same thing was decided in respect of the letter, which was sent to the 
plaintiff. In this letter the broker simply advised the plaintiff to obtain insurance from 
another insurance company. Also, as to the aspect of remoteness, the decision was that all 
the amount of damage that was suffered by the plaintiff was not too remote in relation to 
the activities of the brokers. The result was that the plaintiff was entitled to recover all the 
money he has spent as a result of the negligence of the brokers91.
I will now concentrate on the case of FNCB Ltd. (Formerly First National 
Commercial Bank pic.) v Barnet Devannev (Harrow) Ltd. (formerly Barnet 
Devannev & Co Ltd.) 1/7/1999 98. The facts of the case were as follows. In 1989 Barnet 
Devanney & Co. Ltd, a firm of insurance brokers, arranged a cover on behalf of First 
National Commercial Bank pic for the insurance with General Accident Fire and Life 
Association Corporation pic and others, who were the insurers of the case, for a property. 
This property was charged to the bank as a security for a loan, which was given to the 
owner. The policy was effected on the name of the owner and the bank. When the 
property was damaged by fire, the insurers denied liability to both on the ground of non­
disclosure and misrepresentation. The bank brought an action against the insurers and 
although it had recovered some money under a Contigency policy, it had still suffered 
quite a loss " . Hence, the bank in this case brought the proceedings against the brokers 
for negligence and breach of contract. In the court of first instance, the bank’s claim was 
unsatisfactory because the judge believed that negligence and breach of contract were not 
proved. Also, he decided that even if damages were awarded to the bank, the amount 
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the calculation of damages 10°. The bank appealed in respect of this decision. The brokers 
submitted that if the appeal of the bank was successful, then, the Contigency policy 
recoveries should be brought into account when assessing the damages. Hence, the issues 
for the court were three: (1) whether the brokers were negligent in arranging the 
appropriate insurance cover? (2) Whether the loss of the bank was caused by the 
negligence? (3) Whether the proceeds of the Contigency policy should be brought into 
account ,01? The Contigency policy actually covered direct losses in respect of mortgage 
loans if the mortgagor had failed to maintain proper insurance. And the policy did not 
contain any mortgagee protection clause or a non-invalidation clause. It was argued that 
the brokers were negligent in not including these clauses in the policy. The duty that they 
owed was either contractual or tortious. When dealing with this, Lord Justice Morritt 
analysed the sources from which the judge came to his conclusion. These sources 
consisted of textbooks, precedent and the tendencies of the market. However, Lord 
Justice Morritt did not come up to the same conclusion. He submitted, first of all, that 
there was no evidence of a responsible market practice not to ask for a mortgage 
protection clause. Also he observed that it was not the function of an insurance broker to 
take a view on undetermined matters of law. Finally, he thought that the existence of the 
Contigency policy did not absolve the brokers from their duty to obtain primary 
protection. Therefore, the brokers were held liable for not including the clauses 
mentioned above in the insurance cover 102. One very important aspect of the case was 
that in this kind of clauses, no additional premium is required; hence, the brokers should 
not include it in the policy. It must be said at this point that one of the main issues of the 
case was the difference between a composite and a joint insurance. As to the first one, 
Lord Justice Morritt challenged the judge’s decision. His argument was based on the fact 
that although he was right to decide that a reasonable insurance broker would have 
known as a matter of law that no breach of condition, misrepresentation or non-disclosure 
would affect the claim of a mortgagee, as a result of New Hampshire Insurance Co. v
100 Ibid. Paragraph 2.
101 Ibid. Paragraph 3.
102 Ibid. Paragraphs 20-24.
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MGN Ltd. 103, this was not the case in 1989 104. The next big issue of the FNCB case 
was that of causation. The judge’s conclusion in relation to this was that even if the 
brokers were negligent, the loss to the bank was not the result of this negligence. He also 
submitted that the right of legal recovery was not dependent upon the inclusion of the 
clause. On appeal, it was decided that if the clause was included, the insurers would have 
to pay the bank in hill 105. The last issue was that of the Contigency policy. The brokers 
claimed in the court of first instance that credit should be given to them because the 
amount of the bank’s loss was reduced by the amount recovered under the Contigency 
policy. In the court of first instance, this argument was not accepted. On appeal, Lord 
Justice Morritt agreed with the judge. He held that there was no possibility of double 
recovery for the bank. The loss suffered by the bank was not reduced by the amount 
recovered under the policy 106.
In case where there is a placement of illegal insurance, the broker is liable if he 
chooses an authorised insurer 107.
4.10 Cancellation and Renewals of Policies
Another possibility that need to be examined is what is the position when a policy 
is cancelled by any of the parties. A relevant case is that of London Borough of 
Bromley v Ellis 108. A purchase of a car took place between D and E who was the person 
who purchased the car. Also, an agreement was made to the effect that the car’s insurance 
would be transferred to E. As a result, the insurance brokers that were instructed by E 
issued a cover note. However, the insurers did not accept the proposal of the brokers and 
the cover had to be cancelled. The problem was that E was not informed. When an
103 (1997) L.R.L.R 24.
104 Ibid. Paragraph 20.
105 Ibid. Paragraphs 25-32.
106 Ibid. Paragraph 38.
107 Insurance Law Monthly. Insurance Brokers Breach Defences Duty of Care Measure of Damages Risk 
Assessment. 7 (3) 1995. Pages 5-7.
108 (1971) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 97.
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accident happened, there was an action against E and E on his part made a claim against 
his insurance brokers for indemnity. His claim was successful. On appeal the Court of 
Appeal held that “although the brokers were not E ’s agents, they were under a duty to 
use reasonable care in arranging the transfer; they were in breach o f their duty, and 
therefore E was entitled to indemnity from them” 109.
The next case I am going to talk about relates to the situation where there is a 
renewal of the policy. In Mint Security Ltd. v Blair 110 the facts of the case were as 
follows: the plaintiffs carried on a security business in Birmingham. The third defendants 
were instructed by the plaintiffs to obtain cash in transit with a limit of £50.000. They 
asked afterwards the second defendants to deal with it. When a slip was given to the first 
defendants, a proposal form was completed by the plaintiffs on 1975 and was renewed in 
1976. When the plaintiffs decided that they wanted to expand their business in London 
and Manchester a new slip was prepared at 1977, which included the proposal of 1975. 
Hence, practically the underwriters in this instance were the defendants. On 1977, money 
that was delivered by the plaintiffs was stolen and as a result they indemnified the owner 
and tried to recover the money from the first defendants. The argument of the first 
defendants was that “that they were entitled to limit their liability to £20.000” ni. This 
was according to the limits of liability as these were put in the policy. The next aspect of 
the argument was that “they were entitled to avoid liability in that the plaintiffs were in 
breach o f the warranty contained in the proposal form since no member o f the crew had 
been in the plaintiffs ’ employment for at least a year, at least one member had not been 
trained before embarking on operations” m . On the other hand, the allegations on the 
part of the plaintiffs’ were “a like sum o f damages for breach o f contract or duty from the 
third defendants or from the second defendants and further applied for rectification o f the 
policy by deleting the reference to the proposal form” 113. The decision was quite 
complicated and the reason was that three defendants were involved, however, the 
general conclusion was that the limitation clause applied and the plaintiffs were entitled 
to recover £20.000 from the second defendants. The claims against the first and the third
109 /bid.
110 (1982) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 188.
111 Ibid. Pages 188-189.
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defendants failed 114. Also, I will make a reference to the part of the decision that is 
dedicated to the renewal of the policy. The problem in this particular case was whether a 
piece of vital information, the inclusion of the 1975 proposal in the 1977 policy, was 
passed in such a way in order to discharge the defendants of their duty. In the actual 
judgement, Staughton J said: “it is not suggested that the vital information was passed 
directly to the plaintiffs. However, the second defendant avers but the third defendants 
deny that the second defendants sent a copy o f the slip to the third defendants. That is the 
crucial issue if a copy o f a slip was so sent, then the second defendants discharged their 
duty, although they might have done so more conspicuously; i f  it was not sent, then the 
second defendants were in breach o f their duty” 1l5. All this means that the vital issue 
seems to be whether a copy was sent or not.
4.11 Standard of the Duty of Care
I am going to focus on what is the exact standard of a duty of care that is required 
by a broker, when he has to discuss with his client the type of cover that he has to obtain. 
Also, what happens in the case where this kind of insurance that is wanted cannot be 
obtained and it is the broker who must notify the client that an alteration has to be made? 
As we shall see a broker is generally required to secure his client’s interests and quite a 
lot depends on the particular circumstances of each case. In the case of Harvest 
Trucking Co .Ltd. v P.B Davis T/A P.B Davies Insurance Services 116, thieves entered 
a warehouse which belonged to the plaintiffs’ company and stole a lorry with a quantity 
of goods. After the theft took place, the company was liable to its customers for the loss. 
The plaintiffs tried to recover the money they spent under their insurance policy. The 
vital point was a clause that was included in the policy: “no claim will be admitted for 
the theft o f or from any vehicle, which is not individually attended” 117. According to 
this clause, there was no substance in trying to allege that the insurer had to pay. It was a 
fact that was beyond doubt. So, the only solution that the plaintiffs had was to bring an
U3lbid.
1,4 Ibid.
115 Ibid. Page 99.
116 (1991)2 Lloyd’s Rep. 638.
117 Ibid. Pages 638-639.
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action against the defendant broker. Their argument was based on the fact that he actually 
failed to obtain proper cover and inform the plaintiff company which was the exact effect 
of the “individually attended clause”. It was held that “on the facts and the evidence the 
defendant was in breach o f this duty and his failure to do either o f these things”- to 
obtain the appropriate cover or to use his best endeavours to bring the insurer’s terms to 
the company’s attention -  “and his further failure to obtain his client's consent to any 
further action amounted to negligence on his part” 118. Also, the second aspect of the 
decision had to do with the fact that “the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed on the basis 
that i f  the defendant had performed his duty as an intermediary, they would have 
recovered from the insurers the amount o f loss they had in fact suffered” 119. Finally, the 
argument of the defendant that the plaintiffs were deemed to mitigate their losses by not 
pursuing their remedies was rejected 120. What can be concluded from the above is that 
because of a broker’s expected knowledge, there may be instances, where he will be 
considered to owe a duty of care simply because there will be no other person, on whom 
his client could possibly rely on.
4.12 Duty to assist in making the claims.
The broker is obliged for one more time to exercise his reasonable care and skill 
in order to fulfil his duty to assist in making a claim. As the situation is, this duty is most 
of the time related to the duty to ensure the proper preservation of documents and also 
sometimes the collection of claims. The reason behind this is that when for example a 
broker fails to retain documents, the result is that when a claim takes place, it is not then 
possible to track down who are the parties in an insurance contract. This happens because 
a number of years may pass before a claim comes into question. Then all the parties, 
whether they are at fault or not, are faced with a potential loss. Details about all these will 
be mentioned in the next unit of this chapter. For now I will refer to a very old case. This 
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event, which damaged the cargo, took place on 28 January. Although most of the cargo 
was saved, its commercial value was more or less lost. On 2 February, there was a letter 
to the broker by the assured, which asked him “to do the needful” about the cover and 
also saying “I  should wish to abandon, i f  it be admitted of”. The reply of the broker took 
place on the 4th of the same month and its meaning was that he could not discuss 
substantially with any underwriters if he was not aware of more details. When the assured 
again replied, he did not say anything about abandonment. The assured after all these 
brought an action against the broker, when he served a notice of abandonment. The 
allegation was that there was a lapse of time and the court upheld this. Of course, the 
assured could not make any claim under his insurance cover and this was the cause of 
action. It was decided that the broker could not be held liable because he was not given 
clear instructions 122. At this point, it must be said that this decision can be seen to be 
quite controversial and perhaps in our days a broker would be in a more difficult position 
because he would be expected to understand his principal’s instructions 123. This case just 
shows that a broker can be very important under certain circumstances in order to make a 
recovery possible. As I said above, more will be said below in relation to retention of 
documents and collection of claims.
4.13 Preservation of Documents and Collection of claims
A fundamental case that is concentrated on this matter is Grace v Leslie & 
Godwin Financial Services Ltd.124. The contracts in question were retrocession 
contracts. Actually what happened is that in 1956 the defendants were the brokers who 
placed the retrocession cover for the plaintiffs. Almost thirty years later, in 1984 the 
plaintiffs tried to claim under the retrocession contracts but this was proved not to be 
possible. This happened because the retrocessionaires were mentioned in the cover notes 
just as “companies” or “London Companies”. This simply meant that they could not be 
traced. The question that arose was whether the brokers were under a duty in contract or 
in tort to keep the relevant documents in order to “make” the action possible. Clarke J.
122 Ibid.
123 Benett Howard.(1996). The Law of Marine Insurance. Clarendon Press. Pages 93-94.
124 (1995) L.R.L.R 472.
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said: “in my opinion, the evidence shows that it is and was the universal o f Lloyd's 
brokers to collect claims when called upon to do so...in consideration o f the insured (or 
reinsured as the case might be) agreeing to pay the broker’s commission, the broker 
agree inter alia to collect the claims ...his duty is to exercise all reasonable care and skill 
in collecting claims when asking to do so ” 125. The effect of the opinion of the judge was 
that the broker was under a duty to keep the records as long as he would regard a claim 
possible. This principle as the judge stated it is quite controversial as it imposes such a 
heavy burden on the broker. Finally, an allegation that the plaintiffs were contributorily 
negligent, on the ground when the cover was originally obtained, they did not ask for the 
names of the retrocessionaires was rejected because it was held that the market practice in 
the 1950’s did not impose such a duty on the plaintiffs 126. Another issue was that of time 
bar. The argument on the part of the brokers was that the cause of action had occurred 
when the documents were actually lost, so, the six- year limitation period had passed. The 
judge did not agree with that and stated that the six-year time-bar period started when the 
brokers were called to collect the claims 127. It is interesting to look at the implications of 
this decision. There is a possibility that it can lead the courts to the tendency to create a 
much more extensive duty for collection of claims. This duty actually consists of the 
assessment on the part of the broker when it is the same time for destruction of 
documents. Also, a broker must advise his client when it is the right time for destruction 
and obtain his principal consent for i t 128.
The same principle more or less applies when the broker holds the documents of 
his principal at his property. A case, which is about what happens when the principal asks 
for documents that are in the possession of the broker, is Yasuda Fire and Marine 
Insurance Co. of Europe v Orion Marine Insurance Underwriting Agency Ltd. 129. 
This case is very significant in the context of European law, since it deals with the right 
of inspection and there are a number of directives, which are dedicated to this. The 
defendants entered into three underwriting agency agreements with the plaintiffs. They
125 Ibid. Page 477.
U6 Ibid.
127 Mattick Richard. Insurance Brokers Documents Duty of Care Insurance Claims. International Law 
Review 3 (9) 1995. Pages 329-331.
128 Ibid.
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acted as their underwriting agents. Two parts of the agreement were of particular 
significance. The first one is that the defendants were entitled “to maintain all necessary 
books accounts records and other usual documentation appertaining to the insurance 
business transacted” 13°. And the other is that the plaintiffs were entitled “to inspect the 
same at any reasonable time following a written request to do so” 131. It must be cited at 
this point that all these documents were deemed to be the property of the brokers. In 
1993, the plaintiffs asked the defendants to give them access to their computer records. 
On their part, the defendants refused to give them access because according to them (1) 
they had already permitted detailed inspection and copying o f the defendants ’ written 
records under the agreements. (2) The computer records contained confidential 
information relating to other pool members’ participation. (3) The defendants were not 
obliged under the agreements to create new documents for the plaintiffs ’ benefit” 132. The 
plaintiffs, after terminating the agreement with the defendants, asked for the inspection of 
the records, which would enable them to carry on their business. Again, the defendants 
refused and submitted that the termination amounted to the repudiatory breach of the 
agreements. The court decided that the agent’s duty to provide his principal this kind of 
information “arose from the fact that the principal entrusted to the agent the making o f 
transactions binding on the principal. He was entitled to know what his personal 
contractual rights and duties were” 133. In respect of what was the effect of the 
termination of agency, it was held that “on the proper construction o f the inspection 
clause the inspection facility under the agreements was not discharged by the termination 
o f the agency agreements for repudiatory breach” m . Again, it is shown in this case that 
the burden that can be imposed on a broker is quite heavy.
4.14 Remedies
Everything in respect of remedies depends on whether the action is brought under 
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14A of the Limitation Act 1980 in respect of hidden losses. More about this is 
mentioned in the unit that is concerned with the liability of the brokers both in contract 
and tort.
4.15 Defences
In Youell and Others v Bland Welch & Co. Ltd. and Others (The Superhulls 
Cover No 2 case) 135 -  which I mentioned above -  a number of defences were raised. 
This case concerned a professional principal. These defences were that first of all the 
broker did not understand that the reinsurance contract was not back-to-back and also that 
because the reinsured did not make any further investigation when he was provided with 
a copy of the policy, this gave rise to an estoppel. These arguments were really based on 
two older precedents. The first one is the case of General Accident Fire and Life 
Assurance Corporation v J.H Minet and Co. Ltd. 136. The whole case was about an 
excess reinsurance contract, which was issued by the plaintiff company. After a number 
of accidents, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant brokers for failure to 
obtain the appropriate cover. The brokers argued that since they sent the cover note to the 
plaintiffs, the policy, which was obtained, was clearly shown. The court held that “there 
was a breach o f contract by the defendants in that they have failed to effect a reinsurance 
cover according to the plaintiffs’ instructions; that in the particular circumstances no 
negligence could be imputed to the plaintiffs ’ underwriter in failing to appreciate that full 
cover was not provided by the cover note; and that therefore the defendants were liable
1 X Iin damages ” . What the judges said was that the defendants had to prove ratification of
their action by the plaintiffs in order for them to avoid liability because they could not be 
held liable for something that the plaintiffs had already accepted. However, ratification 
on the particular case was rejected.
135 (1990)2 Lloyd’s Rep. 431.
136 (1942) L1.L.R. 1.
137 Ibid. Page 1.
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The other precedent I would like to refer to is that of Dickson v Devitt 138. Lord 
Atkin gave a quite influential speech. The following is an extract about the possible 
reliance of each client on his broker: “when a broker is employed to effect an insurance, 
especially when a broker is a person o f repute and experience, the client is entitled to 
rely upon the broker carrying out his instructions and is not bound to examine the 
documents drawn up in performance o f these instructions" 139. These are authorities 
according to which an insured or a reinsured has the right to rely on his broker to obtain 
the appropriate cover or to inform him about the details of the policy. So, the result in the 
Superhulls case 140 was, as I mentioned above, that the brokers were liable. In respect of 
the defence of contributory negligence that was alleged, the court decided that the 
reinsured was 20 per cent blameworthy. It was also submitted that the cases of Dickson v 
Devitt 141 and General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation v J.H Minet 
and Co. Ltd. 142 were decided on their own facts and did not create any kind of rigid 
rule.
I am going to refer now to two other cases. The first one is that of Vesta v 
Butcher l43. This case was about the insurance of a fish farm. As to the matter of 
contributory negligence, it was held that this defence would be allowed. The plaintiffs’ 
allegation that the blame between the parties could not be apportioned was rejected. 
Hence, it was decided that the plaintiffs were three quarters to blame and the brokers 
were just one quarter blameworthy. The Court of Appeal accepted this and in the House 
of Lords the point was not raised 144. In contrast, I am going to refer to the case of Prvke 
v Gibbs Hartley Cooper Ltd. 145. Here, the vital issue was that a financial guarantee 
policy was issued but it was outside the scope of a binding authority under which a firm 
of underwriters was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs. The defendants were actually the 
brokers acting in respect of a binding authority. The insurer was actually based in the U.S
138 (1916) 86 L.J.K.B 315.
139 O’Neil P.T & Woloniecki J.W. (1998). The law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell, 1st edition. Pages 
384-385.
140 (1990)2 Lloyd’s Rep. 431.
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and when the broker was sent there to check whether his client- the U.S insurer- is 
conducting his business properly- he returned with quite an inadequate report. One of the 
arguments was that the broker takes commission, hence he owes a duty of care, but this 
failed. Also, the defence of contributory negligence was not established according to the 
particular facts of the case I46. However, this case was very difficult to be decided 
because the broker was in conflict of interest with his principal.
Another defence that needs to be mentioned is that of causative breach. This 
defence sometimes is related to the defence of contributory negligence. In simple words, 
this defence is based on the question whether the alleged “illegal” conduct on the part of 
the defendant has caused in any way, the damage that the cause of action is based on. It 
can be possible that there is no connection between the two and as a result no liability can 
be inferred. In the case of Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping 
Corporation (No 2 ) 147 there was a claim for damages for deceit. There was an allegation 
that the defendant had made false statements to the issuing bank in respect of a bill of 
lading. In the words of Lord Justice Aldous “the plaintiff's attempted deceit o f the issuing 
bank was not causative o f any part o f the damage suffered by reason o f the defendant ’s 
deceit ”148. The reason was that the bank had refused the payment anyway because of 
discrepancies in its documents. Another aspect of causation in this sense was developed 
in Vesta v Butcher where under English law, the 24-hour watch condition, which was 
breached, would render the policy null and void, although that the loss that took place 
was irrelevant to this condition ,49. Hence, it is quite clear that the defence of causative 
breach is something that has to be examined by the courts according to the particular 
aspects and facts of each case.
Finally, one more important case is that of National Insurance and Guarantee 
Corporation pic v Imperio Reinsurance Co. (U.K) Ltd. and Rusell Tudor-Price Co.
147 27 July 2000, w \v\v. 1 a\vrepoit.co.uk. Page 1.
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Ltd, 15°. In this case, three defences were raised: waiver, estoppel and ratification. The 
outcome was that a client had not waived his right against his broker merely because the 
client has expressed the mistaken opinion that the policy has satisfied his instructions 151. 
In relation to the defence of waiver, it was decided that for waiver to be established, the 
waiving party must not only know the fact on which his right to elect is founded but also 
that he has a right to elect...there could be no waiver or estoppel in the absence of 
unequivocal representation by a party that he will not rely or abandon his right152. About 
ratification it was held that when there was ratification by a principal contract, although 
the desired cover was not obtained, the effect was the contract that was binding as 
between the principal and the third party, but did not deprive the principal of any of the 
rights he may had against his agent153. This is how, more or less, defences are used in the 
insurance field.
151 National Insurance and Guarantee Corporation pic v Imperio Reinsurance Co. (U.K) Ltd. and Rusell 
Tudor-Price Co. Ltd. (1998) 3 I.R.L.N 2 / O’Neil P.T & Woloniecki J.W. (1998). The law of Reinsurance. 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1st edition.
152 National Insurance and Guarantee Corporation pic v Imperio Reinsurance Co. (U.K) Ltd. and Rusell 
Tudor-Price Co. Ltd. (1998) 3 I.R.L.N 2.
153 ibid:
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4.16 Codes of Conduct154
The first thing that needs to be said is that the Code of Conduct is very much the 
consequence of the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977. Lloyd’s established it 
and its importance is beyond doubt. Before I start analysing each section, I will state the 
three fundamental principles under which the Code was created: (1) Insurance Brokers 
shall at all times conduct their business with utmost good faith and integrity. (2) 
Insurance brokers shall do everything possible to satisfy the insurance requirements 
of their clients and shall place the interests of those clients before all other 
considerations. Subject to these requirements and interests, insurance brokers shall 
have proper regard to others. (3) Statements made by or on behalf of insurance 
brokers when advertising shall not be misleading or extravagant155.
I will know make a very brief reference to what these sections are about:
7.17 Sections
>  Section 1
I will know make a very brief reference to what these sections are. This is about the 
relationship with the client. He must make sure that the client knows what is the role of a 
Lloyd’s broker and also what is his knowledge towards the risks he will face or the 
dealings he will be a part into.
> Section 2 / Remuneration
Section 2 is about remuneration. It is submitted that if the client asks the broker, he 
has to disclose the amount of brokerage they will take. The same applies in respect of any 
payment during the transaction.
154 For further details see: Wright Jonathan. (1999) Insurance Brokers Codes of Practice Professional 
Conduct. International Insurance Law Review 3 (3). Pages 100-101.
155 Shaw Richard. A Lloyd’s Broker. (1995). Lloyd’s London Press. Pages 271-272.
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>  Section 3 / Confidentiality
This is about the confidentiality of the client’s information. The information that 
the client tells to his broker cannot be used or disclosed. The only situation when this can 
happen is when he does it in the ordinary of negotiating an insurance contract. Another 
one is when the client gives his consent or when a court requires the information.
>  Section 4 / Choice o f Insurers
It is the duty of the broker to try and find a certain number of insurers, in order to 
be able to obtain the adequate insurance cover. The broker must also understand that 
whatever connection he has must not prejudice his affairs. Finally, I will refer briefly to 
the situation where a possible insurer is outside U.K or an EEC country. The broker is 
actually allowed to suggest to his client three things: (a) the insurer is not supervised by 
the regulations o f  an EEC country, (b) Even i f  the client is an individual he will not 
fin d  protection in the Policyholders Protection Act 1975. (c) The client may face  
problems to bring an action against such an insurer.
If however, the client ignores the instructions of his broker, the broker must 
inform him that he disagrees and ask his client to put his acknowledgement in writing.
> Section 5 / Disclosure
This is one of the vital duties of the broker and is fully analysed in the chapter, 
which is about the duty of the utmost good faith. Generally, the broker is obliged to 
disclose all the information, which is considered as material. Also, a broker should not, at 
least in the normal course of business complete his proposal form for his client. In the 
occasion when he does not believe that the statements of the client are true, he must ask 
him, in order to be positive that he possesses the correct information.
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> Section 6 / Documentation
The broker is under a duty to have written confirmation of any insurance policy and 
its terms. This should happen in respect of the names of the insurers and also in relation 
with other pieces of information. In the case of a lien exercised by a broker, he must 
inform his client that he is withholding the relevant documents.
> Section 7 / Accounting
The whole accounting function is the responsibility of the broker. All the monies 
have to be kept in an Insurance Broking Account. More details will be mentioned in the 
unit that is about the accounts of a broker.
> Section 8 / Binding authorities
This section is related to binding authorities. What is the Code focused on is that 
the broker must avoid a potential conflict of interest. He must always place business in 
order to achieve the best result for his client. For more, see the chapter of binding 
authorities.
> Section 9 / Claims
In relation with claims the broker must make sure that all the information, which 
has been acquired in respect of any claim is correct. Again, the avoidance of conflicts of 
interest is important.
> Section 10 / Renewal
The broker is simply under a duty when his client’s insurance expires to seek for 
certain instructions and remind him of his duties.
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> Section 11 / Transfer of client
On the occasion when the client decides to change broker, the old one has to 
provide the new Lloyd’s broker with any documentation that will make his business 
easier.
> Section 12 / Servicing
In respect of servicing, even when the relationship between a broker and a client 
has been terminated, the broker is still under a duty to provide for his client any services, 
which are related with the particular insurance. The only reason according to which he 
does not have to do all that is if he has evidence that the client has instructed a new 
broker to perform all the activities he has been asked to do.
> Section 13 / Complaints
When there is a complaint, the broker must inform his client about the complaints’ 
procedure. The client has actually the right to write his complaint to the Council of 
Lloyd’s.
> Section 14 / Supervision of Staff
A registered insurance broker must supervise the work that is done by a broker. He 
should also try to inform his employees about the legal consequences of their actions and 
the legal framework that they have to move around
> Section 15 / Competence
A requirement for a broker to deal with a particular class of business is that he is 
competent in it.
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> Section 16 / Lloyd’s Name
Finally, a broker must be aware that of the regulatory status of the parties in an 
insurance transaction and be careful to use correctly the name of Lloyd’s.
4.17 Conclusion
In conclusion I can say that the duties a broker can undertake are very significant 
for the proper performance of his job. As we can see from the Code of Conduct, efforts 
are made to try and regulate their duties and their rights. However, sometimes codes and 
rules are not enough because the market itself is faced with obscure problems under 
strange circumstances. But, it is the only way by which brokers have something to 
follow, so, that they do not act completely without a guide.
The other important aspect that needs to be mentioned is that there have been a 
number of new cases -  some of them are mentioned here -  which may prove to be very 
influential in the future. Moreover, it is an area, which can be described as a changing 
environment 156. It will be very interesting how the concept of the duties of insurance 
brokers will be affected by the General Insurance Standards Council reform. The 
major issue is not that there will be new regulatory bodies but how the market will react 
to these changes. I will deal with this point more thoroughly in my conclusive thoughts as 
to what the position of insurance brokers will be in the future.
Hence, as we examined above, the duties of insurance brokers are very wide. It 
seems like a broker is not the person who will just obtain the cover for his client and this 
will be it. There can be instances where hid duty will continue to exist much after the 
completion of the insurance contract or before that. For example, the broker has to 
investigate the risk and also advise his client as to appropriate cover. This is, of course, 
very logical since it is something that goes together with a broker’s expertise. And as we 
saw in the very recent Aneco case 157 it can be the basis for very complicated and 
important claims. Also, it would be useful to make a reference to the duty of the broker as
156 Part of this research is dedicated to the latest developments in respect of the regulation around insurance 
brokers.
157 30/7/1999.
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to the inspection of documents. It is again a duty that can take place much after the 
conclusion of the insurance contract and yet it can be very significant. Finally, I need to 
say that perhaps the most common duty of a broker is that of disclosure and 
misrepresentation. The number of case that had to be decided on this ground is very 
large. The most recent I have mentioned is the FNCB case 158. It is very clearly shown in 
this case that non-disclosure will continue to be a very common ground for proceedings 
to be brought because it can be very difficult for a broker in practice not to be in breach 
of his duty of disclosure and in the same time to be able to obtain the adequate cover he 
needs. The reason for this is that there certain kind of risks that are very unattractive and 
there can be insured only on a very high premium. So, the broker has no real choice but 
not to reveal everything. The chapter that follows and deals with the liability of brokers 
will make the nature of the duties of insurance brokers even more clear.
158 1/7/1999.
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5.1 Utm ost  Good Faith
5.1.1 Introduction
General English contract law does not impose a duty on the parties to 
volunteer information during the contractual negotiations. Of course, this does not 
mean that the law will protect someone who has been induced into a contract by a 
misrepresentation, but just that a party has the right not to share information, even if it 
is highly relevant to the contract. However, this is not the position in insurance law. 
Insurance law contracts are considered to be uberrimae fidei -  of the utmost good 
faith- and this simply means that there is a duty on the parties to disclose certain kind 
of information. Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 makes it obvious: “A 
contract o f marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if 
the utmost good faith be not be observed by either party, the contract may be avoided 
by the other party” l. Something that needs to be mentioned is that this duty is very 
significant in relation to brokers, because during the negotiations for the conclusion of 
the contract, it can affect the whole procedure. An obvious example is the case of Pan 
Atlantic v Pine Top 2, but this case will be analysed below, because of the 
implications that it has had. I intend to refer to a number of opinions, as to the actual 
result that this case had in relation to the operation of the insurance market.
5.1.2 G oof Faith in Contract Law.
First of all I intend to make a general reference to the concept of good faith in 
contract law. The reason for this is that it will be much easier afterwards to understand 
the difference between contract and insurance law and also what is the whole 
philosophy under which insurance operates. As it was cited in the introductory 
paragraph, a general duty of good faith is not recognised in English law. But, the 
situation is much more complex than such an explicit explanation and in the same 
time aphorism of good faith. The concept of deceit at common law recognises a duty 
of good faith in negotiation and performance as well as the enforcement of contracts.
1 Ivamy E.R Hardy Ivamy. Chalmers Marine Insurance 1906. London. (1966). Butterworths. Page 25.
2 (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496, (1995) 1 A.C 501 (H.L)
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The problem is that for deceit to be established fraud has to be proved. As it is put in 
an article: “this duty is no more than a duty not to engage in fraudulent contracts ” , 
which as a result makes the duty less onerous and more difficult to be applied. So, the 
vital question is whether the law requires anything more than a duty not to act 
fraudulently. It must be said at this point that every country or more specifically every 
legal system has developed its own approach towards the issue of good faith. I am 
going to look at quite a few countries but English law will be the starting point. The 
refusal of the courts to recognise a duty of good faith was developed in respect of two 
kinds of arguments. First we have the pragmatic thesis4. This was a theory, which 
was developed, in the famous case of Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Usual 
Programmes Ltd. 5. It holds that “although English law has not committed itself to 
an explicit principle o f good faith, it nevertheless succeeds in acting against cases o f 
unfair dealing by one means or another”. And as Sir Thomas put it “it has developed- 
the English law- piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems o f 
unfairness ” 6. It can be assumed from this kind of response that the requirement of 
good faith is not vital, simply because English law can do nicely even without one. 
The other approach is called the repugnatory thesis and it was developed in 
Walford v Miles 7, where it was held that it was not possible “to recognise an 
agreement to negotiate in good faith as a legally enforceable contract” 8. The 
reasoning behind this approach is that -  in the words of Lord Ackner -  “the concept 
o f a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the 
adversarial position o f the parties when involved in negotiations ”9. The consequence 
of this opinion is that a general duty of good faith will actually unsettle the practical 
commercial position, and as a result problems will be created between the parties of 
the bargain. However, although it seems to be quite justified, there may be some space 
for a duty of good faith, even if the adversarial position of the parties is adopted. This 
does not necessarily mean that good faith has to be accepted in theory, but rather that 
it can be accepted in the exercise of the law. This is the preservation function of
3 Carter J.W & M.P Furmston.. Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiations of Contracts. (1994). 8 
Journal of Contract Law. Part I. Page 1.
4 See: Brownsword Roger. Two Concepts of Good Faith. (1994) 7 Journal of Contract Law. Page 198.
5 (1989) Q.B 433.
6 Ibid Page 439.
7 (1992) 1 All E.R453.
8 Ibid Page 460. Per Lord Ackner..
9 Ibid
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good faith10. This is reflected by the courts in that they are often influenced by the 
reliance that a party may wish to show that a particular way to negotiate is not 
permitted, in order to preserve justice and ensure the economic fairness of a contract. 
On the other hand, in the United States of America the concept of good faith is treated 
in a different way. In the words of Mr. Farnsworth, “if the English have difficulty to 
attaching any meaning to good faith, the difficulty in my country is quite the opposite: 
the Americans have...too many meanings o f good fa ith”11. One of them is the 
prospect of good faith need to be mentioned. The first one is called the excluder 
analysis and it was developed by Professor Summers12. According to it, it would be 
better in cases of doubt for a court to define good faith by excluding what it cannot 
be- bad faith -. The second one is the forgone opportunity analysis13. Professor 
Steven Burton developed this analysis and it states that a standard can be created by 
the expectation of the parties. The sources where a concept of good faith can be found 
in United States law is the Uniform Commercial Code, the American Law 
Institute’s Reinstatement (2nd) of Contracts and the United Nations Convention 
on contracts for the International Sale of Goods 14.
In Italy and Germany, a duty to negotiate in good faith is imposed in some 
cases. In the Italian Civil Code, this is expressly provided. In the German Civil 
Code, there is an express provision for good faith in the performance but not in the 
negotiation of a contract. I left France for the end because the duty of disclosure in the 
negotiations of a contract is much wider and it is more similar to the duty of the 
utmost good faith in English insurance law. It exists not only in the areas of sale and 
insurance, but also in money lending and franchising. And it arises both through 
legislation and case law15.
Finally, in Greece the situation is as follows16. The main article is article 288 
of the Civil Code. According to it “the debtor is obliged to fulfill the giving- his part
10 See: Carter J.W & M.P Furmston. Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiations of Contracts. (1994). 
8 Journal of Contract Law. Part I.






16 See: Aggelopoulou Penelope. (1997). Civil Code and Introductory Law. Sakkoulas Publications. 
Stathopoulos Mihalis. (1993). General Culpability Law. Sakkoulas Publications. 2nd edition.
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of the bargain - as he is obliged by good faith taking into account also the customs 
prevailing in legal relations”. Something else that needs to be mentioned is that in 
case there is a breach of duty the only remedy that can be awarded is avoidance of 
contract.
5 .U  Utmost Good Faith
It is time to move on to the duty of the utmost good faith. This is the area, 
which is related to brokers because as I submitted in the introductory part, this is a 
duty that is recognised in the insurance field. The most usual remedies for breach of 
duty of the utmost good faith are avoidance or rescission- retrospective avoidance- of 
the contract. As a starting point, I need to say that even the common law recognised a 
duty of disclosure17. In the very old case of Carter v Boehm 18 Lord Mansfield made 
a statement that remains influential until today: “Insurance is a contract upon 
speculation...the keeping back o f such circumstance is a fraud and therefore the 
policy is void”19. In relation with misrepresentation, Lord Mansfield again held in 
Macdowell v Fraser 20 that a contract could be avoided by an underwriter because of 
a non-fraudulent misrepresentation. Finally, in Ionides v Pacific Fire and Marine 
Insurance C o.21 a cargo policy was held to be void although the misrepresentation 
was made in an innocent way22.
5.13.1 Marine Insurance Act 1906 -  Relevant Sections
Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 -  it is cited above -  is the most 
explicit one in relation to the duty of utmost good faith. Also relevant are sections 18- 
20. Section 18 of the same statute is about disclosure on the part of the assured and it 
provides that “subject to the provisions o f this section, the assured must disclose to 
the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is 
known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, 
in the ordinary course o f business, ought to be known to him. I f  the assured fails to
17 See: Bennett Howard. The Law of Marine Insurance . Clarendon Press. Page 45.
18 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905,1909 1 W. Bl. 593.
19 Ibid. Pages 593-594. Per Lord Mansfield.
20 (1779) 1 Dougl. 260.
21 (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B 674.
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23 • #make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract” . Very important is 
subsection 2 as well: “every circumstance is material which would influence the 
judgement o f a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will 
take the risk”24. Section 19 is about the knowledge of an agent effecting the 
insurance. According to it “subject to the provisions o f the preceding section as to 
circumstances which need not to be disclosed where an insurance is effected for an 
assured by an agent, the agent must disclose to the insurer (a) every material 
circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to insure is deemed to know 
every circumstance which in the ordinary course o f business ought to be known by, or 
to have been communicated to him and (b) every material circumstance which the 
assured is bound to disclose, unless it comes to his knowledge too late to 
communicate it to the agent” 25. Finally, there is section 20, which is related to 
misrepresentations that may happen during the negotiations. This section is quite 
relevant as to what is considered a misrepresentation. Hence, “(1) every material 
made by the assured or his agent to the insurer during the negotiations o f the 
contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be true. I f  it is untrue the insurer 
may avoid the contract. (2) A representation is material which would influence the 
judgement o f a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will 
take the risk”26. This part of the section has been subject to a great extent of analysis 
both by courts and academics.
Relevant Cases -  Prior to the CTI and the Pan Atlantic Cases
Two of the most significant cases in relation to the duty of the utmost good 
faith, namely the CTI case and the Pan Atlantic case 27 dealt extensively with this 
point. However, I will refer to them further on. Going back to the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 section 20 also provides that “(3) a representation must be either a 
representation as to a matter o f fact or to a matter o f expectation or belief (4) A
22 Ibid. Page 683.





27 Proper reference is cited below.
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representation as to a matter o f  fact is true, if  it be substantially correct, that is to say, 
if  the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct would not 
be considered material by a prudent insurer. (5) A representation as to a matter o f  
expectation or belief is true if  it be made in good faith. (6) A representation may be 
withdrawn or corrected before the contract is concluded. (7) Whether a particular 
representation be material or not is, in each case a question o ffa c t”2*. At this point 
two elements of good faith must be mentioned: firstly, although the duty of utmost 
good faith is deemed, in most of the cases, to be owed by the assured, in reality, all 
the parties of the contract are under this obligation. And secondly, the duty of the 
utmost good faith is a continuous one. Before the MIA 1906, the duty of utmost good 
faith was recognised as a duty existing in contexts other than a context of pre- 
contractual negotiations. For example, in Shepherd v Chewter29. Lord Ellerborough 
held that an adjustment would not be binding, unless there was a full disclosure of the 
circumstances of the case. Also, a post-contractual duty was recognised but there was 
no discussion about the remedies of a possible breach.
After the MIA 1906, not a lot of cases have been decided on the ground of 
section 17. The first case that needs to be mentioned is Berger v Light Diffusers . In 
this case Kerr J. decided that in order for a marine insurance to be void, the situation 
should be that the non-disclosure had to be material not to the objective underwriter 
but to the particular underwriter who deals with the transaction in question. This was 
also the main issue of the questions that were addressed in the Pan Atlantic case. 
Hence, if we want to summarise them the basic issues were (1) when is a non­
disclosure regarded as material -  in other words what impact should it have on 
the mind of a prudent underwriter-? (2) Is materiality an objective concept as 
section 18(2) and 20(2) of the MIA 1906 show or a subjective element as well? In 
the Berger case it is obvious that a subjective element was recognised and this was an
28 Ivamy E.R Hardy Ivamy. Chalmers Marine Insurance 1906. London. (1966). Butterworths. Pages 25- 
32.
29 (1808) 1 Comp. 274.
30 (1973) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 442.
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advantage for the assured, because the underwriters would have to prove that they
'i 1
were actually induced in the contract .
The CTI and the Pan Atlantic Cases
I am going now to move on to two cases, which are very closely related with 
each other. The reason for this is not that they have any kind of contractual 
relationship but rather in the second one what had to be done was actually the 
assessment and the examination of the first one’s results. Hence, the first one of these 
cases is Container Transport International Inc. v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting 
Association (Bermuda) 32. The case was about non-disclosure of a previous claims 
history. And it was held that in order for a particular circumstance to be material, it 
should, if it was disclosed, make a prudent underwriter, either to cancel the policy or 
charge an additional premium. In the words of the court, “since the English law is so 
favourable to the underwriter in this respect, the least that should normally be 
expected o f  the underwriter is to show that a prudent insurer would have charged an 
increased rate ” 33. However, the decision did not remain the same on appeal34. The 
Court of Appeal decided that in respect of sections 18(2) and 20(2) of MIA 1906, 
there was no subjective element on materiality and even more importantly, that the 
influence on the mind of the underwriter did not necessarily mean that he should 
change his mind but rather that it would have an impact on his mind. According to 
Stephenson J. “everything is material to which a prudent insurer, i f  he were in the 
proposed insurer’s place, would wish to direct his mind in the course o f  considering 
the proposed insurance with a view to deciding whether to take it up and on what 
terms, including premium. His mind would, I think be influenced in the process o f  
judging whether to do so, either temporarily where he can say that he would 
ultimately have reached the same decision without it, or permanently where it would
31 For more details see the judgment.
32 (1982) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 178.
23 Ibid. Pages 188-189.
34 (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476.
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have led him to reach a different decision” 35. Hence, what are in effect the 
implications of the CTI case? Cameron Marky Hewitt concluded that this decision 
has been under great condemnation. And his reasoning seems to be quite 
convincing... “It was pointed out by numerous writers that the test o f  materiality was 
generous in the extreme to insurers ” 36. Also, he argued that “there was a particular 
fear that the parties to international insurance and reinsurance contracts would
7^ • •disregard English law in favour o f a more rational law” . And it is not really 
difficult for someone to understand that this would have a very bad impact on the 
English insurance market. Finally, he referred to the fact that the Insurance 
Ombudsman Bureau, “which adjudicates on consumer insurance disputes and 
which is not bound by the strict law, refused to apply the CTI and began to adopt a
qo
proportionality approach ” .
It is quite clear from the above that the decision in the CTI case could not last 
long and this is what really happened. Its findings were examined in the case of Pan 
Atlantic v Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd 39. There were actually two different tests 
that had to be examined by the court. These were related to the aspects of materiality 
and inducement. Before I concentrate in the actual decision, it is significant to 
emphasise the fact that the findings were in accordance with the CTI case on the 
subjective element test and on the different decision test. The plaintiffs in the case 
were the reassured and the defendants were the insurers. The contract in question 
covered losses occurred in 1982 and similar contracts also existed for the periods 
1977-1979 and 1980. The plaintiffs claimed payment of damages in respect of
35 Ibid. Page 529. Per Lord Stephenson.
36 See: Hewitt Marky Cameron. Reinsurance Disclosure Insurance Contracts Misrepresentation 
Underwriters. In House L. May 1993. Page 59.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 (C.A), (1995) 1 A.C 501
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outstanding losses due to them and they also sought indemnification under the 
reinsurance contract. On the other hand, the defendants raised the argument that they 
did not have to pay on the basis of a non-disclosure of a material fact. The court held 
that in respect of the period 1980-81 the non-disclosure was immaterial and as a result 
the underwriters were not entitled to avoid the policy. For a period 1977-1979, it was 
decided that there was a waiver of disclosure by the brokers of the defendants. And 
for 1981, in contrast, it was held that there was a material non-disclosure, so the 
defendants were entitled to uphold their defence. This was the practical outcome of 
the case. But, there was a theoretical background that had to be applied in the case. 
The Court of Appeal upheld actually the objective materiality test that was adopted by 
the CTI case and decided that inducement was not an essential requirement. In the 
House of Lords the decision remained the same in respect of materiality, but changed 
about inducement40. However, this case has been discussed extensively among 
writers. I am going to refer now to some of the views that have been expressed in 
respect of this case. Hence, according to Harold Caplam41, the decision did not make 
any serious difference in the operation of the insurance market. The fact that, 
according to this case, the test for materiality is an objective one and the test for 
inducement is subjective did not have such an important practical effect. It is worth 
citing down an influential part of his article: “Is anything changed by Pan Atlantic? 
Very little. The commercial buyer is still at the risk o f  discovering, years later, that 
insurers who have never written his business will find fault with the broker’s 
presentation, saying that they would have liked more o f  this or that, or that the 
omission o f  the other is something which, with hindsight, they would have dearly 
loved to be told about; and that his own insurer was undeniably induced to grant the 
cover in blissful ignorance o f  misrepresentation or non-disclosure- how could it be 
otherwise 42?
40 More analytical views about this decision are discussed below. However, the main issues were that 
of materiality and inducement.
41 Caplam Harold. (1994) . Reinsurance Contracts Disclosure Fraud. Illegality. Letters of Credit. Int. 
I.L.R. 2(12). Pages 433-437.
42 Ibid. Page 435.
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5 3 .1 2  Types o f Material Information
Another interesting view is the one by Malcolm Clark43. He made an effort to 
analyse different types of information and accordingly decide whether it is considered 
material. Type (A) “is information such that, i f  the insurer had known about it, after 
due consideration he would have refused to make a contract at all”. Type (B) “is 
information such that, if  the insurer had known o f it, he would have made the contract 
o f insurance but only on terms especially as to premium, different from those which he 
did agree”. Type (C) “is information such that, i f  the insurer had known it, he would 
have considered it relevant, but unlike Type (A), so relevant that he would have 
refused to contract and, unlike type (B), not so relevant that he would have insisted on 
different terms”. Finally there is type (D) “which appears to be information between 
type (B) and (C) 44. Hence, according to this analysis, the main point that needs to be 
discussed is actually the purpose of disclosure. The reason for this is that it directly 
affects which type of information is the one that needs to be disclosed. If the test is for 
the insurer to decide whether he will take the risk or not, then is type (B) that needs to 
be revealed. On the other hand, if the test concentrates on the fact to enable the insurer 
decide whether he will make further inquiries in order to undertake the risk or not, 
type (C) is the information that ought to be disclosed. And this is where two very 
important cases- the CTI and the Pan Atlantic cases -  focused on. According to 
Clarke, the effect of the CTI case was that disclosure of type (C) was required. 
However, this approach was reviewed in the Pan Atlantic case. The problem of the 
CTI case was that there were two alternatives, which were not examined. The first 
one is “the awareness ” test. According to this, the insurer would want to be aware of
43 See: Clarke Malcolm. (1993). Reinsurance Disclosure Insurance Contracts Misrepresentation 
Underwriters. L.M.C.L.Q. August. Pages 297-300.
44Ibid.
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this kind of information when taking the risk. However, this kind of solution was not 
the one that was chosen. Steyn L.J. believed that it was the second alternative, which 
was intended to be considered correct by the CTI case. This approach was “the 
different and increased risk”. The result of this is that if this kind of information was 
disclosed, it would make the insurer believe that the risk in question had been 
increased in relation always with the original disclosure. However, according again to 
Malcolme Clarke this approach does not solve any problems. And there were quite a 
few reasons for his doubts to be taken seriously. One of the most important ones is 
that many times in the London market, risks are taken on because of commercial 
reasons and with very high speed, so that there can be no real difference between the 
“awareness” and “the increased risk” test. Another reason is that the remedy for non­
disclosure is based on the vitiation of the consent of the insurer, but this cannot be 
upheld, since there is always the possibility that the insurer will eventually take the 
risk. These kinds of problems make sometimes non-disclosure nothing more than a 
technical defence, which causes confusion among lawyers and their clients. It is worth 
noting that as doubts were expressed about the outcome of the case, as I cited above, 
another suggestion that was mentioned was that when the non-disclosure came into 
light, the adjustment of the premium would be enough45.
I am going to refer now to another case, where the duty of the utmost good 
faith was one of the central issues. This case is The Litsion Pride46. The problem 
here was the broker’s own knowledge and this was the factor that made this case so 
difficult to be decided. The facts were as follows. The first plaintiffs of the case were 
the owners of the vessel Litsion Pride. The defendants were the underwriters with 
which the vessel was insured against war risks. The second plaintiffs were those to 
whom the vessel was mortgaged. It would be veiy interesting to look at the 
warranties, which were incorporated in the policy. These were: (a) this coverage shall 
extend worldwide, but in the event o f a vessel...insured hereunder sailing for...or  
being with the Territorial Waters o f  any o f  the Countries or places described in the
45 See: Hall John & Justin Tivey. Reinsurance Disclosure Insurance Contracts Misrepresentation 
Underwriters. Int. I.L.R. (1993). Pages 181-184.
46 (1985) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437.
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Current Exclusions...additional premium shall be paid  at the discretion o f  
Insurers ...(b) Information o f such voyage ...shall be given to the Insurers as soon as 
practicable and the absence o f  prior advice shall not affect the cover... ” 47. Hence, 
the Litsion Pride was chartered to make a voyage in one of the most dangerous ports 
in the Gulf. As a result, the first plaintiffs wrote a letter to the brokers stating that they 
have to proceed with the war insurance and advise the underwriters accordingly. The 
brokers received the letter ten days later. While the vessel was in this dangerous area, 
it was struck by a missile and it was abandoned. On a claim by the plaintiffs the 
argument on the part of the defendants was that they were not liable on the basis that 
the requirements, which were contained in the warranty, were a condition precedent 
for liability to be established in an additional premium area. Also, the underwriters 
submitted that the owners and the brokers were in breach of the duty of utmost good 
faith48. The first part was concentrated on the construction of the warranties. Namely, 
it was held that if clause (b) -  mentioned above -  was a normal “held-covered 
clause”, then, a condition precedent would be implied. However, this was a quite 
more extensive and detailed clause and nothing for condition precedent was 
mentioned. Conclusively, if the underwriters wanted to impose a condition precedent, 
they had to do that in very clear terms. Secondly, it was decided that the phrase “the 
absence of prior advice shall not affect the cover” meant that a duty still existed even 
if the information on the particular voyage was not passed. Moreover, the fact that 
information on the voyage should be given as soon as practicable was not a condition 
precedent 49. The second part of the decision had to do with the issues of fraud and 
bad faith. First of all, the court submitted that that it was made clear that the owners 
would not pay the additional premium required. . Also, the duty of the utmost good 
faith could very clearly apply under the circumstances. The insured was simply 
required to notify all the relevant information to the underwriters. But, this did not 
happen, because the brokers made a number of fraudulent statements, which were
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.49 n ,,- j
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directly relevant with the claim. Finally, the meaning of avoidance under section 17 of 
MIA 1906 was discussed. It was decided that it meant avoidance “ab initio ”. This 
meant that the policy might be avoided or not. If the underwriters wanted to defend 
the claim instead of avoiding it, it was up to them50. Hence, the defence of the 
underwriters was upheld both against the owners and the brokers. It is obvious from 
the above that the fact that the brokers were aware of circumstances that they did not 
communicate to the underwriters was the controversial issue as to whether their 
principals should be held liable for their agents’ fraudulent claims. However, this case 
would not be decided now on the same grounds on the basis that there is no actual 
fraud on the part of the principal.
Moral Hazard
Next, I want to refer to the aspect of moral hazard. It is one of the grounds that 
are used by insurers in order to avoid liability. In the quite old case of Locker & Wolf 
Ltd. v Western Australian Insurance Co. 51 it was recognised that the moral 
integrity of the parties in a contractual relationship is one vital factor. Hence, when a 
state of moral hazard occurred, the avoidance of the policy would be justified per se. 
For example, factors, which would create moral hazard, are the insurance history or 
the criminal record of the parties52. As I cited above, the duty of the utmost good 
faith is applied to all the parties to a contract. This means that the insurer is also under 
a duty of the utmost good faith. However, one of the first cases where an assured 
decided to preserve his rights under the duty of disclosure is the Banque Financiere v 
Westgate Ins Co. Ltd. 53. The case involved the non-disclosure by the insurers of 
certain facts that concerned the dishonesty of the plaintiffs broker. The plaintiffs 
granted a number of loans, but they could not either recover the amount that was 
owed to them or sought indemnity in respect of the debtor’s fraud under the terms of 
the policy. More specifically, the firm of insurance brokers that arranged the cover 
issued cover notes about the first loan, which were proved to be fraudulent. In the end,
50 Ibid.
51 (1936) 1 K.B 408.
52 See: Brown Vanessa. Reinsurance Contracts. Disclosure, Fraud, Illegality. Letters of Credit. (1994). 
Legal Times, 30 November. Page 10.
53 (1991)2 A.C 249.
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the whole scheme was proved to be the result of fraud. An action was brought both 
against brokers-which was settled- and on the insurance contracts. However, in the 
court of first instance, the claim was not upheld because of the existence of an 
“insurers’ liability exclusion clause”. Also, an action was brought against the insurers 
for the non-disclosure of the broker’s fraud. In the court of first instance, the claim 
was successful but the Court of Appeal decided that even if a breach for non­
disclosure was recognised only avoidance of the contract and return of the premiums 
could be established but no damages. Finally, in the House of Lords, it was held that 
the losses that the banks were faced with had nothing to do with the duty of disclosure 
on the part of the insurers. Hence, there was lack of causation. However, it was again 
established that damages could not be awarded. It is true that this approach had 
created quite a few problems in the development of the utmost good faith issue, since 
the party, which tried to rely on it, did not have an extensive reward. The strange thing 
is that the court seemed to be influenced by section 17 of MIA 1906, although so 
many years had passed and it should try to make the rules more flexible towards the 
needs of the modem insurance market54.
Open Cover Arrangement
But what happens in the case of an open cover arrangement? I am going to 
refer to the unreported case of Societe Anonvme d’Intermediaries Luxembouregois 
(SAIL) v Farex Gie 55 where quite a few related issues were discussed56. The facts 
were as follows. According to the report, an open cover is divided in two stages: the 
formation of an open cover, which is considered as a separate contract and the making 
of individual declarations, which are individual contracts as well. So, in this particular 
case, SAIL was an in-house broker acting for a group of insurers and reinsurers called 
AIG, and it entered into a reinsurance agreement with FG. Under the agreement, 
SAIL had to reinsure with FG a number of risks accepted by AIG. The nature of the 
agreement was a non-obligatoiy facultative, which simply meant that SAIL did not 
have to make declarations and on the other hand, FG had the right to accept or reject
54 See: Birds John. (1997). Modem Insurance Law. Sweet & Maxwell. 4th edition. Pages 123-127.
55 December 1993.
56 See: Reinsurance Contracts Disclosure. Ins. L. M. 6 (5) 1994 pages 11-12
utmost u ooa raiin 101 unnstos isioouraKis
any kind of declarations. The agreement, as a slip, took place for 1988-1989 and was 
renewed for 1989-1990, when the disputes arose. Very important in the whole 
operation of the slip was the inclusion of “held-covered” provisions, in respect of 
which, SAIL could treat new declarations as covered for seven days and renewals 
were held covered for thirty days. The court held that the existence of held-covered 
clauses was not directly relevant to the duty of disclosure. Hence, a duty of disclosure 
was not recognised on the part of SAIL. Some of the reasons by Mr. Justice Tuckey 
were that it would be impractical for such a duty to be recognised and that a duty of 
disclosure in respect of open covers would create bizarre results. A duty of disclosure 
was also denied in relation to each particular declaration.
5 3 .1 3  Development o f the law o f the Utmost Good Faith
All the cases I have mentioned already are cases, which have been very 
influential in respect of the development of the duty of the utmost good faith. I am 
going to refer now to some cases that are of equal importance for the reason that they 
show how the law has reacted to the above development. The first case I am going to 
mention is that of The Star Sea 57. A family who lived in England was the beneficial 
owners of a number of vessels that were travelling under a Cypriot flag and the 
managers were a Greek company based on Piraeus. The plaintiffs in the case were a 
Cypriot company. Before a journey of one the vessels, when the ship was inspected, a 
problem with a cut pipe was discovered, but there was a failure to fix it. Near the 
Panama Canal a fire occurred in the engineroom. The result was that the vessel 
became a constructive total loss. The plaintiffs relied on the insurance, which had 
been effected and made a claim. The underwriters however denied liability by arguing 
that the vessel was unseaworthy because of the technical problem that was never 
fixed. Also, the second argument of the underwriters was related to the fact that the 
plaintiffs were in breach of their duty of utmost good faith. The court accepted that 
the vessel was beyond doubt unseaworthy and that the captain was completely 
unaware of the safety mechanism of the ship in the case of fire. However it was not 
accepted that the underwriters were entitled to avoid liability because of breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith. The reason for the decision was that since the insurers had
57 (1997) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 360.
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rejected a particular claim, the duty of the utmost good faith in relation with that claim 
comes to an end at commencement of litigation. There was an appeal by the 
underwriters in respect of the breach of duty and a cross-appeal by the plaintiffs in 
relation to the amount of damages. The argument on the part of the defendants was 
that they could avoid the whole contract retrospectively. The appeal of the 
underwriters was dismissed whereas the cross-appeal was allowed and the assured 
was entitled to indemnity according to the fact that the vessel had become
f  o
constructive total loss. The case went on to the House of Lords . The appeal was 
dismissed but it is worth noting that one of the reasons that was given was the fact that 
other jurisdictions trying to discard English law in respect of the fact that an insurer 
can avoid liability on the basis of factors that are completely irrelevant with the 
occurrence of the loss59. This I submit shows clearly the problems with the English 
approach.
I am going to deal with a number of recent non-marine cases where the duty of 
the utmost good faith is involved. The first case is that of Economides v Commercial 
Union Asse Co. pic. 60. Mr. Economides was insured under a household policy but 
the problem was that when he was asked to give a value for the contents of the house 
he said that it would be 16.000 pounds, whereas the true value was 40.000 pounds. 
When there was a burglary in the property, the insurers sought to avoid liability on the 
ground that the insured was under a duty to make further enquiries as to the true value 
of the contents and also on the ground of non-disclosure. At the court of first instance, 
it was held that he was not entitled to recover anything under the policy. However, the 
appeal was allowed. The reasoning of the court was related to the fact that the plaintiff 
was just under an obligation to act in an honest way and this was something that was 
established. Also, a duty to make any further enquiries was not recognised unless it 
was something that was mentioned in the proposal form. In the words of Simon 
Brown LJ “if  insurers wish to place upon their assured an obligation to carry out 
specific enquiries or otherwise take steps to provide objective justification fo r their 
valuations, they must spell out these requirements in the proposal form ” 61. Another
58 http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id200001/ldjudgmt/jd010118/manife-4.htm.
59 Ibid Paragraph 79.
60 Lloyd’s Law Reports Insurance and Reinsurance 9.
61 Ibid Page 16. Per Lord Simon Brown.
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£S) • • •case is that of Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (U.K) . The similarity with
the previous case is that again the insurance policy in question was a household 
contents one. The main issue of dispute was related with question Q6, which simply 
asked if the assured or his spouse were at any time subject to any conviction of arson, 
fraud or a number of other offences? The plaintiff answered “no” but this was proved 
to be false. The other issue of the case took place after the burglary, which resulted, in 
the claim. In addition with all the other things that were claimed by the plaintiff, he 
also wanted compensation for the loss of the computer. However, it was proved that 
this computer did not exist and that the receipt for it has been forged. The questions 
for the court were two: the first one was if the plaintiff irrespective of the fraud was 
entitled to the recovery of any genuine loss. The second one was if the supply of false 
information in respect of question Q6 could be considered to be an offence of 
obtaining property by deception. The first question was answered negatively and the 
second one positively. The appeal was dismissed and the court held that although 
there was no express provision citing that in case of fraud, the policy would be void, 
this made no difference at all. The principle behind this decision was in the words of 
Lord Woolf MR that “the policy o f  the law in this area must be to discourage the 
making o f  fraudulent claims” 63. In the case of ICCI v Royal Hotel 64 the policy in 
question was about fire insurance in respect of a hotel. The importance of the case lies 
on the fact that the principles, which were established by the Pan Atlantic decision 
were in question. The facts were as follows. Royal Hotel was closed since June 1992 
because of a number of fires. The insurance, of course, covered fire among other 
perils. However, the correct legal process was not followed, since the insured had 
created through his director and his secretary false invoices that were submitted to 
bankers. These invoices were the result of fraud and one of the main issues for the 
court was if the activities of the insured’s director and his secretary could be 
considered as his actions. The action was brought by a company called ICCI and was 
one of the insurers. They also tried to avoid liability under the policy on the grounds 
of non-disclosure. In the court of first instance it was held that Royal Hotel had
62 (1999) Lloyd’s Rep. 209.
63 Ibid. Page 16. Per Lord Woolf MR.
64 (1998) Lloyd’s Rep. 151.
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forfeited all its rights because of the fraud. On appeal, the decision of the court was, in 
respect of the first issue, that the actions of the director could be regarded as the 
insured’s. The result of the fraud was, according to the court, that material facts were 
not disclosed to ICCI and Royal Insurance- a parent company- when the policy was 
renewed. And they were facts that a prudent underwriter would take very much into 
account when dealing with the policy. As to the second part of the test that was used 
in the Pan Atlantic case- inducement- it was held that ICCI was induced to enter the 
contract because of the non-disclosure. Therefore, it is clear that the principle 
established in Pan Atlantic applied. In addition, the questions of affirmation and 
estoppel were raised, but they are of no specific relevance in respect of utmost good 
faith65. Another case where inducement was one of the main issues is that of Kausar 
v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd.66. The insurance here was in respect of a shop. The 
insurers argued that they were not under any obligations in respect of the insurance 
policy effected because Mrs. Kapuar failed to disclose to them material facts such as 
that part of the premises were used as a Turkish social club and that she had serious 
problems with her tenant. Very important was Condition 3 of the policy, which cited 
that the insured would not be covered if there was a change in the circumstances and 
the insurers did not agree to that. The change had to do with the suspicion of the 
insured that the tenant had destroyed a window. The judge in the first hearing held 
that the insurance company was induced to the contract and that there was no material 
non-disclosure. This was reversed on appeal67. Finally, I would like to refer to one 
reinsurance case, where the central question was that of non-disclosure, Hill v Citadel 
Insce. 68. This case was about excess of loss reinsurance business. The plaintiffs were 
underwriters for XL cover from 1983 to 1991. The first and the second defendants 
subscribed for the year 1989 -  the first- and for the year 1990- the second- under the 
reinsurance contracts. The plaintiffs claimed sums under these contracts from both the 
defendants and for both years as well. On their part, the defendants tried to avoid 
liability on the ground of non-disclosure and misrepresentation. As to 1989, it was 
held by the court of first instance that there was a material non-disclosure since it was
65 Ibid.
66 (2000) Lloyd’s Law Rep. 154.
67 Ibid.
68 Lloyd’s Reinsurance Rep. 167.
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not disclosed to them what were the costs of recent years. The same applied for the 
renewal in 1990; so, the defendants could treat the contracts as void. The decision was 
upheld on appeal69.
Finally, I would like to make a reference to the operation of a binder in 
relation with the duty of the utmost good faith. Of course, further analysis would be 
done in later chapters of this research dealing with reinsurance, so, I will try to be 
brief. Hence, a binder is “a contract between an insurer and a broker delegating 
certain underwriting powers on brokers”10. If the binder is granted directly by the 
insurer to the assured, the situation is not so complex, because the assured owes a duty 
of disclosure of all material facts, but not of individual declarations. The problem 
starts with whose agent is the broker during the operation of a binder. For example, in 
the case of a non-obligatory binder- the insurer has the right to avoid the declaration- 
if a broker does not communicate properly the information that he has to, to an 
insurer, whose agent is he 71
It is obvious from the above that the duty of the utmost good faith has a vital 
role in the operation of insurance law. It can affect the role of brokers, because as it is 
shown from the cases I mentioned they are under a duty of disclosure as well. 
Whether they are directly liable or not is a complex matter and quite a few aspects 
come into play such as imputation of knowledge. Also, the duty of the utmost good 
faith is a factor that can make a policy void or on the other hand uphold it. And this is 
the reason why it is treated with so much caution by the courts.
5.1.4 Conclusion
As a conclusion, I submit that Pan Atlantic is the most influential case in 
relation to the duty of the utmost good faith, but someone cannot be positive whether 
the subjective- the actual underwriter’s- or the objective approach is better, because 
both create problems in their justification. It seems however that in recent cases like 
the ICCI case the principles established there remain very effective. Anyway, it is 
something that will always be an available and is quite a “technical” defence, so,
69 Ibid.
70 Merkin R.M. (1996). The Duties of Marine Insurance Brokers, in Thomas D.R. The Modem Law of 
Marine Insurance. LLP. Page 288.
7] Ibid
brokers and other parties must be very careful in how they conduct their business. 
Perhaps the solution would be a proportionality approach as in the rest of the 
Continent72. This approach simply means that the parties are considered to be 
responsible according to their involvement in the cause of action. For example, in a 
particular case both the plaintiff and the respondent can be held to be liable for the 
same cause of action and the discretion of the court is in accordance with this 
proportion. However, how the duty of the utmost good faith is applied may vary in 
relation with the circumstances of each case. Hence, it is up to the courts to try and 
make an adjustment between law and the balance of the insurance market.
72 O’Neill P.T & J.W Woloniescki. The Law of Reinsurance in England and Bermuda. Sweet & 
Maxwell. 1998. Paragraphs 10-10 -  10-24.
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5,2 IMPUTATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Imputation of knowledge is very much related to agency law. However, it is very 
significant in the insurance and reinsurance field because in relation to whether an 
imputation of knowledge can be assumed, many of the relations of the parties are 
determined. The meaning of imputation of knowledge is that any knowledge, which is 
known to an agent during the course of the particular transaction, that he is appointed for, 
is deemed to be known to the principal. The case that examined the above is Blackburn 
Low v Vigors ^This case was about communication of knowledge. Briefly, the facts 
were the following. A reinsurance contract, which was instructed by the plaintiffs, who 
were the assured in this particular instance, took place through their Glasgow brokers. 
Actually, the reinsurance was obtained through the London agents of the Glasgow 
brokers. The crucial point of this case was that the Glasgow brokers knew a material fact 
to the risk of the ship, but it was not communicated to the plaintiffs. Immediately after 
that a different Lloyd’s broker put through different reinsurance and the defendant 
Lloyd’s underwriter reinsured the ship on a “lost or not lost basis”. However, when the 
second policy was actually issued, the ship was lost. The argument on the part of the 
defendant underwriter was that the second policy should be void because the plaintiffs 
were imputed with knowledge, which was known to the Glasgow brokers but which -  the 
letter -  had failed to disclose.
In the court of first instance it was decided by Day J. that judgement should be 
given for the plaintiffs, because the material information was not communicated. The 
Court of Appeal reversed this judgement and held that non-disclosure of the fact was fatal 
to the action of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed in respect of this. The appeal was 
allowed. According to Lord Halsbuiy “the judgement o f the Court o f  Appeal is intended 
to lay down a principle that would not be contested, but applying that principle to a state 
o f facts to which I  think it is inapplicable ” 2. According to him again, it all depends on the 
type of the broker. The second policy was actually issued on instructions of the other 
broker who did not have the knowledge of the Glasgow broker. Generally, if “the person
1 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 531.
2 Ibid. Page 535. Per Lord Halsbury L.C
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is an agent to know, his knowledge does bind the principal” 3. It is up to the principal to 
give to his agent such authority, in order for him to know if the agent’s actions can be 
deemed to be his actions. The same principle was actually followed by Lord 
Machaghten4. According to him a legal duty existed for the Glasgow brokers to make to 
the underwriter of the first policy full disclosure of certain material facts, but also a 
moral duty existed as well for them to communicate all material information to their 
principals. The case where the legal duty or the moral obligation of communication was 
distinguished is Banque Financiere v Westgate Insurance5.1 am not going to deal with 
the facts in a detailed way since I have already analysed this case in the previous part of 
this chapter6.
Another case that was interrelated with Blackburn Low v Vigors was 
Blackburn Low v Haslam1. In this case there was a cause of action in respect of the first 
reinsurance policy, which took place by the London agents of the Glasgow brokers. It 
was held by the court that he policy was void, because of concealment of material facts. 
The Divisional Court did not change the decision. It is worth noting the exact wording of 
Baron Pollock: “the judgement in no way conflicts with the decision in Blackburn Low v 
Vigors. Although the opinion was expressed in that case it was not the duty o f  the agents 
to communicate to the principals the decision, which they had received, we take that
O
opinion as applying to the particular facts before the House ” .
A more recent case is that of Kingscroft Insurance Co. Ltd. v Nissan Fire and 
Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (Unreported) 9. The plaintiffs here were the reinsureds and 
their claim was actually for an indemnity against the defendant reinsurers. The treaties 
were arranged through a company, which acted as the plaintiffs’ agent. The argument on 
the part of the defendants was that they should avoid treaties on the basis of non­
disclosure in respect of illegal procedures followed by three directors. Moreover, they
3 Ibid. Pages 537-538. Per Lord Halsbury L.C.
4 Ibid Pages 542-543. Per Lord Macnaghten.
5 (1991) 2 A.C 249.
6 For more details see part about Utmost Good Faith.
7 (1888)21 Q.B.D 144.
8 Ibid. Page 153. Per Baron Pollock.
9 Mitchell Charles. English Insurance Decisions. 1996. Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. 
Page 296.
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submitted that they could not make any connection between the plaintiffs and the 
knowledge of the guilty directors, but they could do that in relation to the innocent 
directors, who, although they were not aware, of course, of the fraud of the guilty 
directors, knew that a certain amount of money was not paid to the plaintiffs. The PCW 
Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers case 10 was used to support this argument. In the court of 
first instance, it was decided that the defence could not be upheld. The ratio decidendi 
was that the transmission of information from his agent to the insured could not take 
place when the nature of the type of information is such that it cannot be inferred that the 
agent would reveal it to his principal. The defendants appealed but their appeal was 
dismissed because it could not be established that the innocent directors knew that the 
“guilty” ones did not intend to pay the plaintiffs but keep the money for themselves. This 
kind of knowledge either could not be deemed to be known under section 18 of MIA 
1916.
The relevant sections of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 are sections 18, 19, 20 as
I have already mentioned11. Generally they are the codification of common law as this is 
established in Blackburn Low v Vigors. Section 18 states that the circumstances under 
which the assured owes a duty of disclosure of all the material facts to the insurer. More 
specifically, it states that “the assured is deemed to know every circumstance, which in 
the ordinary course o f business ought to be known to him”12. It also states the remedy for 
failure to disclose. The insurer has the right to avoid the contract. Section 19 is very 
similar to section 18, but it deals with the knowledge of the agent effecting insurance. 
Similarly, it provides that “an agent to insure is deemed to know every circumstance 
which in the ordinary course o f business ought to be known by or to have been 
communicated to him”u . The only defence that is recognised by section 19(b) is when 
the information that needed to be disclosed came to the knowledge of the assured too late, 
that it would be impossible to communicate it to his agent. The difference between the 
two sections is that section 19 does not provide for the remedy that should be awarded.
10 (1996)1 Lloyd’s Rep. 241.
II These sections are also analysed in the chapter, which is about the duty of the utmost good faith.
12 Ivamy E.R. Hardy. Chalmers. Marine Insurance Act 1906.6th edition, London, Butterworths. Page 26.
13 Ibid. Page 31.
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The only remedy that is allowed by section 19 is that of the insured against the broker for 
failure to obtain effective insurance. Therefore, it is very strange that although the statute 
imposes more or less a direct duty of the agent towards the insurer, the insurer has a right 
of action not against the agent but only against the principal and the only available 
remedy is that of avoidance. This is confirmed by section 20 to which I will refer later. 
Before I continue with sections 20 and 84, it would be very interesting to look how other 
countries deal with this duty of disclosure. However, the last thing I want to say for now 
about English law is that it does not accept forgetfulness as an excuse. As Malcolm 
Clarke puts it in his book: "no allowance is made for forgetfulness or age: the person 
with a bad memory is expected to have a good notepad or a good organisation ”14.
Hence, in Australia there is a rule according to which disclosure is required to 
everything that would seem material to a reasonable insured. Also, in Switzerland there is 
quite a similar rule 15. What it says is that there must be a limitation of the duty of 
disclosure to an accurate response to the insurer’s questions. This principle can be 
addressed in English law only if it is said that for things that the insurer did not ask, he 
waived the duty of disclosure towards him. We can now move on to France. There the 
situation is quite simple. Where there is a wilful misrepresentation or a non-disclosure, 
the contract is nullified. On the other hand, if the misrepresentation is not wilful, then the 
insurer has to pay a proportion of the claim as if the misrepresentation was not done. 
Finally, I will make a reference to America. There, avoidance of a contract because of 
non- disclosure can be achieved only under two conditions. The first one is that "the 
information was not discoverable by the insurer’s own investigation o f the risk”. The 
second condition is that "the odds o f discovery were tipped against the insurer by willful 
concealment, for example fraud, on the part o f the proposer” ,6. Every system of these 
that are mentioned had its advantages and disadvantages but I am not going to examine 
them in detail at this point17.
Moreover, in respect of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, we have section 20. 
This is about the duties that may arise, when we have misrepresentation. Simply, the
14 Malcolm Clark. (1997). Policies and perceptions of insurance. Clarendon Law Press. Page 87.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. Page 104.
17 Ibid. Page 99-106.
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contract can be voidable only if the misrepresentation is material. However, the most 
complicated of the above sections is section 19. Its implications start from the fact that it 
refers to agents and most of the times the relationships between agents, principals and 
third parties are quite difficult to be understood. The major thing about this section is that 
it deals only with what must be disclosed on the part of the broker. There have been some 
cases, where this kind of knowledge has been examined. I will make an effort now to 
analyse these sections in relation with the doctrine of utmost good faith. The basic 
analysis about the utmost good faith is done in the relevant part of this chapter but I will 
focus on the relationship between the sections because this is interrelated with the 
concept of imputation of knowledge. First of all, it needs to be said that that there is both 
a pre-formation doctrine of the utmost good faith and the post-formation doctrine. But, 
what is the relationship between the sections? Hence, section 17 18 actually is the one 
that imposes a general duty upon the parties of an insurance contract and sections 18-20 
provide for the relevant details. It is also obvious that section 17 is much broader in 
respect of the pre-formation doctrine of the utmost good faith and that sections 18-20 deal 
actually with the assured’s duty of the utmost good faith. As a result it can be inferred 
that only section 17 can be used in order to enforce the insurer’s duty. Finally, it must be 
said that there is no aspect of materiality in relation to section 1719.
In PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers 20 quite a few aspects of sections 18 and 
19 were analysed. The facts of the case were as follows. PCW Underwriting Agencies 
Ltd. were actually the managing agents for a number of Lloyd’s underwriters. According 
to a DTI report there were some individuals in this agency scheme, who were committing 
fraud by diversion of a premium income, which was for the benefit of the syndicates. The 
result was that a number of reinsurers submitted that they were entitled to repudiate 
liability on the basis that the existence of the fraud was not disclosed to them. The parties 
of the action decided to arbitrate. Hence, Mr. Justice Waller as a Judge-Arbitrator held 
that the insurers could not be deemed to be aware of the dishonest conduct of the PCW
181 have referred to it in the part that is about utmost good faith. It is the section, which renders a contract 
of marine insurance one of uberrimae fidei.
19 Bennett Howard N. Mapping the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance contract law. Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. Page 165.
20 (1996) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 241.
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agents. Secondly, the agents in question could not be thought to be “agents to insure”. 
Thirdly, these agents were not in any direct relationship with the insurers and fourthly the 
knowledge of PCW Ltd. in respect of their dishonesty was not held by them in their 
capacity as agents to insure, therefore, there was no obligation on them to disclose 
anything about their dishonest conduct. The reinsurers appealed. The Court of Appeal 
decided that first of all, according to section 18, a person who wants to be insured must 
disclose what is known to him. However, it was held that an assured could not be deemed 
to know his agent’s own dishonesty. Conclusively, it was submitted that in this particular 
case the PCW insurers could not be deemed to know about the dishonesty of some of the 
PCW agents. Also, simply because an agent is “an agent to insure”, this does not 
necessarily mean that his knowledge is deemed to be his principal’s knowledge21.1 will 
refer to some parts of Lord Justice Staughton’s judgement. The first thing I am going to 
deal with is how he approached sections 18 and 19. He cited that “it seems to me that 
sections 18 and 19 are carefully framed so as to describe what must be disclosed. By 
section 18 the person seeking insurance must first disclose what is known to him. If he is 
a natural person, that means to him personally; if  a company, known to a director or 
employee at an appropriate level. Secondly, a person must disclose everything, which in 
the ordinary course o f business ought to be known to him. This is a quite sufficient test to 
deal with the knowledge o f agents” 22. Finally, I will quote his words as to what is the 
position of an agent to insure. He said that “I do not find in the authorities any decision 
that an agent to insure is required by section 19 to disclose information which he has 
received otherwise than in the character o f agent for the assured” 23.
In the case of Simner v New India Assurance Co Ltd 24 three categories of 
agents were recognised, where the knowledge of the agent is deemed to be the knowledge 
of the principal. These categories are the following. “There is a class o f agent on whom 
an assured relies for information concerning the proposed matter o f the proposed 
insurance”. Secondly, “the assured will be deemed to know circumstances within the 
knowledge o f his agent, where the agent can be regarded as being in such a predominant
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. Page 254. Per Justice Staughton.
23 Ibid. Page 257. Per Justice Staughton.
24 (1995) L.R.L.R. 240.
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position in a relation to the assured that his knowledge can be regarded as the knowledge
• 25of the assured”. Thirdly, “where the agent has effected the relevant insurance ” .
5.2.1 Conclusion
It is not very simple to state whether a duty of disclosure applies in relation to a 
particular agent or when a piece of material information is communicated to another 
person. The reason for this is that there can be a lot of things according to which this can 
be decided. For example, what is the exact nature of the agent in the particular contract 
and whether he can be considered as an agent to insure? Everything actually depends on 
the circumstances and on the relationship between the parties.
25 Blackburn Low v Vigors (1887) 12 App. Cas. 531. Page 539. Per Lord Halsbury L.C.
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5.3 FRAUD OF AGENTS
53.1 Introduction
It is quite common in the business world for agents to commit fraud. In the 
context of insurance law, cases about fraud arise both in the insurance and the 
reinsurance field. The problem that usually arises is whether the knowledge of the agent 
that commits the fraud is considered to be the knowledge of the company he works for -  
this simply means his principal.
53.2 Fraud of Agents
The first thing that needs to be said is that the available remedy for innocent 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure is avoidance. When there is fraud the difference is 
that damages are also available \  The case that states the principles for the fraud of 
agents is Re Hampshire Land Company2. Briefly, the facts were as follows: two sister- 
companies were involved. This close relationship was created from the fact that four of 
the directors of the Hampshire Land Company- this was the first company - were also the 
directors of the Portsea Island Building Society and both companies had the same 
secretary. The important person was Mr Wills, an agent of both companies. What actually 
happened was that the Portsea Company lent some money to the Hampshire Company. 
But, there were some regulations that needed to be observed in order for the borrowing of 
the money to be within the rules. The relevant section was clause 82 of the association 
agreement. It provided that “the directors may borrow, in the name or otherwise on 
behalf o f the company, such sums o f money, as they may from time to time think 
expedient... provided nevertheless that the aggregate o f  the principal money so borrowed 
shall not at arty time exceed the amount they paid- in capital, unless the borrowing o f the 
larger amount shall have been previously authorised by a general meeting, in which case 
the directors may borrow to such extent as is authorised”3. The details of the action were 
as follows. J.J Saffery was the liquidator of the company and he took out a summons to
1 O’Neill P.T. & J.W Woloniecki. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell. Page 361.
Paragraph 9-35.
2 (1986) 2 Ch. 743.
3 Ibid. Page 743.
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which the society and Mr. Edmonds, who was one of the liquidators of the society, were 
respondents. The main question was whether the society could be considered to be a 
creditor of the company4. Vaughan Williams J. held that there was no proper authority for 
the borrowing of the money. This was because article 38 of the association agreement 
provided that “seven days notice at the least, specifying the place, the day and the hour o f  
the meeting, and in case o f  special business the general nature o f such business, shall be 
given by a circular letter addressed to each member and sent to his address in the 
company’s register” 5. In our case, this was not done properly, so; there was no real 
authorisation. However, the basic question, according to Vaughan Williams J., which 
arose, was whether there was an imputation of knowledge upon the company in respect 
of its agent’s actions in relation to the formalities of the borrowing. The authoritative 
case, to which the case was referred, was Royal British Bank v Turquand6. The 
principle that this case upheld is that a company -when borrowing of money was 
involved- had a right to make an assumption that all the formalities are being observed by 
the borrowing company. The only situation where this cannot be accepted is when there 
is an imputation of knowledge. This principle was relevant to the Hampshire case. It was 
argued in the Hampshire Land Company that since Mr Wills was an agent of both 
companies, it would just be fair and reasonable to assume that the knowledge he had as 
an agent of one company could be imputed to be the knowledge of the other company. 
Vaugham William J. did not accept this argument. He cited the case of Re Marseilles 
Extension Rv. Co7. He said that in his opinion ffom the judgements in this case, it 
became clear that there may be circumstances, where the personal knowledge of someone 
cannot affect the knowledge of the company. The only circumstance, where knowledge 
would be imputed would be when the common agent had a duty to communicate his 
knowledge to the other company. So, he concluded that in the case of Mr Wills, it could
4 Ibid. Page 744.
5 Ibid.
6 6 E&B. 327.
7L.R 7.Ch. 161.
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not be accepted that his knowledge was the company’s knowledge. In contrast, although 
Mr Wills had been guilty of fraud, the company was innocent8.
An example would make the whole situation easier to understand. Also, it will 
show that sometimes in practice it is not obvious how legal principles can be “enforced”. 
The example I am going to focus on is that of an underwriter, who is dealing with a 
reinsurance to close. This is the procedure where the underwriter is actually setting the 
premium, which the old year syndicate should pay to the next year in order to be free 
from any liabilities9. But, in the same time he is the underwriter of both his old and his 
new syndicate at Lloyd’s. This of course can create difficulties, because the underwriter 
will have a duty towards his old syndicate to effect the reinsurance and towards his new 
syndicate to make a full disclosure and not to overlook anything for the benefit of his old 
syndicate. Under these circumstances, it would be very difficult to follow the Hampshire 
Land principle and be positive about the imputation of knowledge of the agent10. 
Something else that needs to be addressed is whether the agent is fraudulent or just 
negligent is a vital factor or just another element for liability to be imposed.
The next two cases I am going to refer to are mentioned in previous parts of this 
chapter, so I am going to make a brief reference just to the outcome of them. The first one 
is Societe Anonvme D’ Intermediaries Luxembourgeois (SAIL) v Farex Gie. et al11. 
In this case, there was a firm of London brokers -  Health Fielding -  which was acting for 
both the reinsured -  SAIL -  for the original reinsurance -  and for the reinsurer -  Farex -  
for the placement of retrocession12. The action against the brokers was based on the 
argument that Health Fielding knew that the retrocession cover was not effective and that
8 For more details see judgement.
9 O’Neill P.T. & J.W Woloniecki. (1998). The Law of Reinsurance. Sweet & Maxwell. Pages 362-363. 
Paragraph 9-36.
10 Ibid.
11 (1995) L.R.L.R 126.
12 This is the procedure where cover is obtained for reinsurance contract. A more detailed definition is 
given in other parts of my thesis.
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there was an imputation of knowledge to the reinsured. The outcome of the case was that
1 Tno imputation of knowledge could be inferred .
The second case is PCW Syndicates v PCW reinsurers14. The cause of action 
was an alleged dishonest contact by agents. The sections of Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
around which the whole case was revolved, were sections 18 and 19.lt was decided by 
the court that the agents did not have a duty of disclosure. The reason for the decision 
was that, according to Walller J., the knowledge of the agents was not acquired in respect 
of their duties towards the reinsured15.
The other important aspect of the case has to do with the fact that the court 
decided that the agents were not “agents to insure”. This meant in practical terms that the 
case had to be decided according to section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, since 
section 19 was not applicable. The major idea, which was upheld by the judge was that in 
section 18 what matters is what was ought to be known by the principal of the agent. 
This, as it is logical, gives emphasis to the standard duty of care that an ordinary agent 
owes to his principal. However, the main issue, which is not so straightforward, is 
whether there is any difference of the duties of someone that is judged under section 18 
and an agent who is deemed to be “an agent to insure”. In this case it was held that there 
could be no different standards because the opposite would be absurd16.
In the case of Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd 17 the main issue 
that arose related to whether an agent was considered to be “an agent to insure”. The 
answer that was given was that “an agent to insure” was an agent that simply played that 
most significant role in effecting the insurance contracts in question. This was actually 
the difference that was noted between the Group Josi case and the PCW Syndicates 
case. In the first one, the agent had played only a small role in concluding the contracts, 
whereas in the second one, he had a much more significant role.
The application of the principles that were established in the Group Josi case and 
the PCW Syndicates was done in Kingscroft v Nissan Fire and Marine, Commercial
13 Because of the nature of the open cover, see p. 54 supra.
14 (1996) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 241.
15 The case is analysed in a more detailed way in the part about imputation of knowledge.
]6Ibid.
17 (1996) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345.
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City (unreported) 18. There were two principles which were held to be inferred from the 
two above cases: (a) Where an agent is defrauding an insurer, the agent’s principal (the 
reinsured) is not fixed with the fraudulent agent’s own knowledge o f the fraud, either 
because he has no deemed knowledge under section 18 o f the Marine Insurance Act or 
because under the principle in Hampshire Land, he does not know o f  the fraud, (b) 
Underwriting agents in the position o f the Weavers are not agents to insure under section 
19 o f the Marine Insurance Act -  Weavers were the defendants in the Group Josi case19. 
The impact of these two principles is that in case there is a fraudulent conduct by an 
agent, it is quite difficult to prove that the principal was considered to have the 
knowledge of his agent. The further test, which was upheld by the court in relation to 
imputation of knowledge was the following: (a) Whether the information in question is o f  
a kind which it is the agent’s duty to acquire for his principal, (b) Whether having regard 
to the particular information in question, it can be inferred that the agent will have 
performed a duty by communicating to the principal20. Therefore, according to these 
principles everything depends on the kind of information and on the duties of the agent. 
What is quite significant is that it does not really matter whether an agent acts in a 
fraudulent or a non-fraudulent way. This is because the communication of information 
from the agent to the principal does not affect the agent’s motives.
5.3.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, in relation to the fraud of agents, generally, it is very easy to 
assume when an agent commits fraud or when he is just negligent. Also, in most cases, it 
is quite easy to ascertain his degree of responsibility. However, in legal terms a fraud 
committed by an agent is a much more complicated issue. In relation to section 18 the 
problem is the position of the reinsured, because a broker under these circumstances is 
deemed to be the agent of the reinsured. Of course it is essential that the agent in question 
is not classified as an agent to insure, because then, his duty of disclosure would fall
18 29.7.99 / Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court), u u\\ elhomcs.coin
19 Ibid. Per Coleman J.
20 Ibid.
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within section 19. Hence, it has to be made clear that the duty of the reinsured to the 
reinsurer is completely separate to the duty of the broker to the reinsured. The other thing 
that needs to be stated as a closing point is that the dishonesty or not of an agent has 
nothing to do with his duties towards his principal, because what matters is the actual 
materiality of the information and what is the agent’s role in the formation of contracts. 
The more he is involved the greater his duty will be.
C h a p t e r
Proposals -  Slips -Policies - 
Renewals
Proposals, blips, Policies and Renewals unnstos isiDouraxis
6 .1  Inroduction
Much of this chapter will be dedicated to the procedure followed by Lloyd’s in 
relation to the obtaining and the placement of the cover. This does not mean that this 
is the only way that exists. However, it is true that the history of Lloyd’s and its role 
makes it very influential and if someone understands the exact way by which an 
insurance cover is obtained and placed properly, then, he will be in the position to say 
that he knows more or less how the insurance market works.
6 .2  Proposal Form
The first thing I am going to deal with is the proposal form l. The reason for 
this is that everything starts from there. It must be said at this point that there is a 
difference in the terms, which are used in the United Kingdom and in U.S.A. In the 
U.K, the document that is used to express that there is a wish for an insurance cover to 
be obtained is called a proposal form, whereas, in U.S.A this is called application 
form 2. The general rule is that brokers should not, except where certain circumstances 
exist, fill in proposal forms themselves. The danger that exists is that there is always a 
possibility that because the broker will not be aware of some facts that may be vital, 
the information that will be written on the proposal form can be wrong and this of 
course can create serious problems during the procedure of the formation of the 
insurance contract. What is generally required by a broker is described by example 14 
of the Insurance Brokers Registration Council Code of Conduct 1978: it is 
provided that “in the completion o f  the proposal form, claim form, or any other 
material document, insurance brokers shall make it clear that all the answers or 
statements are the client’s own responsibility. The client should always be asked to 
check the details and told that the inclusion o f  incorrect information may result in a 
claim being repudiated” 3. It is shown from that statement that the burden, when a 
false piece of information is inserted, lies on the proposer and not on the broker. Of 
course, quite a lot depends on who is the proposer and who is the broker. For 
example, if the proposer is someone who cannot even read and the broker is one with
1 Shaw Gordon. The Insurance Broker . (1995). Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. Chapter 10.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. Page 285.
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quite a good reputation, it would seem correct that a high degree of responsibility 
should be assumed on the part of the broker.
The cases that are related with this topic are mentioned in my research under 
either “the duty of utmost good faith or imputation of knowledge or liability of 
brokers”. This is logical as these are usually the questions, which arise under these 
circumstances. Namely, when a court is faced with a problem that is related with what 
exactly happened during the procedure of the passing of the proposal forms or slips a 
number of allegations is made. The insurers in most instances deny liability on the 
basis of non-disclosure of material information. This is quite a common defence 4. 
The insurer quite often alleges that his broker is liable, because simply he did not 
follow his instructions and the insurance cover, which was obtained, was not the 
appropriate one. And on their part the brokers either argue that the defence of non­
disclosure should fail, because they passed all the correct information to the 
underwriters or they submit that it is the fault of the insured, because he did not 
reveal, either fraudulently or negligently all the relevant information to the broker.
I am going to start my analysis with an unreported case. It is quite illustrative 
about how things work in practice and how sometimes obscure situations may occur. 
This case is known as the loss of an eye case 5. This case was so complicated, that 
even in the original source, to which I refer is divided into three parts. Because of lack 
of space, I do not intend to do the same thing. However, I will try to show its 
significance by referring to particular parts of the judgement. The proposer- the 
plaintiff -  was a person from Europe, who had very little ability to speak English. 
Because of this, he used a friend as an interpreter when he wanted to have an 
insurance policy in case he had a personal accident. This is the point when things 
started to become a little bit more complicated. The cover the insured wanted was 
around two million pounds. But, the strange thing was the insured’s life. Namely, he 
liked more or less to live on the edge. He had a very bad driving record and he was 
involved in a number of accidents. Although he told the broker -  the defendant -  with 
whom he was dealing with, that he was seriously injured on two occasions, he did not 
disclose to him the fact that as a result of these injuries he received a very substantial
4 See chapter about duties of insurance brokers.
5 Shaw Gordon. The Insurance Broker. (1995). Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. page 72-74.
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amount of money from his insurers. Finally, he was about to go hunting in the 
Amazon jungle and the possibility of returning alive from there was only fifty per 
cent. As is obvious from the above, the facts of the case were quite unusual and the 
court had to face a number of problems. The major problem actually was that there 
was great dispute as to what exactly happened when the broker met with his client. 
However, the judge rejected the allegations of the client that actually he has disclosed 
all the material information to the broker. Only nominal damages were awarded to the 
proposer of the insurance cover because the broker had failed to inform his client that 
there was a duty of disclosure imposed on him. After that, in the judgement there was 
a reference as to what was the exact job of the broker in relation to the information 
that should be put in the proposal form. It was said that the broker generally is not 
expected to act as the person, who must try really hard in order to examine and assess 
whether the information he acquires is true or not. The only thing that the broker is 
required to do is to provide his client with proper assistance in the completion of the 
proposal form 6.
Before I move on to some typical but yet very significant facts about proposal 
forms, I will concentrate for a while on the legal aspects that are involved in this 
topic. Of course, an analytical examination does not have to be done, because all these 
things are mentioned in the other parts of this research. Despite that, a reference will 
be made, since it will be much easier to understand why the process of obtaining an 
insurance cover can become so confusing sometimes. One very important aspect is 
that of imputation of knowledge. One very old case about imputation of knowledge 
is that of Bawdev v London, Edinburgh and Glasgow Assurance Co.7. This case 
has very unusual facts. The proposer had one eye only and he could not read. It was 
written in the proposal form that the proposer suffered from no disability, despite the 
fact that the broker knew about his disability. When an accident took place, the result 
was that he lost his other eye as well. The court decided that the proposer was entitled 
to recover for total loss of sight under the policy. The ratio decidendi in this case was 
that it should be accepted that since the agent knew about the special circumstances, 
which were related to the proposer, his knowledge could be said to have been imputed 
to the insurer. The case seems to be correctly decided but moreover it need to be cited
6 For a more detailed analysis see in: Shaw Gordon. The Insurance Broker . (1995). Lloyd’s of London 
Press Ltd. Chapter 10.
7 (1892) 2 Q.B 534.
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that by the cases that followed, nobody can be positive how influential this case really 
is. An example is the case of Newsholme Bros v Road Transport and General 
Insurance Co. 8. This case is significant in relation to how the importance that the 
address can have in a proposal form, but I will refer to this later in this chapter. As far 
as imputation of knowledge is concerned, it was held in the arbitration stage that the 
agent’s knowledge could be imputed the insurer, so, he could not avoid liability. 
However, this conclusion was not upheld in the court of first instance or in the Court 
of Appeal. The reasoning of the court was actually twofold: the first argument had to 
do with the fact that, according to the court, if a proposer asks an agent to act on his 
behalf in respect of the completion of a proposal form, this agent cannot afterwards be 
deemed to be the agent of the insurer. The second one was that since the proposer had 
signed the proposal, if some of the information that is contained in there is untrue, it 
could not be admitted that he can avoid liability on the ground that the agent, who 
filled the proposal form for him, is the agent of the insurer who will eventually 
receive the proposal form. Finally, another judge submitted that if he accepted 
evidence as to what the agent in question really knew would be against the parol 
evidence rule. The effect of this rule is that somebody cannot give oral evidence, 
which will contradict written evidence in a contract unless there is an allegation of 
fraud or mistake. So, the judge believed that this rule could not be overruled in order 
to protect the proposer. From these two cases, the conclusion that can be reached is 
that everything depends on the circumstances, in order to decide whether imputation 
of knowledge can be established. Agency law principles are involved and everything 
is more or less a matter of authority. The general rule is that an agent does not have 
actual authority to fill in a proposal form. But, things become more complicated, 
because it is not always easy to decide when ostensible authority is accepted to exist9. 
However, for the purposes of this chapter, I do not intend to go into depth about 
agency rules.
It is time now to deal with the actual information that can be contained in a 
proposal form 10. There are a number of cases in which vital information, such as the 
name or the address of the proposer, is proved, either with or without intent, to be 
wrong. First of all, there are examples, where there is a mistake as to the name of the
8 (1929)2 K.B. 256.
9 Birds John. Modem Insurance Law. (1997V Sweet & Maxwell. 4th edition. Pages 145-150.
10 Shaw Gordon. The Insurance Broker . (1995). Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. Pages 77-85.
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proposer. In the case of Home v Poland n , in the insurance policy a person used the 
name with which he was generally known and not his real name. The court held on 
this point that the insurers could avoid liability because there was a misrepresentation 
on the part of the proposer. Other facts, which can be important, are the address or the 
occupation of the proposer. In McNealv v Pennine Insurance Co.12. the person who 
wanted to insure his car was a part-time musician and a building contractor on a 
regular basis. The problem really was that part-time were excluded from the insurance 
cover, but when the broker effecting the cover asked him what his job was, he simply 
answered that he was a building contractor. The decision of the court was that the 
broker was at fault in not informing the client what was the exact list of the 
occupations excluded. I have referred to this case more when talking about the duties 
of the brokers. Another case, which is related with all that, is Roberts v Plaisted13. 
The insured wanted to insure his premises. His broker visited the premises and when 
he asked what was the purpose that the premises were used for, the insured answered 
that they were used as a hotel. The cover that was obtained was for a year but fire 
damaged the premises a couple of weeks before the expiry of the policy. The insurers 
made an allegation that they could avoid liability on the ground that the premises were 
used as a discotheque as well, a fact, which was not disclosed to them. In the court of 
first instance, Hodgson J. held that the argument on the part of the insurers could not 
be justified because the insured actually answered honestly to the question of the 
insurers. He was not obliged by any means to disclose all the other purposes that the 
premises were used for. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the 
judge. The reasoning was the following: (1) Even if it was a material fact that part of 
the premises was used as a discotheque, this was not something that had to be 
disclosed. (2) Moreover, only exceptional risks could be included in a supplementary 
question of the proposal form but this was not one. (3) It was correct to be concluded 
that the presentation of the proposal form meant that the insurers had waived any right 
to repudiate 14. Finally, the case went to the House of Lords. Again, the decision was 
concentrated on the use of the premises and the decision remained the same: “Mr.
11 (1922) 2 K.B 364.
12 (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 18.
13 (1989) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 341.
14 Ibid.
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Justice Hodson was justified in the conclusion that by presenting the proposal form, 
the insurers waived any right which they have had to repudiate on the basis that the 
assured failed to disclose that he was operating a discotheque at the motel and that, 
therefore, this appeal must be dismissed” 15. It is obvious from the above cases that it 
is really very easy for a proposal form to be confusing.
6.3 The Slip
The slip is something that is used largely by Lloyd’s brokers. It is very 
important to note at this point the similarities and the differences between proposal 
forms and slips 16. The similarities relate to the fact that the information, which is 
contained in both documents, is more or less the same. The first thing that needs to be 
mentioned in the slip is the name and the address of the assured. After that, the period 
of the insurance cover, which is obtained in and the sum that is insured. Finally, the 
situation of the premises and any other conditions that can be contained in the policy. 
This of course is not directly relevant to Marine Insurance. However, although by this 
brief analysis, they seem exactly the same, they are quite different in some aspects. 
The first difference is that in the slip someone can see the shape of the policy if the 
cover is obtained. In contrast, in the proposal form of this kind is not contained. The 
second thing that is different is related to the precise details of the properties. During 
the process of the slip, generally there will be a survey by the broker to the premises 
that are to be insured. Again, in the proposal form in contrast, all the details about the 
property are mentioned by the proposer. Thirdly, the broker proffers the slip on its 
own slip. On the other hand, the proposer signs the proposal but this is prepared by 
the insurer. And finally, the main difference is that the slip, until a policy is issued, 
can constitute an insurance contract, which can be binding 11. The proposal form is 
just an invitation to the insurer to make an offer. It is true that Lloyd’s has quite a few 
rules in relation with slips. The Lloyd’s Standard Slip was first established in the 
market in 1970 18.1 am going now to refer to the progress of the slip. In the beginning, 
it is the broker who figures out the proposal sums, which are to be insured and the rate
15 Ibid.
16 Shaw Gordon. The Insurance Broker . (1995). Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. Pages 87-99.
17 Ibid.
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of premium that he expects to achieve. However, in the insurance market things are 
not always so simple and I will try to refer to some cases, which are about whether a 
binding contract can be deemed to exist. The first thing that needs to be said is that for 
a contract to be completed, the broker has to find, first of all, underwriters to cover 
100 per cent of the risk. Of course, this is not always easy and everything depends on 
the nature of the risk. In American Airlines v Hope 19 the facts were as follows. The 
case was about an aircraft, which was destroyed on the ground at Beirut airport by 
Israeli forces. In the slip, war risks were included, but with an additional premium. 
Also, the other question was if the clause referring to “unprovoked incidents arising 
during normal course o f  assured’s operation” was incorporated into the slip. And 
what was the exact meaning of the phrase “as expiring” that was mentioned in the 
slip. So, the problem was whether the insured, since he did not make any effort as for 
the insurance cover to be obtained at an additional premium, was entitled to recover 
anything in respect of the loss that took place. The main point of interest in this case 
was that in some other policies issued by the plaintiffs, there were two types of 
clauses included. The first one was an “over” clause. This simply meant that it should 
cover loss over Arab/Israeli territory. The second one was a “between” clause and its 
purpose was to cover loss between Arab and Israel. The House of Lords held that 
there was no way to change the “between” for the “over” wording. Hence, as a result, 
the plaintiffs were not covered for the loss, which took place on the ground of the 
airport. Finally, I am going to cite the case of Bartlett and Partners v Meller 20. This 
was a typical case where there was a problem between the wording of the policy and 
the wording of the slip. However, the contra proferentes rule applied, therefore, 
since there was an ambiguity, it had to be constmed against the plaintiffs.
19 (1983) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287.
20 (1961) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 487.
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6.4 Development of the Slip System
Before talking about case law, it would be very useful to talk about the 
relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. First, we can refer to section 21 
of MIA. According to it, “a contract o f  marine insurance is deemed to be concluded 
when the proposal o f  the assured is accepted by the insurer, whether the policy be 
then issued or not; and for the purpose o f  showing when the proposal was accepted, 
reference may be made to the slip or covering note or other customary memorandum 
o f the contract, although it may be unstamped” 21. Also, section 22 provides that “the 
policy may be executed and issued either at the time when the contract is concluded, 
or afterwards” 22 Hence every case has to be decided according to these sections.
There have been some very important cases, which were very influential in the 
whole slip procedure. The first case I am going to deal with is Janglom v Excess 
Insurance Co. 23 There, insurance was needed to cover jewellery. The premium was 
really high and the broker suggested that it would be reduced if it were kept in the 
custody of a bank. According to that, the cover was actually re-arranged and the 
jewellery was insured when it was in the bank or while it was taken out of the bank. 
The same day that the plaintiff -  i.e. the insured -  was informed about the new 
arrangement, the jewellery was stolen. So, the plaintiff brought an action against the 
leading insurers as first defendants and against the brokers as second defendants. The 
submission on the part of the insurers was that they were not liable, because the 
insurance covered only the period, when the jewellery was not in the custody of the 
bank, when it was stolen, they could avoid liability. Another question, which was 
raised and is much more related to what we are talking about here is whether the slip 
can constitute an offer that is accepted or rejected by an underwriter. The court held 
that: (1) when an underwriter takes a line on a slip, this simply means that he is 
making an offer on the terms of a slip. There is also a retention of right by him to 
modify his offer according to the particular terms of each agreement. (2) The fact that 
there should be a formal delivery in the custody of the bank could not constitute a 
formal requirement of the policy. This could happen only with a warranty that the
21 Bennett Howard. The law of Marine Insurance. 1996. Clarendon Press. Pages 30-31/ Stamp duty is 
no longer in force.
22 Ibid. Page 31.
23 (1971) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 271.
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jewellery was in the custody of the bank in a certain date and time. (3) The 
requirement of “prior advice to the brokers ” was satisfied since the second defendant 
knew that the jewellery was not in the bank. (4) If there are amendments to a slip, 
these can be construed contra proferentem against underwriters as a whole”24. 
Conclusively, the action by the plaintiff was successful against the first defendant. 
And it was established that the underwriter makes an offer when dealing with a slip.
Moving on swiftly, I am going to talk about the Fennia cases. In the case of 
General Reinsurance Corporation and others v Forsakringsaktiebolaget Fennia 
Patria 25 one of the points, which were discussed was the same, as the one I 
mentioned above, namely the making or accepting an offer by an underwriter in 
relation with a slip. The facts were as follows: the plaintiffs were a reinsurance 
company and the defendants were a Finish insurance company. They provided cover 
for the dispatch of linerboard, sackcraft and pulp paper. The company for which they 
provided cover was Eurocan and the paper was under its control while it was stored. 
Fennia actually obtained reinsurance for this cover- “the whole account cover”- and 
also “a specific cover” in respect of paper, which was kept in some named 
warehouses. After a while, the cover was increased. A fire took place in one of the 
warehouses and the paper stored in was destroyed. Some of this paper had already 
been agreed to be sold to customers. A couple of days after, Fennia’s brokers prepared 
an amendment slip, by which only a small amount was to be covered by “the specific 
cover”. As a result of all these things, the underwriter initiated the slip, but when 
Fennia asked them to cancel the amendment, they refused and they tried to rely on the 
amendment slip, in order to avoid liability. The decision of the court was focused on 
the following points. (1) The underwriter was bound by the slip. He could only write 
down a risk that was over-subscribed. (2) The initialisation of the slip by the 
underwriter could be considered to be an acceptance, so, the contract was binding 
upon the parties. (3) The custom and practice of Lloyd’s insurance market meant that 
the right to cancel and time-on-risk was binding both on the underwriter and the 
assured. (4) Also, it was held that the custom, which was related with original slips, 
should not extend to amendment slips. (5) Finally, it was decided that the property did 
not pass to the customers 26. As we can see, the rule in respect of the initialing a slip
24 Ibid. Page 371.
25 (1982) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 87.
26 Ibid. Page 88.
proposals, Mips, policies ana Kenewais u u ^nrisios 1 sioouraKis
was changed. It constituted an acceptance on the part of the underwriter. However, 
there was an appeal to this case. As to the fact of whether there was an acceptance of 
the underwriter, the decision remained the same. Also, "it could not be established 
that there was a custom existed that the insured or reinsured had the right to cancel 
the contract. And it could not be concluded that the right o f  cancellation should arise 
by implication o f  law” 11. Therefore, the appeal was allowed. This series of the Fennia 
appeals were very important in relation with how the slip system worked.
Next, I am going to deal with some aspects of the Zephyr case 28. I have 
mentioned this case in quite a few aspects. Here, I will concentrate on what is the 
legal effect of signing down. The court held that the whole matter was more or less a 
question of reliance. It was established that a duty existed on the part of the brokers to 
make sure that the signing down indication is achieved. I am not analysing the facts in 
a detailed way, since this is done in another part of my research. This question is very 
important about slips, because in reality a signing down is a very usual custom.
Finally, a reference will be made to the regulatory aspects of the slip system 
at Lloyd’s . There is a part, which is dedicated to this in the Lloyd’s Policy Signing 
Manual. It starts by saying that the slip is actually the main document, according to 
which everything is controlled. There are Treaty Standard Form slips and non-treaty 
Standard Slips. The Treaty Standard Form Slip includes “all treaty and excess of loss 
reinsurance business”. On the other hand, the non-treaty Standard Slip is about “all 
business both direct and reinsurance other than treaty scheme and excess of loss 
reinsurance business”. There are also some rules, which are about alterations or 
renewals. In respect of alterations, it must be said that they must be done on the slip. 
However, if the slip is signed at the LPSO, the alterations have to be done on a 
separate attachment. And in relation to renewals, it has to be mentioned that renewals 
sheets are used only when a policy is renewed on almost the same terms as the 
previous policy”. For more technical details, one can refer to the LPSO manual.
21 Ibid.
28 (1985) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 529.
29 Shaw Gordon. The Insurance Broker . (1995). Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. Chapter 10.
Proposals, blips, Policies ana Kenewais l J l unristos isioouraKis
6.5 Rectification
This is actually the remedy that is provided by the courts for any mistakes that 
may happen between the progress of the slip and the issue of the formal policy. And 
the main thing is to try and follow the common intention of the parties . There are 
four factors, which can establish common intention 31. Hence, the basis for 
rectification is that when there is a difference between the slip and the policy, the 
difference must be disregarded and rectified32.
6.6 Renewal of the Slip
This is a very significant aspect of the slip procedure. I am going to use the 
wording of Lord Diplock in the Hope case: “when the time comes to renew the 
insurance with the same leading underwriter, the broker makes out a new slip and 
takes it to the leading underwriter, generally with a copy o f  the previous y e a r ’s slip 
from which the expiring policy was prepared... to simplify the negotiations, the 
renewal slip uses the expression as expiring after the reference to a particular form o f  
cover to indicate that the underwriter’s liability under that head in the renewed 
insurance is to be no different from his corresponding liability under the expiring 
policy... on a renewal, the broker draws the leading underwriter’s attention to any 
changes from the expiring slip, which have been made in the renewal slip and which 
affect the risks to be covered” 33. Of course, this whole procedure is not so simple in 
the insurance market. The duty of the utmost good faith is very significant in relation 
with all that. If the correct information is revealed, it is much easier for a policy 
without problems to arise.
30 Bennett Howard. The law of Marine Insurance. 1996. Clarendon Press. Page 38.
31 Agip S.p.A v Navigazione Alta Italia S.p.A (The Nail Genova and Nail Superba) (1984) 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 353. Page 359.
32 See: Symington & Co. v Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd. (No 2) (1928) 34 Com. Cas. 233. 
Wilson Holgate & Co. Ltd. v Lancanshire & Chesire Insurance Corp. Ltd. (1922) 13 Ll.L.Rep. 
486.
33 American Airlines v Hope (1983) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287. Per Lord Diplock.
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6.7 The Policy
This is a topic, which is very much related to the practice of Lloyd’s. In the 
beginning, the way by which the actual policy was processed was very different from 
what is happening now. No particular office was involved and everything was done in 
the so-called Room. However, this practice created a few problems to a number of 
underwriters, especially when the amount of policies and slips started to increase. The 
result was that in 1916, there was a set-up of an office called the Lloyd’s 
Underwriters Signing Bureau. The importance of this office was shown from the 
interest that the underwriters showed in it. But, its use remained on a voluntary basis 
until 1924. It was then decided that when the sum insured a policy was more than 200 
pounds, it had to be signed by the Bureau, in order to be effective. Moreover, it was 
stated that if the official Bureau did not sign a policy, it would not be considered as an 
acceptance of liability. As it was proved through the years, the creation of this office 
influenced the whole functioning of Lloyd’s. Its name to Lloyd’s Policy Signing 
Office took place in 1927 33.
I will refer to one case, in order to make it clear how significant can the role of 
LPSO be. In Eagle Star v Insurance Co. Ltd v Spratt 34. the plaintiffs were an 
insurance company, which reinsured some risks with Lloyd’s underwriters, one of 
them was the defendant. The underwriters were not happy with the plaintiffs. 
Negotiations were done through a negotiating committee. During the negotiations, the 
defendants failed to attend a meeting and in the meanwhile one of the leading 
underwriters disagreed with some of the terms. In the end, the defendants argued that 
they were not bound by the policies, which were signed by the LPSO. The court held 
that the underwriters were bound by the policies. Lord Denning said: “To my mind the 
answer is plain as can be: when LPSO put their stamp on a policy...they bind the 
underwriters as completely and effectively as if  each underwriter had signed for  
him self’. And according to Lord Justice Phillimore: I  entirely agree...that when 
underwriters set up this policy signing policy they entrusted to it to the task o f  signing 
policies, which will bind them ” 35. This actual decision shows how things work and 
what is the role of LPSO.
34 (1971) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 116.
35 Ibid. Page 128.
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In conclusion, it can be said that slips and policies create a system under which 
the insurance market works and also the amount of work is controlled .
36 Shaw Gordon. The Insurance Broker . (1995). Lloyd’s of London. Chapter 13.
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7.1.1 B in d in g  A u t h o r i t i e s
7.1.1 Introduction
Emphasis must be given to the feature of binding authorities that is one that is 
developed within the London marine insurance market. Before we start analysing 
what is the exact position and which are the duties that a broker has in respect of 
them, it would be very useful to mention quite briefly what are the binding authorities, 
which types we have and how they work. We can start by saying that a binding 
authority is actually a form of agency relationship.
7.1.2 Underwriting Agents
The first one is one the underwriting agent. The only thing that can be said at 
this point is that an underwriting agent is appointed by insurers and his duty is to deal 
with proposals and underwriting decisions. Their presence is more usual in the 
reinsurance field and it needs to be said that their role becomes more important when 
there is an overseas insurer, who does not have to be regulated under the Insurance 
Companies Act 19821.
7.1.3 Line Slips
The second form of agency relationship is based on the Lloyd’s line slip. The 
line slip actually means the delegation of authority by other underwriters to the 
leading one . Again it is a facility that was developed in the London market and its 
practical view means that the leading underwriter can accept risks on behalf of others 
and as a result it can save a broker quite a lot of time. So, a broker is helped to be 
more quick and efficient. A reference must be made here to what is called the line- 
slips. One of the most important questions in relation with line-slips is “whether the 
leading underwriter owes a duty o f  care to those on whose behalf he is authorised to 
a c t”? As Merkin put it “the answer it is submitted must be yes, a result which can be 
properly by the implication o f  an equivalent implied term to the authority Thomas
1 Merkin R.M. (1996VThe Duties of Marine Insurance Brokers.. in Thomas D.R, The Modem Law of 
Marine Insurance. LLP. Pages 287-292.
2 Ibid.
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also asked two questions than can arise in the absence of a line-slip: (1) Does the 
leading underwriter operating under a leading underwriter clause owe a duty of 
care to the following market to reach settlements in good faith? (2) Does the leading 
underwriter owe a duty of care to the following market in accepting risks, given the 
likelihood that the decision will be a significant factor in the decisions o f the 
following market? 3. The last thing in respect of line-slips I want to focus on is their 
shape. Usually, the cover part of a line slip is on two A4 pages. The first sentence of 
the slip is the cover reference. Afterwards, somebody can find the name of the 
coverholder and the account. Next it is the type of contract. Most of the times the 
contract will be permanent and it will have a cancellation notice clause. Finally, there 
are four other clauses. The first is the insurable interest clause. The second one relates 
to the territorial limits. The third one is about the limits of liability and insured values 
and the last one is about conditions. After all these, there are eight more pages with 
underwriters’ stamps and initials by the leader. It would very useful for someone to 
look for example at a Lloyd’s line slip in order to understand how works in practice4.
7.1.4 Binding Authorities
The third type of agency relationship is in terms of so-called binding 
authorities. As a definition one can say “a binding authority is an agreement between 
underwriters and a coverholder authorising that coverholder to accept risks on behalf 
o f the underwriting members on conditions set out in the contract, without specific 
prior approval o f  those underwriters either from a broker or any other intermediary 
or direct from an assured” 5. It is true that most of the times both the assured and the 
broker benefit from this procedure. An obvious example where the use of the binder 
has very satisfactory results is when the assured has a very poor claims record. The 
reason is the following. In an open market, it would be very easy for a certain kind
3 Ibid. Page 288.
4 Ibid. Pages 287-292.
5 Shaw Gordon. (1995) The Lloyd’s Broker. Lloyd’s of London Press. Page 181.
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risk to be completely uninsurable. On the other hand, in case of a binder, it would be 
very much better for both of them because the assured can be allocated to the binder 
and as a result a lower premium can be paid. But of course, there are a few 
disadvantages as well. For example, there is always a chance that an insurer will not 
renew the binder at its renewal date. So, this will result in damage to the broker’s 
market. It would be quite useful to summarise what is the broker’s exact position in 
respect of the operation of a binder: “a broker acts as an independent commercial 
entity in making such decisions, with a perfect entitlement to filter business to the 
binder in a manner which protects the broker’s own in t e r e s t s 6 Also, we cannot 
forget that what is required by a broker to an assured is only reasonable conduct7. In 
relation with this, we can mention here that in Australia the position is quite different. 
Under the Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act 1984, the coverholder of a binder is 
considered to be the agent of the insurer and secondly he has to disclose the fact that 
he is operating under a binder. If this does not happen, it is possible for the contract to 
become voidable. The disclosure is relevant with the doctrine of the utmost good 
faith. An analysis is made in another chapter, so I will be quite brief. If the binder is 
obligatory -  the insurer does not have the right to refuse risks by the assured -  the 
situation is the following: a duty of disclosure by the assured is recognised in respect 
of all the material facts. On the other hand, it is not recognised in respect of individual 
declarations. But, if the binder is non-obligatory then, the insurer has a right to refuse 
risks from the assured- a duty of disclosure cannot be implied, because the policy is 
only a framework contract and each declaration is a separate contract with the result 
that the insurer may either reject or accept the declarations8.
I will give emphasis on a few more things in relation with obligatory and non- 
obligatoiy binders. Generally, as it is implied from the above obligatory binders are 
considered to be contracts of the utmost good faith and all the difficulties arise in 
respect of the individual declarations, which take place during the operation of a non- 
obligatory binder. The most crucial question is whether a broker owes a duty of care 
to the insurer. In Empress Assurance Corporation Ltd v Bowring & Co Ltd.9. the 
problem was that the broker had made some false declarations in respect of an amount
6 Merkin R.M. (1996VThe Duties of Marine Insurance Brokers. , in Thomas D.R, The Modem Law of 
Marine Insurance. LLP. Page 289.
1 Ibid. Page 287-292.
8 Ibid Page 290.
9 (1905). 1 Com. Cas. 107.
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of premium paid to the reinsurer, although he acted in good faith. As a result, there 
was a claim by the reisurer that the broker had been in breach of duty. It was held that 
he did not 10. Also, serious problems arise when the assured has made hill disclosure 
to the broker, but the information is not communicated in the right way to the insurer. 
It was decided again in the Empress Assurance case that when a situation like that 
takes place the insurer has waived his right of disclosure and as a result it is submitted
that the information has been received by him n .
• * « 1 2 *Very interesting about binding authorities is the Fisher Report . This was
published by Lloyd’s and its original title was “Self Regulation at Lloyd’s”. It was 
actually a report by the Fisher Working Party in May 1980. Some parts have to be 
extracted in the exact words in order to look at the use of binding authorities and some 
other important aspects of them. In chapter 22 of the report it is written that “the use 
o f Binding Authorities clearly carries special risks fo r those Underwriters who give 
them, and no system o f  control would remove all possibilities o f abuse... We are 
satisfied that the premium income currently generated by Binding Authorities is
1 3considerable and represents a significant proportion o f  the total business written ” .
Afterwards, emphasis is given to the fact that the brokers are the suitable persons in 
order for the selection of the coverholders to be quite secure and the unsatisfactory 
choices to be very rare. Finally, in chapter 22 we have a very significant reference to 
the role of the Council or the Committee. It is stated that the Council must have the 
power to make the appropriate rules in order to make binding authorities more useful 
and that it should have the right to impose obligations on the brokers, so that the 
coverholders are instructed correctly and all the requirements are satisfied. And the 
last thing that is mentioned in respect of binding authorities is that an authority must 
be conditional on registration by the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office and that the 
broker has to inform the coverholder.
But, what is the exact process of setting up a binder? Again, in the Fisher 
Report is mentioned: “In every case, the binding authority will have been negotiated 
by a Lloyd's Broker, who most commonly will be instructed by a would-be 
coverholder to negotiate a binding authority for him with Lloyd's Underwriters
10 For more details see the judgement
11 Ibid.
12 Shaw Gordon. (1995) The Lloyd’s Broker. Lloyd’s of London Press. Chapter 20.
13 Ibid. Page 181.
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(though occasionally the initiative will come from Underwriters) ” 14. However, many 
times it is the broker, who will try his best in order to prepare the market to join the 
binder. It has to be stated here that the Fisher Report was very influential at Lloyd’s in 
respect of the position of brokers and as a result the Brokers Regulation Committee 
was created. This Committee published a document. Its title was “Lloyd's: 
Consultative Document: The Regulation of Lloyd's Brokers" and it is known as the 
Green Book. And there was a paragraph in it that dealt with the Lloyd’s Code of 
Practice for Lloyd’s Brokers. There in paragraph 8, one can find very important 
statements about binding authorities. At 8.1, it is written that the actual purpose of the 
use of binding authorities is to make much easier the acceptance of business. The only 
requirement that is emphasised is that the broker should always act for his client’s 
best interests. At 8.2, it is mentioned that if the broker acts under a binding authority, 
this fact should be disclosed to his client as well as the economical advantages that the 
Lloyd’s broker will have as a result of the use of binding authorities. Finally, at 8.3 it 
is cited that it is the duty of the broker to inform the insurers that his priorities are 
focused on his clients and not on the insurers15.
Now, it is time to write about the statutory instruments in respect of binding 
authorities16. The first one is the Binding Authorities Byelaw (No. 9 of 1990). It has 
quite a few provisions. The first one is about interpretation. There, in subsections (3) 
and (4), someone can find the definition of what is and what is not a binding 
authority. According to subsection (3), a binding authority is a limited binding 
authority or a marine open cargo cover. Also, there are some restrictions in case 
where the coverholder is not a Lloyd’s person or entity. On the other hand, according 
to subsection (4), binding authority is not a Lloyd’s broker marine line slip. I have to 
say at this point that this byelaw is actually the result of the consolidation of the 
Binding Authorities (Amendment) Byelaw (No 1 of 1988) and the Insurance 
Intermediaries Byelaw (No 8 of 1990)17.
The second statutory instrument is the Binding Authorities Regulation (No 5 
of 1990). The most significant provision is the one that deals with the delegation
14 Ibid. Page 182.
15 Ibid. Appendix 15. Page 363.
16 Ibid. Pages 183-186.
17 Ibid.
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under the binding authorities. Under this provision delegation by the coverholder can 
happen only with the presence of prior written agreement. Again, it is a consolidation 
of the Binding Authorities (Amendment) Regulation (No 1 of 1988), the Binding 
Authorities (Amendment No 2) Regulation (No 2 of 1989) and the Insurance 
Intermediaries Byelaw (No 8 of 1990)18. The third is the Binding Authorities 
Registration Scheme. This scheme is about the registration of binding authorities and 
some other important topics, such as the signing of the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office 
or the resubmission of registration documents. The fourth one is the “the Operation 
of Binding Authorities Code of Practice”, which was made under paragraph 6 of 
Regulation No. 5 of 1990. It included among others coverholders’ compliance with 
laws, transmission of information and responsibility of operation19.
The last part of the chapter will be dedicated to a brief explanation of the 
persons and how they can be involved during the operation of a binder20. First of all, 
the coverholder is recognised as the agent of the underwriter. Another fact is that 
“where the employer is a Lloyd’s broker direct as his agent, then the potential for  
conflict arises in the event o f  a claim”.21 This is often the reason, which leads many 
coverholders to try to find other brokers, in order to avoid the conflict of interest is 
also the integrity of the coverholder, especially in cases where there are disputes that 
have to do with matters of disclosure or other problems. A measure, which can help to 
the correct operation of binding authorities -  as much as this can happen -  is the 
monitoring of the check -  lists. These appeared for the first time in the Regulation No 
5 of 1990. They are prescribed in some classes, which are prescribed by the 
Committee and when a leading underwriter subscribes in such a class under a binding 
authority, then he had to sign a document that is called a check list. The solution that 
this can provide is that in some instances, where there is damage, it will be found out 
quite soon.
This theoretical background will be very useful in order to move on now and 





21 Ibid. Page 187.
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7.2 BINDING AUTHORITIES & BROKERS
7.2.1 Binding Authorities and Reinsurance
Binding authorities are quite a common concept in the field of reinsurance. I have 
already referred to the theoretical background of binding authorities, when I was talking 
about special arrangements, where brokers are involved. What I am going to analyse now 
is the binding authorities, which are effected through underwriting agents and what is the 
position of each party during the transaction. This area, although it does not directly 
concern a broker, is very important, because for example a broker is under a duty to make 
inquiries, in order to assess whether the underwriting agent he deals with has the 
authority to conclude the contract in question. In respect of the agent’s position, 
everything depends on the authority that he has, whether this is actual or ostensible1. The 
opinion of the broker is vital. The reason for this is that most of the times, the principal of 
the broker will rely on him to ascertain the “quality” of the assured because it is he that 
will have the personal knowledge and experience about whom he is dealing with.
The first thing I am going to refer to is the position of the underwriting agent 
during the transaction. Is he always merely an agent or he is in the position to accept risks 
also as a principal? A case where this question was elaborated is Trancontinental 
Underwriting Agency S.R.L v Grand Union Insurance Co. Ltd. 2. Briefly the facts 
were as follows: the case was about a retrocession cover. A retrocession agreement takes 
place when a reinsurer actually agrees to insure the liability of another insurer. The 
plaintiffs in this case were the managing agents of a retrocession pool in which the 
defendants were interested. Hence, the two questions that arose- in respect of the 
relationship between the retrocessionaire (the person who insures the liability of the other 
reinsurer) and the retrocedant (the original reinsurer) were: (a) whether the plaintiffs were 
on the proper construction o f the agreement parties thereto and (b) irrespective o f  
answer to (a) whether the plaintiffs as brokers were in any event entitled to a claim under 
the agreements on behalf o f their principals in the capacity o f fiduciary agents 3. In the 
arbitration stage, it was decided by the arbitrators, that the plaintiffs did not have the right
1 Birds John. (1997). Modem Insurance Law. Sweet & Maxwell. 4th edition. Pages 178-180.
2 (1987) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 409.
3 Ibid. Page 409.
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to sue the defendants and there was an appeal to that. I am going to refer to the judgement 
in quite some detail.
In relation to the first question, the argument of the plaintiffs was that the ratio 
decidendi of the arbitration is in conflict with an agency law principle. Someone can read 
in the authoritative textbook of Bowstead on Agency: “an agent who makes a judgement 
on behalf o f his principal is liable to or is entitled to sue the third party in accordance 
with the terms o f any contractual engagement into which he has entered... the question 
whether an agent is deemed to have contracted personally depends on the intention o f the 
parties”4. The same principle was established as well in earlier cases. In Cooke v 
Wilson5, it was said by Mr. Justice Creswell that “prima facie, when a man signs a 
contract in his own name, he is a contracting party and there must be something very 
strong upon the face o f the instrument to prevent that liability from attaching to him ” 6. 
Also, in Parker v Winlow7, Lord Campbell C.J said, “I  can see no doubt for myself that 
the defendant is personally liable. He makes the contract using apt words to show that he 
contracts. And the only ground suggested for rebutting his personal liability is that he 
says he is the agent for another: but he may well contract and pledge his personal 
liability, though he is the agent for another”9. And Mr. Justice Crompton in upholding 
his argument expressed his opinion that “mere words o f description attached to the name 
of the contractor, such as used here, saying he is the agent for another, cannot limit his 
liability as contractor. A man, though agent, may very well intend to bind himself, and he 
does not bind himself if  he contracts without restrictive words to show that he does not do 
so personally” 9. These were more or less the authorities used by the plaintiffs. Hence, in 
summary, Mr. Mance argued on behalf of the plaintiffs, that because the plaintiffs
4 Ibid. Page 412. / Bowstead William. (1996). Bowstead and Reynold on Agency. Sweet and Maxwell. 16th 
edition. Articles 115-116
5 (1856) 1 C.B (N.S) 153.
6 Ibid Page 162. Per Mr. Justice Cresswell.
7 (1857) 9 Exch. 942.
8 Ibid Page 947. Per Lord Campbell C.J.
9 Ibid. Page 949. Per Mr. Justice Crompton.
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themselves signed the contract in question and because there was no intention for this not 
to happen, they were parties to the contract.
On the other hand, the defendants argued that the decision of the arbitrators was 
correct and that because the plaintiffs acted only as brokers and managing agents, they 
could not be deemed to be the parties of the contract. They relied on a passage in 
Halsbury’s Laws of England: “extrinsic evidence generally cannot be received in order 
to prove that a person appearing, on the face o f the document, to be the principal was in 
fact the agent ...where a person contracts professedly as an agent, then in order to charge 
him on the contract, it may be shown by extrinsic evidence that he is in fact the 
principal”10.
The court accepted plaintiffs argument. Mr. Justice Hirst in justifying his 
decision said that it was clear from the retrocession agreements that the plaintiffs did not 
try to exonerate themselves from liability. It was beyond doubt that they intended to be 
parties of the contract. In addition, the judge said that because the plaintiffs were 
considered to be personally involved with the contract and personally contracted, they did 
not mean that the unnamed principals of the pool could not bring an action or be sued 
together with their agents11.
The second question had to do with the right of the plaintiffs to sue in respect of 
their position as brokers. Again, the plaintiffs justified their position with a number of 
authorities. The first one that was used was from Amould on Marine Insurance: “an 
action on a policy may be brought in the name o f broker or other agent who has effected 
it in his own name” u. Quite a few cases were mentioned as well. In Provisional 
Insurance Co. of Canada v Leduc13. it was upheld that “it is clear that an agent who 
insures for another with his authority may sue in his own name” 14. Finally, Mr. Mance 
cited down the cases of Lloyd’s v Harper 15 and the more recent one of Woodar
10 Halsburv’s Laws of England. (1983). Volume 12, paragraph 1479.4th edition. This was mentioned in the 
judgement
For more details see the actual judgement
a  j  a  <1____ : _____ i ______ ______ i  / r t n __________ t u : ___________12 Amould Marine Insurance. 16tn edition, paragraph 1354.
13 (1874) L.R6P.C 224.
14 Ibid. Per Sir Barmes Peacock.
15 (1880) 16 Ch. D 290.
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Investment Development Ltd v Wimpev Construction U.K Ltd. 16. Both cases
actually upheld the principle that when a party -  e.g. A- is a trustee for someone else- e.g. 
B- then, it is possible for A to claim everything under the contract to which B is entitled 
to. The Woodar case was even more specific, because it dealt with the position of an 
insurance broker. The defendants on their part stated that in the case of The Albazero17. 
it was said that in order for someone to claim the interest of someone else under a 
contract, “it must be shown that it appears from the terms o f the policy that he intended 
to cover their interests” 18. Their other argument was that the authorities that were 
mentioned by the plaintiffs applied only to marine insurance. The court again accepted 
the plaintiffs’ argument, by saying that it would not be logical for the brokers’ capacity to 
be disputed, since it is in the nature of the brokers’ business to act on behalf of their 
principals.
Another area of dispute in relation to the authority of agents is when we have a 
termination of an agency agreement, but at the same time the principal gives to his agent 
the right to continue to administer the run-off of the business. This administration of the 
run-off of the business by the agents means in simple words that the agent will deal only 
with business that has already been done by him on behalf of his principal in respect of 
the agency agreement that has been terminated19. It must be mentioned here that although 
this is quite a usual scenario in the insurance context, the principal has of course the right 
to cancel completely the agreement and discharge his agent. A very significant case that 
is related with all these aspects is Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company of 
Europe Ltd. v Orion Marine Insurance Underwriting Agency Ltd20. The defendants- 
Orion - were actually the underwriting agents of the plaintiffs-Yasuda Fire-. The 
agreement contained clause 4.2 by which “the plaintiff was entitled to inspect and take
16 (1980) 1 W.L.R277.
17 (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 467.
18 Ibid. Page 474.
19 For a more detailed definition see: O’Neill P.T. & J.W. Woloniescki. The Law of Reinsurance. (1998). 
Sweet & Maxwell. Paragraph 16-01
20 (1995) Q.B. 174, (1995) 2 W.L.R. 49. (1995) 3 All E.R. 211, (1995) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 525, The Times, 
October 27,1994, ChD.
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extracts fo r  or make copies o f all the necessary hooks, accounts, records and other
21documentation, although the records were to be the property o f the defendants” . At 
first, the plaintiffs terminated the agreement, but let the defendants to continue to 
administer the run-off of the business. Later on, they decided to conduct the run-off 
themselves. As a result, in respect of clause 4.2, they asked the defendants to give their 
permission for the inspection and copy of the records, accounts, books and any other 
information to take place. The defendants refused. These were the general facts of the 
case and the cause of action concerned the defendants’ refusal.
It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff's that “it is a fundamental principle o f  the 
law o f agency that an agent’s duty to maintain existing records and to allow access to 
them after the contract o f agency has been terminated, continues. The business 
underwritten was the plaintiff’s business, not that o f the defendant’s, so that the fiduciary 
duties imposed on the defendants by the relationship o f principal and agent continue in 
respect o f business already transacted” 22. According to the argument the fact that the 
information would remain the information of the defendants did not give them the right to 
refuse the inspection. The only effect that this could have was that the defendants did not 
have to submit to the plaintiffs the original sources of information. It was also mentioned 
that even if the defendants, as their system, kept the records of all the customers together 
and not of each customer separately, this will not affect their obligation. According to 
their duty to provide certain information, they would simply have to provide their 
principals with the records of all the customers.
On the other hand, the defendants based their arguments on the case Photo 
Productions Ltd. v Securicor Transport Ltd. 23. Generally the argument was “that 
where primary obligations have been discharged by acceptance o f repudiatory breach, 
the primary obligations can no longer be enforced, whether by specific performance, 
injunction or otherwise. The only available remedy to the innocent party is the secondary
21 (1995) Q.B. 174. Page 174.
22 Bowstead William. (1996)Bowstead and Reynold on Agency. Pages 191-192. Article 151. Sweet and 
Maxwell. 16th edition.
23 (1980) A.C 827,849, 850.
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remedy o f damages” 24. Moreover, the court upheld that that the extent of damages that 
should be awarded, should be decided by arbitration.
It will be very interesting now to look at the decision of Colman J. His actual 
decision was that the plaintiffs, although a termination of agency agreement between 
them and the defendants had taken place, had a continuing right to inspect all the records 
they needed for the effective run-off of the business. First of all, the judge said that it was 
not for this court to decide which party was in repudiatoiy breach of contract, because 
this was a matter of arbitration. Further on, he upheld the plaintiffs’ argument, by 
accepting that, because the risks that were involved were complex and long-term, it was 
vital for them to have quick access to the records. Following his argument, he analysed 
the case of Photo Productions. Actually, he quoted a part of Lord Diplock’s speech: 
“every failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach o f contract. The secondary 
obligation on the part o f the contract breaker to which it gives rise by implication o f the 
common law is to pay monetary compensation to the other party for the loss sustained by 
him in consequence o f the breach” 25. However, Lord Dip lock recognised two 
exceptions, when the primary obligations of the parties do change and the party, who is 
not at fault has the right to cancel. According to his own words, the two exceptions were: 
(a) when the event resulting from the failure by one party to perform a primary 
obligation has the effect o f depriving the other party o f substantially the whole benefit, 
which it was the intention o f the parties that he should obtain from the contract, the party 
not in default may elect to put an end to all primary obligations o f both parties remaining 
unperformed 26. (b) Where the contracting parties have agreed, whether by implication o f 
law or the contracting parties or by express words, that any failure by one party to 
perform a primary obligation, irrespective of the gravity o f the event that has in fact 
resulted from the breach, it shall entitle the other party to elect to put an end to all
97primary obligations o f both parties remaining unperformed” .
24 Ibid
25 Photo Productions Ltd. v Securicor Transport Ltd. (1980) A.C 827, 849, 850. Per Lord Diplock.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid
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Colman J. supported the view that the right of inspection could not be cancelled, 
because the defendants had a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs and the relationship 
could not be affected by the repudiatory breach. He also said that this continuing 
relationship existed irrespective of the contract of agency. In his own words: “although in 
modern commercial transactions, agencies are almost invariably founded upon a 
contract between a principal and an agent, there is no necessity for such contract to 
exist. It is sufficient if there is a contract by the principal to the exercise by the agent of 
authority and consent by agent to his exercising such authority on behalf o f the 
principal” 28. Something else that he focused on was the fact that it was impossible for 
the plaintiffs to keep up with the run-off of their business, if the defendant’s duty was not 
regognised. A citation would be quite helpful: “that obligation to provide an accurate 
account in the fullest sense arises by reason o f the fact that the agent has been entrusted 
with the authority to bind the principal to transactions with third parties and the 
principal is entitled to know what his personal contractual rights and duties are in 
relation with those third parties as well as what he is entitled to receive by way of 
payment from the agent" 29. This is quite briefly the reasoning of Colman J. in his own 
words. In the more recent case of Home Insurance v M.E Ruttv Underwriting Agency 
Ltd.30, it was held that in case of pool members, if the records of their agent are asked to 
be passed to them, they are entitled jointly to them .
7.2.2 Difference between Open Covers and Binders
It is time now to focus on the difference between open covers and binders. The 
difference is very important to a broker, because agency issues are involved. An open 
cover is when an insurer binds himself that he will accept certain kind of risks to a certain 
amount. In this case, there is no agency agreement and the contract is between the
28 (1995) Q.B 174. Page 185. Per Colman J.
29 Ibid
30 (1996) L.R L.R415.
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reinsurer and the reinsured. Open covers are also called facultory obligatory treaty31. 
On the other hand, as I have already mentioned, when there is a binder, the broker is the 
agent of the reinsured. A case that is about open covers is Phoenix General Insurance 
Co. of Greece v Halva non 32. In this case the plaintiffs reinsured with the defendants. 
The defendants under the open covers were obliged to accept the risks that the plaintiffs 
would choose. It must be said at this point that all the contracts were kept in the form of 
slips and as a result no policies were signed. This created a lot of difficulties to the court, 
because, what the parties intended to do, could be very obscure. The cause was the 
following: it was argued by the defendants that under the Insurance Companies 
(Classes of General Business) Regulations 1977, which amended the Insurance 
Companies Act 1977, that the class of insurance which the plaintiffs undertook could be 
covered only by class 16. (Miscellaneous). Following the argument, the defendants 
continued that that this was illegal, because the plaintiffs were authorised only by section 
83(4) of the original Act -  Insurance Companies Act 1977 -, which was about marine 
aviation and transport insurance business. As a result, a number of issues had arisen. The 
first issue was about the illegality on the part of the plaintiffs, which could render the 
contracts in question void. The principle that the defendants supported could be found in 
the case of Maries v Philip Trant and Sons Ltd.33: “so far as the cause o f action itself 
is concerned, the principle is well settled that if  the plaintiff requires any aid from an 
illegal transaction to establish his cause o f action, then he shall not be aided from the 
court” 34. The other cases that were used were the case of Bedford Insurance Co. Ltd.
31 O’Neill P.T. & J.W. Woloniescki. The Law of Reinsurance. (1998). Sweet & Maxwell. Paragraph 10-10.
32 (1985) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 599.
33 (1954) 1 Q.B 29.
34 Ibid. Page 32.
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v Institute do Reseguros do Brasil35, and also that of Stewart v Oriental Fire and 
Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.36. In the first case, the principle which was upheld was that 
“a reassured could recover under a reinsurance contract on account of what he held to 
be the illegality o f the original insurances" 31. In the other case it was held that “a 
reassured who had not been carrying on business illegally, could recover under his
reinsurance contract from a reinsurer who had” 38. Hence, the first thing that the judge
had to decide was whether the plaintiffs had committed a criminal offence. The court 
answered that the plaintiffs did commit a criminal offence. As I have already stated 
everything depended on whether the plaintiffs were authorised to act under certain 
provisions or not. The plaintiffs argued that they were acting under class 5 and 6 of the 
1977 Regulations. These two classes related to aviation. The defendants said that the only 
class, which could cover the plaintiffs activities, was class 16, which was about 
miscellaneous financial loss. The court upheld this opinion. The second question that the 
court had to decide as to the extent of illegality on the part of the plaintiffs. The court 
held that the transactions could not be considered void and the illegality concerned only a 
certain part of the plaintiffs. Finally, there was a question about the retention of risk of 
the reassured. This device is used to ensure that the reassured is acting in a reasonable 
way. The court decided that it could not be implied that the plaintiffs were under an 
obligation to retain any part of the risk.
Generally, the reasoning why commercially open covers are needed was very well 
explained in Glasgow Assurance Co. v Svmondson by Scrutton J.: “in the insurance 
market quantities o f risks are passed on well-known underwriters o f high standing, 
whether companies or Lloyd’s men... on the other hand, original lines o f insurance could
35 (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, (1985) 1 Q.B 966.
36 (1984) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 109, (1985) 1 O.B 988.
37 Phoenix General Insurance Co. of Greece v Halvanon (1985) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 599. Page 603. Per Mr. 
Justice Hobhouse.
38 Ibid.
39 (1911) 16 Com. Cas. 109.
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not be placed with new companies or foreign companies who are not well known, and if  
they are to get any business, they must accept reinsurances o f the lines o f the popular 
underwriters” 40.
7.2.3 Conclusion
It is obvious from the above that the whole chain of open covers, binding 
authorities and especially how the parties of a contract deal with them is a very complex 
issue. Therefore, it is logical that many times abuse of binding authorities takes place and 
liabilities between the parties have to be settled. I will make just very brief reference at 
this now, because I am going to analyse it in the chapter, which will be dedicated to the 
topic of liability. Hence, the main thing that should be mentioned is that everything in 
regard to the liability of the parties depends on the actual or ostensible authority that the 
principal gives to his agent. Also, the liability can have more than one form. There may 
be liability between the principal and his agents or it may be exclusively the liability of 
the intermediaries- this is the category, which is of most concern to brokers-.
40 Ibid.
7.3 U m b r e l l a  A r r a n g e m e n t s
This is again a concept of Lloyd’s, since it is very much related with Lloyd’s 
practice. The definition of what constitutes an umbrella arrangement can be found in 
Appendix EE of the Green Book entitled: Consultative Document: The Regulation of 
Lloyd’s Brokers: “ an arrangement between a Lloyd’s broker and a non-Lloyd’s 
broker (other than a subsidiary o f the Lloyd’s broker) whereby business is transacted 
at Lloyd’s by the directors, partners or employees o f the non-Lloyd’s broker, using the 
Lloyd’s brokers’ slips" \  It is obvious that this can be proved to be a very important 
device in practice. It is a way by which Lloyd’s becomes more approachable and is 
helping non-Lloyd’s brokers to conduct business. However, it is a system that has 
some disadvantages as well. There have been many instances when non-Lloyd’s 
brokers have been proved to be untrustworthy and the result was that many problems 
were created. There was a case a few years ago where a Lloyd’s broker put himself
into trouble because of a non-Lloyd’s broker who operated a binding authority under
2 3an umbrella arrangement . However, this case remained unreported . These
problems have to do with for example retention of premiums for quite a long period or 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts. Also, there have been 
instances of no proper security or record of accounts. This is logical in a way because 
it is much more difficult for the whole Lloyd’s system to be able to check and assess 
someone who is not a Lloyd’s broker than someone who is.
I am going to refer to one case in order to look at umbrella arrangements in a 
practical way. The case in pont is Johns v Kelly4. The facts were as follows. Hoover 
pic was a company that wanted to obtain a warranty for their goods, which would be 
for a more extended period than the original one. In order to do that, they asked for 
the advice of an insurance consultants’ firm who advised them to employ a company 
called Multi Guarantee Co. Ltd. to go through with the task. So, as a result this
1 The Green Paper: Lloyd’s: Consultative Document: Umbrella Arrangements. May 1984.
The Green Book: Consultative Document: The Regulation of Lloyd’s Brokers. November 1987. 
Appendix EE. / Shaw Gordon. (1995). The Lloyd’s Broker. Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. Chapter 22.
2 See: Shaw Gordon. (1995). The Lloyd’s Broker. Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. Paragraph 22.1
3 Ibid. Page 203.
4 (1986) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 468.
company instructed Campbell Robert -  CR - to place the cover. The problem was that 
CR were not Lloyd’s brokers and they had to try and sort out an umbrella arrangement 
with a Lloyd’s broker. They arranged it with a firm of Lloyd’s brokers called Robert 
Morris Gray Ltd. The agreement was that CR would pay RMB a 5 per cent of 
premium income due to Lloyd’s underwriters. Also, CR agreed to indemnify RMB in 
relation to any liability, arising in tort in relation to their activities. When CR placed 
the risk for Hoover there was an upper limit about claims, which could be made and 
the insured had to be Hoover. Hence, when the action was brought, a number of 
parties were involved. The insurers denied liability “on the ground that the claim 
made by RMB did not fall within the policy and alternatively that they were entitled to 
avoid the policies on the ground o f misrepresentation in that RMB had declared on 
the proposal form that CR was not an associate company; and on the ground o f  
material non-disclosure in that RMB had not disclosed to the insurers the existence o f  
the umbrella arrangement, which was a material circumstance that ought to have 
been disclosed” 5. The court held that CR was not an associate company with RMB. 
Also, that a duty of care was owed by RMB to Hoover and that it was clear that RMB 
was under a duty to control CR’s actions. Thirdly, the relationship between RMB and 
Mr.Tim Roberts, who was CR’s principal, could not be considered to be a normal 
relationship between an employer and an employee. It was just a method to satisfy the 
Committee of Lloyd’s. Fourthly, the court accepted that the actual existence of an 
umbrella arrangement was a factor, which would have been considered material by a 
prudent insurer. Finally, it was held that there was no evidence proving that RMB 
disclosed the existence of an umbrella arrangement at any time during the conclusion 
of the insurance contract or its renewal. This was in fact the reason why they were 
held to be liable6. If, however, CR went insolvent but kept the premium as a result of 
fraud, then, RMB would be liable to the assured in tort. The general conclusion that 
can be derived from the above case is that the device of umbrella arrangements can 
sometimes be very useful for the operation of the Lloyd’s insurance market. It is quite 
often the only way by which a non-Lloyds broker can approach Lloyd’s transactions. 
The problem, however, as I mentioned above, is basically one of security. It is not
5 Ibid. Pages 468-469.
6 Ibid.
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easy, for example, for a Lloyd’s broker to make proper investigation about the non- 
Lloyd’s ones. Hence, it is a mechanism that has to be treated with caution from the 
parties, who intend to be involved.
7.3.1 Personal Lines Business
Binding authorities and umbrella arrangements are not the only ways by which 
a non-Lloyd’s broker can have access to Lloyd’s. Personal Lines also exist. My 
reference to them is going to be very brief, because it is a device that is used only to 
non-commercial insurance in the context of private motor car insurance or personal 
accident insurance. The main thing about personal lines is that the person who obtains 
the cover acts in a private capacity . In this kind of circumstances, it is the Lloyd’s 
broker who has to make sure that the individual that is involved will carry out his 
contractual obligations. His role here is more significant than when we have a
g
commercial insurance . The reason for this is that an individual cannot be expected to 
have the expert knowledge like parties who are involved in commercial insurance.
7 Shaw Gordon. (1995). The Lloyd’s Broker. Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. Chapter 23.
8 Ibid
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8 .1  Introduction
The question of liability of an insurance broker in relation to his duties that 
arise under an insurance contract is perhaps the most significant one. The difficulty is 
that it is a very wide topic and it will not be easy to put all the possible aspects of an 
agent’s liability in order. The other thing that must be noted at the beginning is that, in 
order to have a general view of this topic and its implications with other areas of law, 
that analysis cannot be confined only to the position of brokers. Other examples must 
be used such as these relating to solicitors and auditors. It is true that in quite a few 
instances higher courts have used this approach -  the incremental approach -  in 
order to solve legal problems. Another approach, which was used, was the 
profession-by-profession approach, but I will analyse them both in detail later.1
The first thing I should do is recognising the possibilities under which the 
agent is liable to his principal. These are three: (1) an agent can be liable in tort. (2) 
An agent can be liable to his principal in contract. (3) An agent can be liable under his 
fiduciary duties. It cannot be argued that in most of the cases the extent of liability 
will be the same either under contract or under tort. The main difference between 
contract and tort can be the limitation period. The reason for this is that in accordance 
with the Latent Damage Act 1986 (section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980), 
although the normal limitation period is six years from the actual cause of action, now 
it is possible to uphold a claim in tort within three years from the moment, when the 
person, who actually brings an action has acquired knowledge of the relevant facts . 
This point of course will be analysed further. However, in order to understand the 
nature of liability, it would be better to look at the cases and try to figure out the 
principles that derive from them .
1 Malcolm Clarke. The law of Insurance contracts. (1994). Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. 2nd edition. 
Page 213.
2 Ibid. Page 211.
3 See below.
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8.2 Elements o f liability in Tort.
8.2.1 Foreseeability
Foreseeability is not the only requirement. Another two were established in 
Caparo Industries pic, v Dickman 4. I will use the exact words of Lord Bridge: “in 
addition to the foreseeability o f damage, the necessary ingredients in any situation 
giving rise to a duty o f care are that there should exist between the party owing the 
duty and the one to whom it is owed, a relationship characterised by the law as one o f  
“proximity” or “neighbourhood” and that the situation should be one in which the 
court considers it fair and reasonable that the law should impose a duty o f a given 
scope upon the one party for the benefit o f the other” 5.
At this point, it would be very interesting to look at some of the leading cases 
and examine what was said as obiter dictum by the judges in relation to the three 
ingredients according to which liability can be proved. I will say a few more things 
about the element of foreseeability. The main thing that must be mentioned about 
foreseeability is the fact that although it is beyond doubt a necessary requirement for 
liability to exist, it can never be a sufficient cause on its own for liability to be 
established. This was exactly what was said by Lord Keith in the case of Hill v The 
Constable of Yorkshire 6: “ it has been said almost too frequently to require 
repetition, that foreseeability o f likely harm is not in itself a sufficient test o f liability 
in negligence ” 1. However, the position may be quite different, in cases where only 
physical damage is involved. In the Caparo Industries v Dickman case, which is 
mentioned it was cited that “mere foreseeability is not o f itself sufficient to ground 
liability unless, by reason o f circumstances, it itself constitutes the element o f  
proximity, as in the case o f direct physical damage” 8. Moreover, in Murphy 
Brentwood District Council9. Lord Oliver said that “in the straightforward case o f  
the direct infliction o f physical injury by the act o f the defendant, there is no need to 
look beyond the foreseeability by the defendant o f the result in order to establish that
4 (1990) 2 A.C 605, (1990) 2 W.L.R. 358, (1990) 1 All E.R 568 (H.L).
5 Ibid (1990) 1 All E.R. 568 (H.L). Page 617. Per Lord Bridge.
6 (1989) 1 A.C 53.
7 Ibid Page 486. Per Lord Atkin.
8 Caparo Industries pic. v Dickman. (1990) 2 A.C 605, (1990) 2 W.L.R. 358, (1990) 1 All E.R 568 
(H.L). Page 635. Per Lord Oliver
9 (1991) l.A.C. 398.
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there is a proximate relationship with the plaintiff”10. It must said that the above 
distinction, as it is shown by the judges, is only developed as a suggestion and it must 
be understood that in cases where only physical damage is involved, it does not mean 
that the other two requirements do not exist at all. In contrast, the position of the law 
remains the same and the test, as this is applied in the Caparo case, does not change. 
The only difference that can be recognised is that the nature of the cases like these, is 
such that the other two elements- proximity and fair and reasonable to impose a 
duty - most of the times need not to be argued, because they are inferred by the 
circumstances. Irrespective of this, emphasis must be given to the fact that the legal 
position does not alter n .
8.2.2 Proximity
Now, I can move on to the requirement of proximity. In simple words, what 
we mean by the element of proximity is more or less the actual existence and the 
exact nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant in question.
The main thing that needs to be discussed about proximity is that it must be 
made clear that it is not exactly a question of fact that can be decided in each case 
separately. It is more a question of law. It is what Lord Atkin said in his judgement in 
the case of Donoghue v Stevenson 12: “proximity extends to such close and direct 
relations that the act complained o f directly affects a person whom the person alleged 
to be bound to take care would know, would be directly affected by his careless
i
act” .Another definition of what can constitute the necessary degree of proximity 
was given in the case of Murphy v Brentwood District Council 14 -  mentioned 
above “the essential question which has to be asked in every case, given that the 
damage, which is an essential ingredient o f the action has occurred, is whether the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is such -  or, to use the favoured 
expression, whether it is o f  sufficient proximity- that it imposes upon the latter a duty 
o f care to avoid or prevent that loss which was in fact sustained” 15.
10 Ibid Page 486. Per Lord Atkin.
11 Feldthusen Bruce. (1944). Economic Negligence. Thompson Canada Limited. 3rd edition. Pages 40- 
46.
12 (1932) A.C526
13 Ibid Page 581. Per Lord Atkin.
14 (1991) 1 A.C398.
15 Ibid Page 486. Per Lord Oliver.
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8.2.3 The requirement o f “fair and reasonable”
The last factor I am going to refer to in respect of liability, as this can be 
examined under the heading of the general law of negligence is the one that is related 
to the question of “whether it is just fair and reasonable to impose a duty”. This 
specific question is one of the most important concepts that have to be discussed when 
dealing with liability and it is something which is very interrelated with the question 
of the requisite degree of proximity. An extract from the judgement of Lord Morris in 
the case of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.16 proves the significance of this 
ingredient and at the same time reveals its nature. The main idea that derives from his 
judgement is that, generally, “the question of whether or not to impose a duty has to 
be decided according to principles of public policy” 11. It is obvious from the above 
that it is not easy to understand what is the meaning of these requirements in practice. 
Also, another difficulty arises in relation to the fact that it is not clear at all to be 
inferred from the attitude of the courts whether the factors that influence the decisions 
that are taken are following more the proper enforcement of the law or, on the other 
hand, public policy and the particular facts of each case is the vital aspect. This 
problem of definition was emphasised by Lord Bridge in the Caparo case. Actually, 
he specified the problem in the matters of proximity and fairness: “the concepts o f 
proximity and fairness are not susceptible o f any precise definition as would be 
necessary to give them utility as practical tests, but amount in effect to a little more 
than convenient labels to attach to features o f different specific situations which, on a 
detailed examination o f all the circumstances, the law recognises pragmatically as 
giving rise to a duty o f care o f a given scope ” 18. It is clear that Lord Bridge suggests 
that the courts usually follow a pragmatic approach to resolve the cases.
16 (1990) A.C 1004.
17 Ibid Page 1034. Per Lord Morris.
18 Caparo Industries pic. v Dickman. (1990) 2 A.C 605, (1990) 2 W.L.R. 358, (1990) 1 All E.R 568 
(H.L). Page 618. Per Lord Bridge.
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8.3 Negligent misstatements and services- Historical background.
The principles, which were mentioned in the introductory part, were very 
closely related to the general law of negligence. Now, I am going to move on to a 
specific area, which is concerned with brokers, because of the nature of their duties, 
and also other categories of professionals, such as solicitors and auditors. Before I 
start to analyse the earlier cases and their judicial development throughout the years, it 
is worth noting the difference in the approach between the Commonwealth and the 
United States. In the United States, where we can find -  in contrast with the 
Commonwealth -  case law, even until the 1960’s - the law of negligent 
misrepresentation and misstatements was developed completely separately from the 
ordinary law of negligence 19. In the beginning things were not so easy. In relation to 
tort, the only areas of law, where a claim for misrepresentation was allowed, were 
intentional tort or deceit. However, the main difficulty that arose, was that for a claim 
to be justified, fraud on part of the defendant had to be proved. Hence, it was not at all 
an area, where the law of negligence could be developed 20. The result of this was that 
the only way of recovery was the law of contract, but its application was restricted to 
parties, between which privity of contract existed, so that they could bring an action 
against each other. This is perhaps the reason that someone can find many similarities 
between the law of contract and the law of negligent misrepresentation. But, perhaps 
the most significant point is that the law of negligent misrepresentation and 
misstatement developed separately also from the law relating to personal injury, in the 
sense that although there was an effort to apply the personal injury law’s principles in 
cases, where only economic loss was caused, in the end the courts managed to enforce 
these principles in a more commercial context 21. Something that will show the 
reluctance of the courts in England to recognise a duty in respect of negligent 
misrepresentation is the fact that the first case, which actually recognised such a duty, 
took place in 1963 22.
19 Bruce Feldthusen. (1944) Economic Negligence. Thompson Canada Limited. 3rd edition.
20 Ibid. Chapter 2. Paragraph 2.
21 Ibid
22 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller and Partners Ltd. (1964) A.C 465, (1963) 2 All E.R 575, (1963) 3 
W.L.R 101, (1963) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 435 (H.L).
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The first case in the Commonwealth, which in practical terms dealt with 
negligent misrepresentation, although at that time this was not a recognised heading of 
law, was Derry v Peek 23. The case took place in 1889 -  much earlier from the time 
that the law of negligent misrepresentation actually developed and the facts were as 
follows. The directors of a company made some false statements, that they could use 
steam power instead of horses. They said that they relied on the Act of Parliament, by 
which that company was created. The Board of Trade in the end did not allow them to 
do so. The result was that the plaintiffs brought an action, which was based on deceit, 
in relation to the false statements made by the directors of the company. The court 
upheld the action based on deceit. The ratio decidendi of the case was that the court 
had decided that the directors honestly believed that their statements were actually 
true, but that they did not have any reasonable reasons to make such an assumption. 
Hence, as the Court of Appeal decided, fraud had been established. The House of 
Lords however overruled this decision. As Lord Hershell put it: “first, in order to 
sustain an action in deceit, there must be proof o f fraud and nothing short o f that will 
suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that a false misrepresentation has 
been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless 
whether it be true or false ” 24. And in Lord BramwelTs words: “ to found an action in 
for damages there must be a contract and breach or fraud” 25. This approach 
followed by the courts shows that although an action for negligence was not brought 
at all, it would be very difficult for an action based on it to be successful.
The next case I am going to refer to is Cann v Wilson . The facts of this case 
were related to the value of the property. The defendants negligently overvalued the 
property in question. The result of their negligence was that the value failed to cover a 
loan that took place. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the question of reliance 
was beyond doubt, because the defendants actually knew that the plaintiffs would rely 
on their valuation. The court held that the plaintiffs were liable in respect of their
• *)7negligence . This was actually one of the first cases, where negligent 
misrepresentation was not only recognised, as a sufficient cause of action, but it was 
also successful. However, this case did not remain established authority. It was
23 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337.
24 Ibid. Page 374. Per Lord Hershell.
25 Ibid Page 347. Per Lord Hershell.
26 (1888) Ch.D. 39.
27 Ibid Page 39.
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overruled in the case of Le Lievre v Gould 28 According to the facts of the case, a 
surveyor gave to the plaintiffs some certificates, which were related to the progress 
that was made in the construction of the building of houses. The court did not 
recognise that the surveyor owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. One important factor 
of the case, which very much influenced the decision of the court, was that the 
surveyor never gave his permission to the plaintiffs to use his certificates. Another 
fact that we must look at is how the court approached the previous cases: the case of 
Derry v Peek was followed, since it was said in the Le Laivre case that because of 
the Derry v Peek case, an action could not be brought when fraud could not be 
proved. Such a conclusion automatically meant that Cann v Wilson had to be 
overruled 29.
After the cases that I mentioned above, which actually constitute the history of 
the negligent misrepresentation law, we will have to come to the 1960’s. This is the 
period that this area is really developing 30. A case that must be mentioned is Candler 
v Crane, Christmas & Co. 31. It is about the plaintiff who wanted to invest some 
money in a company. However, he wanted to secure his money as much as possible, 
so, he asked the director of the company to inform him about the accounts of the 
company. What the director did is that he put him in touch with the accountants of the 
company. The accountants prepared the accounts and the plaintiff decided to invest. 
In the end, it was proved that all the information, which was provided by the 
accountants was false and the result was that the plaintiff brought an action against the 
accountants. On their part, the accountants admitted that they acted very carelessly but 
not in fraudulent way. The decision of the court is of great importance. The House of 
Lords by a majority of two held that the loss caused by the negligence of the 
accountants was not actionable. The reason for the decision that was given by the 
majority was that a contractual relationship did not exist or any other fiduciary duty 
between the parties 32. However, it is important to note that the dissenting judgement 
of Lord Denning in this case became more authoritative during the years that 
followed. He based his argument on his assumption that the law of negligence had
28 (1893) 1 Q.B. 491.
29 Ibid
30 Bruce Feldthusen. (1944) Economic Negligence. Chapter 2. Thompson Canada Limited. 3rd edition.
31 (1951) 2 K.B 164.
32 Ibid.
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developed quite a lot 33. His argument was divided in three separate questions: (1) 
what persons are under such a duty? In his own words, the answer was “ those 
persons such as accountants, surveyors, valuers and analysts whose profession and 
occupation is to examine books, accounts and other things, and to make reports on 
which people -  other than their client -  rely in the ordinary course o f business ” 34. (2) 
The second question related as to whom these professionals owe the duty in question. 
Lord Denning said “they owe a duty, o f course to their employer or client; and also I  
think to any third person to whom they themselves show the accounts or to whom they 
know their employer is going to show the accounts, so as to induce him to invest 
money or to take some other action on them ” 35. (3) The third question was to what 
transaction does the duty of care extend? Again, in Lord Denning’s words: “ it extends 
I  think only to those transactions for which the accountants knew their accounts were 
required”. The approach, which was followed by Lord Denning, was approved later
'Kf*in the Caparo v Dickman case
However, the most significant case is that of Hedlev Bvme v Heller & 
Partners Ltd. 37. Because of the importance of this case 1 refer to its facts in quite 
some detail. The plaintiffs were contractors of advertising and their client was a 
company called Easipower Ltd. The plaintiffs were actually concerned about the 
financial position of the above company, so, they had asked their bankers about it. 
After a while, the bankers sent a letter to Easipower’s bankers, through which they 
were asking about the financial position of the company in question. The defendants -  
Easipower’s bankers- replied. The content of the letter was that the financial position 
of Easipower was good. The crucial part of the reply was the fact that the information 
was given “without responsibility on the part of the bank”. In the end, the plaintiffs 
lost £17000, because of the negligence of the bankers. Hence, they brought an action 
against them. The actual decision of the court was that the plaintiffs could not recover 
the money, because the bankers never really accepted or implied any kind of 
responsibility. But, in order to understand why this case became such an authority, I
33 Robby Bernstein. Economic Loss (1993) Longman Group Ltd. Page 378.
34 Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co. (1951) 2 K.B 164. Page 179. Per Lord Denning.
35 Ibid
36 Ibid / See also Caparo v Dickman (1990) 2 A.C. 605, (1990) 2 W.L.R. 358, (1990) 1 All. E.R. 568 
(H.L).
37 (1964) A.C. 465, (1963) 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L).
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will analyse the reasoning of the judges 38. I will start with the opinion of Lord 
Morris. Generally, what he believed -  like all the other judges -  is that a duty of care 
would be able to be justified, if the defendants had not made it clear that, that the 
information they gave was without responsibility. Hence, Lord Morris said: “ i f  
someone possessed o f a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective o f contract, to 
apply that skill for the assistance o f another person who relies upon such skill, a duty 
o f care will arise. The fact that the service was given by means o f words can make no 
difference. Furthermore, i f  in the sphere in which a person is so placed that others 
who could reasonably rely upon his judgement or skill or upon his ability to make 
careful inquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give information to, or allows his 
information to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know 
would place reliance on it, then a duty o f care will arise ”39. The next judgement I am 
going to refer to is that of Lord Devlin: “ the categories o f special relationship which 
may give rise to a duty to take care in word as well as in deed are not as limited to 
contractual or fiduciary relationships but include also relationships which are 
equivalent to contract, that there is an assumption o f responsibility in circumstances 
in which but for the absence o f consideration, there would be a contract” 40. Finally, I 
cwill quote the wording of Lord Reid: “ I  can see no logical stopping place short o f  
those relationships where it is plain that the party seeking information or advice was 
trusting the other to exercise such a degree o f care as the circumstances required, 
where it was reasonable for him to do that, and where the other gave the information 
or advice when he knew or ought to have known that the inquirer was relying on 
him”41.
8. 4 Requirements for a duty o f care to be established
From the above extracts from the judgements, it is obvious that the judges 
gave emphasis to a few requirements, in order for a duty of care under such 
circumstances as these in the case to exist. The basic of these requirements is reliance 
by the party who usually brings an action against the other, who has passed some
38 Ibid
39 Ibid Page 502, per Lord Morris.
40 Ibid Per Lord Devlin.
41 Ibid Page 486. Per Lord Reid.
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by the party who usually brings an action against the other, who has passed some 
piece of information in a negligent way. But, this is not the only one, because there 
were another two- special relationship and voluntary assumption of responsibility -  
which were implied by the judges in the Hedley Byrne case and also they were 
developed in other cases. I will be referring to these issues in quite a detailed way 
later on. The general conclusion that can be made from the case is that the reason, that 
a duty of care was held not to exist, was that the restriction, which was put in the 
Derry v Peek case, was assumed to be correct. The restriction was that a person could 
recover from another one in respect of his negligence, if there was no contractual 
relationship, or the person, who was deemed to be negligent, acted as a fiduciary. This 
was the basis for the decision and not the fact that the damage, which resulted from 
the negligence, was purely economic loss 42. Lord Devlin in upholding this conclusion 
said: “ that is why the distinction is now said to depend on whether it is caused 
directly. The interposition o f the physical injury is said to make a difference in 
principle ” 43. Hence, the issue of economic loss was not the vital point of the decision. 
Conclusively, this case is perhaps the most dominant in negligence law, because 
simply it was the recognition of a duty -  in respect of negligent misrepresentation -  
that seemed overdue in relation to the commercial reality of the twentieth centuiy 44.
It is time to move on to the requirements, according to which a duty of care 
may exist.
8. 4 .1  Special Relationship
The first one I am going to discuss is the requirement of a special 
relationship. It needs to be said that this is the most “debatable” requirement. Its 
basis was possibly the solution of two kinds of problems. The first one is that 
according to this, there can be no indeterminate liability, since if there is no sufficient 
proximity, no duty of care will arise. The second one is that the importance of this
42 Robby Bernstein. Economic Negligence. (1993) Longman Group Ltd.
43 Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners Ltd. (1964) A.C 465, (1963) 2 All E.R 575 (H.L). Page 517 per 
Lord Devlin.
44 Robby Bernstein. Economic Negligence. (1993) Longman Group Ltd.
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kind of relationship is actually the basis for the obligation to take care 45. However, 
the situation in relation to proximity is not ideal at all. A lot of problems exist. One 
quite serious one has to do with the fact that a lot of precise and common relationships 
-  e.g. broker-buyer, doctor- patient, appear to be “special”. But, if a higher court 
adopts this approach, then a lower court will have, as a matter of precedent to follow 
the previous decision, as long as the relationship in question is the same. This, of 
course, can create problems of fairness. Also, another problem is that the term 
“special relationship” is not easy to be defined. Hence, what a court has to do is to see 
under its own circumstances and try to avoid “doctrinal decisions”. This is perhaps the 
reason why it was said in the Hedley Byrne case that the term “special relationship” 
should be just a label for the circumstances, under which a duty would exist46.
8. 4. 2 Reasonable Reliance
The second requirement I am going to mention is that of reasonable reliance. 
The test that one applies is if the person, who gives information can reasonably 
foresee that the other, who receives it, will rely on it. This of course can create 
difficulties, especially in cases where an expert gives advice, because in such a case it 
is more than logical that the person who seeks expert information will rely on it. Also, 
he will expect that the expert will not prove negligent and that this information will be 
accurate. But, it is impossible to recognise a duty of care in every case of expert 
advice, because the experts will refuse to give their advice, even when it is vital to do 
so. Another problem that may arise is that in most of the cases although the party who 
receives the information or any other kind of service relies on it, this does not 
necessarily mean that he intends to take legal action against the person who provides 
the information or the service because this would be completely absurd 47. However, it 
must be said that the above criticisms do not imply that reliance is a wrong 
requirement that is used without any justification at all. If someone thinks about it, it 
is logical for a duty of care to exist, it must be that there is reliance from one party to 
another. The most crucial effect that these criticisms can have is that although reliance
45 Ibid. Pages 41-43.
46 Ibid
47 Ibid. Pages 44-46
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is an important factor, it cannot be a sufficient factor on its own. The others must exist 
as well48.
It would be helpful at this point to see how the court looked at this issue of 
reliance in the case of White v Jones 49. This will help us to understand the nature of 
reliance, but I have first to make a brief summary of the facts of the case. The whole 
case was about a solicitor, who delayed in the drawing of the will and as a result, the 
testator’s daughters sued the solicitors for their loss of earnings. The court expressed 
its opinion, in relation to reliance, that it is not a prerequisite to the existence of a duty 
of care. In this case it was held that it was not reasonable for the daughters to rely on 
the solicitors. Besides that, a duty of care was decided to be owed by the solicitors to 
the daughters. The reason for this was the need for fairness. As Malcolm Clarke puts 
it in one of his articles: “as a duty o f care depends on what is fair and reasonable, 
subject to what is reasonable this allows the court to do what is “fa ir”- to follow what 
Lord Goff called “the impulse to do justice” 50. In simple words, this means that 
sometimes the decisions that the courts take have to do with issues of public policy. 
The last thing I need to say about reliance is that it is submitted generally that there 
can be great difference between cases, which concern advice and cases where action 
takes place. It is more possible that that the role of reliance will be more crucial in the 
first kind of cases than the latter ones 51. The decision in White v Jones is also very 
significant in relation to voluntary assumption of responsibility, so, I will deal with it 
again in the next paragraph.
8. 4 .3  Voluntary Assumption o f Responsibility
Hence, the last requirement I will have to deal with is that of voluntary 
assumption of responsibility. Again, as with the other two requirements, this one is 
of great importance and at the same time it has been the subject of criticism. I will try 
to analyse it quite briefly in order to assess its advantages and disadvantages. The 
basic disadvantage of voluntary assumption of responsibility is that it is nothing more
48 Ibid.
49 (1993) 3 All E.R 481.
50 Clarke Malcolm. Insurance Intermediaries: Liability to third parties. International Journal of 
Insurance Law.3. 1995. Pages 162-174. Page 163.
51 Ibid.
Liability or Brokers 10 / unristos isiDOuraKis
than a label to cover certain circumstances. Also, another argument, which is quite 
common, is that assumption of responsibility is nothing more than an artificial legal 
fiction, which most of the times in not upheld by the facts. The reasoning behind this 
argument is this: in order for someone to have assumed beyond doubt responsibility, it 
must be that while he provides a certain piece of information, he has undertaken 
responsibility both not to be negligent and to accept legal liability in case where he is 
in breach of duty and as result the plaintiff has suffered damages. The problem is that 
all these cases are surrounded by a commercial context and in such a commercial 
world, it will be almost impossible not to accept legal liability. So, it might be right 
that assumption of responsibility is only a legal fiction 52. However, the voluntary 
assumption of responsibility approach, in order to ascertain whether a duty of care 
exists, has its advantages as well. One of them is that it is the only requirement, which 
can exist on its own. If it is proved that the defendant has assumed responsibility this 
can be enough proof for liability to stand. The other advantage has to do with the 
cases, where there is a negligent performance of services. There, reliance is not a vital 
factor in deciding whether a duty of care is owed or not. Hence, everything depends 
on whether there is a voluntary assumption of responsibility or not 53. This was a 
factor for the decision in White v Jones that I mentioned above. There, we can look 
at two different approaches in relation to voluntary assumption of responsibility. As 
Malcolm Clarke put it, the first approach was: (1) whatever the answer, for Lord Goff 
the impulse to do justice was such that the House o f Lords was entitled “to extend to 
the intended beneficiary a remedy under the Hedley Byrne principle by holding that 
the assumption o f responsibility by the solicitor towards his client should be held in 
law to extend to the intended beneficiary who (as the solicitor can reasonably foresee) 
may as a result o f the solicitor’s negligence, be deprived o f his intended legacy in 
circumstances in which neither the testator nor his estate will have a remedy against 
the solicitor. On the other hand, the second approach was: (2) in contrast, for Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson the question was misconceived. For him the responsibility to be 
assumed is not responsibility in law as such but, more simply, responsibility for the 
task- in this instance the task o f drawing the will, which was easier to infer.
52 Feldthusen Bruce. Economic Negligence. (1944). Thompson Canada. 3rd edition. Pages 46-52.
53 Ibid.
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Responsibility in law is the law’s reaction to responsibility o f the task54. The most 
vital point in relation with these approaches is that it does not matter which one will 
be followed, because they both reach the same conclusion.
8. 5 Liability in Contract
An agent can also be liable in contract. It must be noted at this point that his 
liability in contract is very closely related with his duties towards his principals. 
Hence, when analysing the agent’s position in contract law, it is necessary to make a 
brief reference to his duties as well. It is said in the introductory part that one 
difference between bringing an action in contract and in tort is the limitation period. 
In contract, the limitation period is stated in section 5 of the Limitation Act 1980, 
where it is cited that the limit is six years from the date when the cause of action took 
place. It is worth referring at this point to an article that deals with limitation periods, 
which are very important for liability in contract55. According to it, then, the effect of 
the Latent Damage Act 1986 is that there is an alternative for an action to be brought 
in tort three years after the date when the damage could have been discovered by the 
assured 56. The two cases mentioned in this article were Iron Trades Mutual 
Insurance Co. Ltd. v Buckerman 57 and Islander Trucking Ltd. v Hogg Robinson 
& Gardner Mountain (Marine! Ltd 58. Summarising the actual result of these cases 
it was cited in the article that “where a broker procures a policy which is voidable 
because o f the broker’s failure to disclose material facts to the insurer, the assured 
suffers damage from the outset and not at the later date at which the insurer avoids 
the policy”59. The same principle was held to apply in New Zealand 60.
54 Clarke Malcolme. Insurance Brokers Duty of Care. International Journal of Insurance Law. 3. 1995. 
Pages 162-174. Page 165.
55 Insurance Law Monthly. 5 (9). 1995. Insurance Brokers Claims Insurance Policies Limitations. Newe 
Zealand. Pages 10-11.
56 Ibid
57 (1989) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 85.
58 (1990) 1 All E.R 808.
59 Insurance Law Monthly. 5 (9). 1995. Insurance Brokers Claims Insurance Policies Limitations. Newe 
Zealand. Pages 10-11.
60 For further details look at: Matthews Corporation Ltd. v Edward Lumley & Sons Ltd. November 
1992.
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It is obvious that the main issue in relation to the agent’s liability in contract is 
whether there is a contract of agency between him and the principal, what type of 
contract that is and what are the exact circumstances. Before I start to analyse cases, I 
will mention a few general examples, which take place between agents and principals. 
If we accept that there is a contractual relationship between the agent and the 
principal, then the basic question is what is the scope of the mandate, according to 
which the contractual obligations are governed. The first general example is (a) 
“where the mandate is for the arrangement o f insurance or for the handling o f claims, 
and the agent receives remuneration from the proposer himself Under such 
circumstances, there is a contract between the agent and the client ” (b) The second 
one is “when the agent does various things for the client, such as arranging insurance 
and receiving payment for the service. Again, there is a contract between the agent 
and the client, (c) Thirdly, “a very common situation arises when the agent is seeking 
insurance for the client and his commissions is paid i f  and when the contract o f  
insurance is concluded, (d) Finally, the last example I  am going to refer to is when 
there is already a contract between the agent and the client and although the agent 
completes the first part o f the contract and later on he promises to do something else 
but does not do it. Then, an action can be brought for breach o f the later promise 61.
However, it is necessary to analyse possible liability in contract in some more 
detail. Something important that must be mentioned is that the client is not obliged to 
agree with one of the policies that it is suggested by the agent. The only thing that can 
be assumed is that the agent has only an opportunity to earn commission if the client 
accepts one of the policies. This actually means that there is no contractual obligation 
on any of the parties until one particular stage. A relevant case, where a loss of an 
opportunity to earn a sum of money was considered to be actionable, is Chaplin v
fS)Hicks . The facts were as follows: the defendant was a well-known actor and 
theatrical manager. In November 1908 he published a letter to a daily newspaper. The 
purpose of the letter was the readers of the newspaper to select twelve ladies that he 
would give engagements to. The plaintiff was one of the ladies, who sent their 
photographs. However, an alteration was made to the conditions of the competition, 
because the response was so great that it would be impossible for him and his
61 Clarke Malcolme. (1994). The Law of Insurance Contracts. Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. 2nd edition. 
Pages 219-223.
62 (1911) 2 K.B 786 (C.A).
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committee to decide in that way. The alteration had to do with the fact that the 
photographs, which were sent would be separated into ten districts within the United 
Kingdom and the readers would vote for the most beautiful. In the end, fifty 
photographs would be chosen by which only twelve would take the promised 
engagements. The plaintiffs photograph was one of the fifty and as a result the 
defendant’s secretary wrote a letter to the plaintiff to call at the Aldwych Theatre at 4 
o’clock on Wednesday afternoon, January 6 to make an appointment to see the 
defendant. The problem was created because the plaintiff was at that time in Dundee, 
while the letter was sent. So, by the time it was re-addressed in Dundee it was too late 
for her to look and see the defendant. Although the plaintiff after that made some 
efforts to have an appointment with the defendant, this was impossible. The result was 
that the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant on order to recover damages 
because his breach of the contract was the cause that she lost her chance to obtain an 
engagement. In the court of first instance, it was decided by the jury that the defendant 
did not take reasonable means in order to ensure that the plaintiff had the opportunity 
to be selected. There was an appeal by the defendant. The argument, which was used 
by the defendant, was that “assuming there is a breach o f contract, the plaintiff is not 
entitled to substantial damages, but to nominal damages only. Either the damages do 
not flow directly from the breach and are too remote, or they are so contingent as to 
be incapable o f assessment ” 63. The judge separated his decision into two parts. The 
first part of judgement had to do with remoteness. The test for remoteness according 
to the judge was " to see whether the damages sought to be recovered follow so 
naturally or by express declaration from the terms o f the contract that they can be 
said to be the result o f the breach ” 64. The court held that the competition the plaintiff 
entered in to gave her a chance of presenting herself and winning the price. Hence, “a 
claim for loss sustained in consequence o f a failure to give the plaintiff an opportunity 
o f taking part in the competition, it is impossible to say that such a result and such 
damages were not within the contemplation o f the parties as the possible outcome o f 
the breach o f the contract” 65.
63 Ibid Page 788. Per Mr. McCardie.
64 Ibid Pages 790-791.
64 Ibid Pages 790-791.
65 Ibid
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The second part of the judgement was about the question of whether damages 
were capable of assessment or not. The argument, which was used in order to uphold 
that the damage could not be assessed, was that the exact extent of damages was 
based upon such a number of contingencies, which could not be properly assessed. 
The opinion of the judge was that the amount of damages that should be awarded 
under such circumstances is more or less a question of guesswork. Also, as a 
conclusion he said: “my view is that under such circumstances as those in this case 
the assessment o f damages was unquestionably for the jury. The jury came to the 
conclusion that the taking away from the plaintiff o f the opportunity o f competition, as 
one o f the fifty when twelve prizes were to be distributed, deprived the plaintiff o f 
something which had monetary value ” 66. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. So, 
the basic result of the case was that even an opportunity to earn some kind of reward 
could constitute appropriate economic consideration.
A quite common question that usually arises is what is the best basis in order 
to ascertain the liability of the agent. It is generally assumed that recognising an 
agent’s duty in contract can have quite a few implications. The implications start from 
the fact that in English law there is no duty to perform contracts in good faith. One 
very important case in relation with good faith is Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v 
Stiletto Usual Programmes Ltd, 67. This case is also mentioned in the chapter about 
the duty of the utmost good faith, so I am not going to analyse it in detail. However, 
the principle that can be derived is that although there is no recognised duty of good 
faith, English law and the courts have developed other mechanisms in order to 
confront unfairness 68. Whether this is a correct approach or not, implications about 
the agent’s liability remain. This does not mean of course that the courts have not held 
agents to be liable in contract. I will refer first to a case of motor insurance. In the 
case of O’Connor v B.D .B Kirbv and Co.69 the main issue was that an insurance 
broker filled a proposal form for his client; he gave it to him in order to check it and 
sign it. However, the client did not exercise proper skill and care and it was proved 
that some piece of information, which was used in the proposal form, was incorrect.
66 Ibid. Pages 793.
67 (1989) Q.B 433,439 (C.A).
68 For further details look see the actual judgement.
69 (1971) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 454.
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More specifically, it was mentioned in the form that his car was packed in a garage, 
while the truth was that he parked his car outside his house. The result was that in a 
“hit and run” accident, the client was in fact uninsured. In the court of first instance it 
was decided that an action for damages could be allowed on the ground that the 
broker was negligent in inserting a false statement in the proposal form. However, 
there was an appeal in respect of that decision. It was held by the Court of Appeal 
that: “(1) the sole effective cause o f the loss was the plaintiff’s failure to check the 
contents o f  the proposal form. (2) The defendants duty was to use such care as was 
reasonable in ensuring that the answers recorded to the questions in the proposal 
form accurately represented the answers given to the defendants by the plaintiff. The 
duty was not a duty to ensure that every answer was correctly recorded. And, on the 
evidence, there had been no breach o f such duty ” 10. Hence, a duty of care was held to 
be able to exist in contract in respect of the duties of an agent towards his client.
The next case I am going to refer to is that of Wilson v Avec Audio Visual 
Equipment Ltd. 71. The facts of the case were as follows: the plaintiff who was an 
insurance broker effected two insurance policies, one against burglary and one for the 
coverage of goods in transit. The defendants -  the insurers - were wound up after that. 
Irrespective o f that and although the defendants did not regognise themselves liable 
after a certain date, the liquidator asked the plaintiff to make a payment in respect of 
the two policies. The issue of the case was the willingness of the plaintiff to get the 
money back, on the ground that he had held himself personally liable to the 
defendants in relation with the premiums. The decision of the court was “that the 
plaintiff had not proved to the satisfaction o f the Court that the had rendered himself 
personally liable and the case was merely one o f an agent who had chosen because he 
was under a mistaken belief as to his legal position vis-a-vis the third party, to assume 
a personal liability to the third party, and having done so, in his turn sought to make 
his principal liable ”12. Again, an agent was held to be liable in contract.
Moreover, another case, which is worth mentioning, is B Ackbar v C.F
7^  • •Greenand Co. Ltd. . It involves again motor insurance and the failure of insurance 
brokers to arrange the passenger insurance for the vehicle in question. The plaintiff
70 Ibid. Pages 454-455.
71 (1974) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81.
72 Ibid Page 81.
73 (1975) Q.B582.
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was actually a passenger in his own lorry, when he was involved in an accident. After 
the accident he found out that his brokers failed to arrange the passenger insurance he 
was looking for. The important part of the facts was that the action was brought more 
than three but less than six years from the date of the accident. The plaintiff brought 
an action against the brokers for breach of their contractual duty to arrange insurance 
cover, because he was unable to recover any damages from his insurers. The argument 
from the defendants was that the damages claimed include damages for plaintiffs 
personal injuries. This meant according to the argument that section 2(1) of the 
Limitation Act 1939 applied and therefore the claim was barred. The court did not in 
the end agree with the argument and held that “the damages which the plaintiff might 
have recovered were only the measure o f damages claimed in the present action and 
the present claim did not consist o f or include damages for personal injuries. Hence, 
section 2(1) o f the Act o f 1939 did not apply and the limitation period was six 
years ”74.
8. 6 Liability in Tort and concurrent Liabilities
However, it must be understood that liability in contract or in tort is not a 
completely separate issue. The initial requirements for it to be established were 
mentioned above. There may be circumstances under which brokers can be liable both 
in contract and in tort. I will refer to a couple of cases, which deal with the aspect of
7Sdual liability. The first case I am going to mention is Osman v J. Ralph Moss Ltd. . 
The facts of the case are also mentioned in the chapter, dealing with the duties of 
insurance brokers, so, I will make only a brief summary. The actual cause of action 
was that when the plaintiff was involved in an accident, the defendants -  the brokers- 
told him, that he was in fact uninsured and he had to bear the costs of his fine, the 
court costs, an amount from driving without care and attention and also the money for 
the other driver to repair his car and hire a replacement car. The plaintiff was entitled 
to all the costs he had incurred in respect of the accident76.
74 Ibid. Page 583.
75 (1990) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 313.
76 For more details see Chapter 4.
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Another case that dealt with both potential negligence on the part of the 
brokers and also with a breach of contract is Cherry v Allied Ins Brokers Ltd. 77 The 
plaintiffs were manufacturers of suede and leather garments. The defendants were the 
brokers of the plaintiffs for quite a long period. But, the plaintiffs were not satisfied 
with them, because they thought that they were paying very high premiums in 
comparison with their record of claims, which was quite low. Hence, the result of all 
these, was that the plaintiffs appointed another firm to act as brokers. They did not 
inform the defendants at once. They did that a couple of months later. At a later 
meeting between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the plaintiffs were advised that the 
insurers would not cancel the policies, which were made with the defendants. Because 
of this fact, the plaintiffs thought that they had double insurance in respect of that 
period, so, they cancelled the insurance policy with the new insurers. However, the 
original insurers -  General Accident Corporation -  agreed to cancel the policies, but 
the plaintiffs were not aware of this fact. When a fire took place in the premises and 
caused substantial damage, the plaintiffs understood that they had no insurance. 
Hence, they brought an action against the defendants for either breach of contract or 
negligence on their part. The court held that “after the advice from the defendants, it 
was logical and sensible for the plaintiffs to cancel the policies with the new insurers. 
The fact that the plaintiffs relied on the defendants resulted in them -  the plaintiffs - 
being without any insurance. Also, the fact that the plaintiffs informed the new 
insurers that they were doubly insured was the fault o f the defendants as well. And 
moreover it was decided that there was no urgency that the plaintiffs should inform 
the defendants that they cancel the new insurance policies. Since the plaintiffs did 
what the defendants advised them to do, they had fulfdled their obligations ” . The 
plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amount of damages as if the original policy with 
General Accident Corporation had been in force.
Another very significant case is The Zephyr 79. The main issues of the case 
were two: the first one had to do with the fact that the reinsurance cover was placed 
by the broker before the original insurance. Hence, this resulted in the question of 
whether brokers were in breach of a duty of care. I am going to refer to the facts of
77 (1978) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.
78 Ibid. Page 274.
79 The Zephyr, General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation and Others, Peter William 
Tanter and Other.(1985) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 529.
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this case in a more detailed way: someone called Mr. S. wanted to buy a vessel and 
asked his insurance brokers to obtain him insurance cover. The insurance that was 
placed by the brokers was a normal marine insurance and reinsurance was essential. 
So, they started to obtain quotes from underwriters. After a while, the purchase of the 
vessel was complete and the insurance brokers submitted that the insurance, which 
had been asked for has been obtained. A few days later, the vessel was seriously 
damaged and there was abandonment by the crew. The original insurance worked in 
quite a perfect way and the shipowners were compensated. The whole problem started 
when the reinsurers refused to pay. The argument which was used by the reinsurers 
was the following: “since an apparent insurance contract has been made by the 
brokers with an underwriter 12 days before any original insurance was placed and 
before the brokers could have any principal on whose behalf they could place any 
reinsurance, the first defendant and following total loss underwriters could not be 
bound by his initialing o f the total loss slip ”80. Also, there was another claim against 
the brokers both in contract and tort. The basis for the claim was that the signing 
indication, which was given by the brokers, had a contractual force, which could 
render them liable. The brokers on their part argued that the signing indication did not 
and could not have any legal effect, which could cause their liability. In the court of 
first instance, it was first of all decided that the signing indication did not have any
O 1
contractual nature, simply because it was not incorporated in the slip . Moreover, it 
was accepted that the only obligation on part of the brokers was to use their best 
endeavours to achieve the signing down. The only alternative way that the brokers 
could be liable contractually was if the representations, which were made were proved 
to be false. This was submitted not to have happened in this case. However, the 
refusal of the court to render the brokers liable in contract did not mean that the 
brokers were not liable at all. The giving of an indication beyond doubt put the 
brokers in the position that they owed a duty of care to the total loss underwriters . 
This was because of the reliance, which was placed by the underwriters on the 
broker’s opinion. And since the brokers did not use their best endeavours in order to 
check whether their signing down indications would be met, they were liable to the
80 Ibid. Page 529.
81 Ibid Page 530.
82 Ibid
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reinsurers. The damages which should be awarded had to be assessed with the
no
difference between the actual signing down and a one-third signing .
There was an appeal by the brokers in respect of their liability in tort to the 
second and the third defendants -  the Postgate syndicates-. One significant thing that 
has to be mentioned is that no express signing down indication was given to Mr. 
Postgate. It was held that “there was nothing in decided cases to suggest that a bare 
promise given in circumstances where the parties stood in no relationship...was 
capable o f creating a situation where the speakers must do or pay damages in 
default” 84. Therefore, according to this reasoning the appeal should be allowed, 
because simply, even if it could be accepted that a signing down indication could 
create a contractual liability, this could not be assumed to be owed to Mr. Postgate. 
There was also an analysis about the reasoning, which was given by the judge at the 
court of first instance. Lord Justice Mustill summarised the findings as follows: (1) so 
far as concerned the claim by the all risks underwriters against the reinsurers, he held 
that the slip contained a mutually binding contract, and was not merely a document o f  
honour ” 85. (2) The learned judge -  in respect of the signing indication -  held that 
such an indication did not amount to a warranty that the slip would sign down to the 
stated percentage ...he did however go on to decide that the indication did give rise to 
an obligation on the part o f the broker to use their best endeavours to achieve the 
indicated signing down, an obligation to be characterised as a tortious duty ” 86. After 
that, he dealt with the main issue of the appeal- the position of the brokers in respect 
of the Posgate syndicates -  and he came to the conclusion that I mentioned above.
One of the most significant cases, which resolved quite a lot of matters around 
the potential liability of brokers, is Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd. 87 n  is 
quite a complex case, therefore, I have to refer to the facts of it, in order to make it 
clear what this case was about. The plaintiffs were a number of underwriting members 
at Lloyd’s called Names. The action was brought against some underwriting agents, 
who were either managing agents, members’ agents or combined agents. And the 
allegation was that they negligently conducted the underwriting affairs of the 
plaintiffs. Before moving on, it would be necessary to give a few definitions in respect
83 Ibid
84 Ibid
85 Ibid Page 533.
86 Ibid Pages 533 -534.
87 (1994) 2 A.C. 145.
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of all these kind of agents. Hence, (1) the agents may be members agents, who advise 
Names on their choice o f syndicates, place Names on the syndicates chosen by them, 
and give general advice to them. (2) They may be managing agents, who underwrite 
contracts o f insurance at Lloyd's on behalf o f the Name, who are members o f the 
syndicates under their management, and who reinsure contracts o f insurance and pay 
claims. (3) They may be combined agents, who perform both the role o f member’s 
agents, and the role o f managing agents in respect o f the syndicates under their 
management” 88. There were actually three strands of litigation: the first one was the 
Merrett actions and second one was the Feltrim actions. The third one was the 
Gooda Walker action. In the Merrett actions, proceedings were brought as an appeal 
from the Merrett Syndicates Ltd. and Merrett Agency Ltd. against some Names at 
Lloyd’s including Henderson. At the court of first instance, the action, which was 
brought by Henderson, was both against some members’ and some managing agents. 
In the Feltrim actions, the appellants were Feltrim Underwriting Agencies Ltd., who 
were managing agents only and some other underwriting agents called the Feltrim 
members’ agents. Finally, in the Gooda Walker actions, the appellants were the 
Gooda Walker members’ agents. In contrast, the managing agents were not involved 
in the proceedings.
Next, I am going to cite the arguments of the appellants, as these were 
developed by their lawyers in the Merrett actions. The basic question, as this was 
addressed by them was: “did managing agents (who were not also members ’ agents) 
owe Names a duty under the pre-1985 forms o f agreement to carry out their 
underwriting functions with reasonable care and skill” 89 ? It must be noted at this 
point that some of these actions had to do with the pre-1985 forms of agreement and 
some with the period after that. However, I will deal with this while I am analysing 
each action separately. Hence, what the lawyers did was that they have cited the three 
requirements, which were needed in order to establish a duty for liability in tort -  
foreseeability of damage, proximity and whether “it is just fair and reasonable” to 
establish a duty of care. The lawyers submitted that foreseeability could not be 
questioned. It was foreseeable that negligence on the part of the managing agents
88 O’Neil P.T & Woloniecki J.W. The Law of Reinsurance, lrst edition. Sweet & Maxwell.(1998). 
Page 443.
89 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd. 2 A.C 145. Page 150.
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could cause economic loss to the Names. In order to support this, emphasis was given 
to the contractual chain between the Names and the managing agents. In respect of 
proximity, the submission was that it was not enough, because the relationship of the 
parties in question was regulated by contract and also it was a pure economic loss 
case. As to the third requirement it was said that since the relationship of the parties 
could be found on a written agreement, this was a decisive fact for not finding a duty 
in tort. The second question according to them was: “did managing agents (who were 
also members agents) owe Names a non-contractual duty under the pre-1985forms o f  
agreement to carry out their underwriting functions, with reasonable care and 
skill”90? The answer to that question had to do with the issue of concurrent liability 
that can be regognised both in contract and tort. Quite a few references were made to 
cases, but I will refer to them in relation to the opinion given by the judge. Thirdly, 
another issue was raised about the fiduciary relationship of the parties, but I am going 
to say a few more things about it, while examining the court’s reaction to it.
Furthermore, which were the arguments of the defendants? The issues, as there 
were raised by them, were the following: “whether a managing agent o f a syndicate 
at Lloyd’s owed a duty o f care in tort to “indirect” and “direct” Names? Also, 
whether a managing agent as a fiduciary owed Names a duty to conduct the 
underwriting with reasonable care and skill And the last issue they addressed was 
“whether the closing o f the syndicates 1984 underwriting year o f account was 
governed by the 1985 form o f agreement or by the pre-1985 form o f agreement” 91. 
The principle that the respondents relied on was that it could not be assumed that the 
finding of a contract could exclude the existence of a tortious duty in an automatic 
way. They said that the vital question in order to decide whether the principle is to be 
applied would be what kind of loss is suffered from the person who is harmed. Again, 
quite a few important cases were cited in order for the argument to be justified, but I 
am going to focus on the actual judgement.
The arguments in respect of the Feltrim and the Gooda Walker actions were 
quite of the same nature. Standard clauses of agency and sub-agency agreements were 
used. And the main point in relation to them was the power of agents under the 
agreements to delegate their powers.
90 Ibid Page 151.
91 Ibid Page 156.
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Lord Goff was the one who actually developed and assessed the arguments for 
both sides 92. Due to the complexity of the case and the number of questions that 
needed to be answered, he tried to separate the issues that had to be resolved. Also, 
because some matters were common within the appeals, he answered them without 
making any specific reference to each case. Hence, the first thing he dealt with was 
the potential liability of managing agents to Names, whether these were direct or 
indirect, in tort. He started with the position of indirect Names, which was common 
both in the Merrett and the Feltrim appeals. Both the direct and the indirect Names 
were trying to establish that a concurrent duty of care was owed in contract and in tort 
as well. In the Merrett action a limitation issue was raised, since it would be much 
more advantageous for the Names, if the limitation period based on tort was applied- 
six years from the date of the cause of action as opposed to three years from the date 
when knowledge of the cause of action was provided. The argument, on the other 
hand, of the managing agents, as I analysed above, was that if a duty was to be 
regognised in tort, this would be quite inconsistent with the contractual relationship 
between the parties. The principle upon which these arguments were faced and 
decided was the one, which was established in the case of Hedley Byrne &  Partners 
Ltd. 93. I have referred to this case in the beginning of this chapter, so, I will focus 
now only to the application of the principle in relation with the managing agents at 
Lloyd’s. Generally, the importance of this case was that it recognised that a duty of 
care could be recognised to exist in tort, under certain circumstances such as reliance, 
even if pure economic loss was involved. Lord Goff actually concluded that the above 
principle could extend, in order to cover managing agents at Lloyd’s. The same 
conclusion was reached by Saville J. in the Court of Appeal. In deciding what he did, 
he relied on a few other cases such as Youell v Bland Welch & Co. Ltd. (No 2) 94 
and Punjab National Bank v De Boinville 95.1 am going to refer to these cases later 
on. Hence, in Lord Goffs words: “for my part I  can see no reason why a duty o f care 
should not likewise be owed by managing agents o f Lloyd’s to a Name... as Saville J. 
and the Court o f Appeal both thought, the relationship between Name and managing 
agents appears to provide a classic example o f the type o f the relationship to which
92 For more details see: Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd. 2 A.C 145. Per Lord Goff.
93 (1964) A.C. 465.
94 (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 431, 459.
95 (1992) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7.
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the principle o f Hedley Byrne applies... I  can see no escape from the conclusion that 
in these circumstances, prima facie a duty o f care is owed in tort by the managing 
agents to such Names ...furthermore, since a duty rests on the principle in Hedley 
Byrne, no problem arises from the fact that the loss suffered by the Names is pure 
economic loss ” 96.
The next argument that he analysed was the one that had to do 'with the 
meaning of “absolute discretion”. The submission of the managing agents was the 
following: “Absolute discretion meant that the power which was given to the one who 
could not receive it, could not be challenged by another person, unless (a) the exercise 
of the power is in bad faith and (b) the exercise of the power is deemed to be 
completely unreasonable. But, Lord Goff agreeing with Saville J . , did not accept that 
the scope of the words, in the way they were used, meant that a duty to exercise due 
skill and care was excluded. In order to support this conclusion, he used an extract 
from Saville J.’s speech. The meaning of it was that the fact that the agents have very 
wide authority to act on behalf of a Name and secondly that their liability in a 
potential action against them is really unlimited, could take someone to the conclusion 
that a duty to exercise due skill and care was attached to them.
However, the most significant question that Lord Goff had to deal with was 
whether or not a concurrent duty of care in tort and in contract could be accepted. He 
actually started his opinion by referring to systems of law and how they try to deal 
with this matter. He said that two are the possible solutions: the first one is that the 
claimant will have the right to obtain a remedy under contract law and the second that 
he will be able to choose, whether he wants to bring an action in contract or in tort. 
For example, in France only the first solution exist because the possibility of a party 
having a remedy under whichever heading he chooses is not allowed. It must be said 
at this point -  Lord Goff referred to it as well -  that the only real difference between 
pursuing a remedy in contract and in tort was the limitation period. The effect of the 
Latent Damage Act 1986 for example is limited only to tortious actions. The change 
that this effect causes is that the exact time of the cause of action can be postponed 
until the moment that the person in question has the actual knowledge. In his own 
words, Lord Goff decided that “so far as the direct Names are concerned, there is
96 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd. 2 A.C 145. Page 182. Per Lord Goff.
Liability ot Brokers l o i Lnristos 1 si Dour axis
plainly a contract between them and the managing agents, in the terms o f the pre- 
1985 byelaw form o f agency agreement, in which a term falls to be implied that the 
agents will exercise due care and skill in the exercise o f their functions as managing 
agents under the agreement. The duty o f care is no different from the duty o f care 
owed by them to the relevant Names in tort; and, having regard to the principles 
already stated, the contract does not operate to exclude the tortious duty leaving it 
open to the Names to pursue either remedy against the agents ” 97. He, then moved on 
to indirect Names and cited that the submission of the managing agents was that all 
the responsibility they had was in relation with another party -  i.e. the members 
agents-. Therefore, they continued that it would not be logical for them to assume 
responsibility for the same things to the indirect Names. Lord Goff rejected this 
contention: “I  for my part cannot see why in principle a party should not assume
QO
responsibility to more than one person in respect o f the same activity” .
In relation to the question of whether a fiduciary duty was owed, the answer 
was quite short. The House of Lords agreed that with the decision that was taken by 
the Court of Appeal and contended that since the question of tortious duty was 
answered in this way, it was not possible for the question of fiduciary duty to be 
addressed. It has to be mentioned that this was an issue, which arose only under the 
Merett actions.
Finally, the last question, which was raised, was the liability of members’ 
agents under the Feltrim and the Gooda Walker action. The period that this action 
referred to was 1987-1989. This meant that Lloyd’s byelaw No.l of 1985 applied. 
According to it, “members’ agents are responsible to the Names for any failure to 
exercise reasonable care and skill on the part o f the managing agents to whom 
underwriting has been delegated by the members’ agents; and that the members 
agents are not required to exercise skill and care only in relation with those activities 
and functions which members agents by custom and practice actually perform for the 
Names personally” ". In order to reach a conclusion, Lord Goff made quite a brief 
reference to the agency and the sub-agency agreements. The most important section of 
the agency agreement was 2(a). It provided that “the agent shall act as the 
underwriting agent for the Name for the purpose o f underwriting at Lloyd’s for the
97 Ibid Page 194. Per Lord Goff.
98 Ibid Page 195. Per Lord Goff.
99 Ibid. Page 197. Per Lord Goff.
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account o f the Name such classes and description o f insurance business, other than 
those prohibited by the Council, as may be transacted by the syndicate ” 10°. The 
argument for the Names in the Feltrim actions was that clause 2(a) actually contained 
an undertaking that members’ agents were bound to underwrite insurance business for 
the Name. The only circumstances, to which this did not apply, are when there is a 
combined agent, who acts as a managing agent of a syndicate of which the Name is a 
member. On the other hand, the members agents’ argument led to the conclusion that 
either under an agency or a sub-agency agreement both by members and managing 
agents did not have any contractual responsibility towards the Names for the 
underwriting. Again, the Court of Appeal’s decision was allowed and the members’ 
agents were held to be under a duty to exercise due skill and care in the course of 
underwriting.
As I mentioned above Lord Goff in his judgement referred to a number of 
authorities. One of them was the case of Punjab National Bank v De Boinville101. 
The plaintiff was an Indian bank, which was carrying business in England. Everything 
started when Esal Commodities Ltd., which was a customer of the Indian bank, made 
two shipments of gasoil to Sudan. One of the vital points was that the payment for the 
two shipments was to be confirmed by a letter of credit, which was issued by the Bank 
of Sudan with the Punjab National Bank in London. This was to be paid in 180 days 
from the date of the bill of lading. Of course, the two shipments were insured by the 
first and the second defendants, Mr. De Boinville and Mr. J. Deere. The other 
defendants were Lloyd’s brokers, who were their employers for the period in 
question: F.F Wright (U.K) Ltd., Bain Clarkson Ltd., and Fielding Juggins Money and 
Stewart Ltd. The dispute arose when the Bank failed to meet its obligations. The 
underwriters tried to deny liability on the basis of misrepresentation and non­
disclosure. Also, an action was brought against the brokers by the plaintiff bank, since 
it was argued that it was their breaches that caused the loss. The second thing they 
said was that the assignment by Esal to Punjab Bank was enough basis to bring an 
action. It was held by the Queen’s Bench Division of the Commercial Court that (1) 
the plaintiff bank was an assured under the first and the second policies and Esal Ltd. 
was the assured under the third and the fourth one. (2) Because o f the assignment, no
100 Punjab National Bank v De Boinville (1992) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7. Page 7.
101 (1992) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7.
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rights have been transferred to Punjab, which Esal might have had. (3) There was a 
contractual relationship between the plaintiff bank and each o f the first and the 
second defendants employers ” 102. Hence, a duty of care was deemed to be owed by 
Mr. De Boinville, Mr. Deere, F.E Wright and Fieldings to the plaintiff bank. On 
appeal, the questions that had to be answered were the following: (1) who was the 
assured under each of the policies? (2) Was there a contractual relationship 
between the bank and the relevant defendants? (3) In the absence of a 
contractual relationship, did the defendants owe a duty of care to the bank? In 
respect of the first question, the Judge of the Commercial Court was accepted to be 
right in his conclusion. So, the plaintiff bank was held to be an assured under the first 
policy. As regards the second question, again, the Judge’s reasoning was followed and 
it was decided that under the third and fourth policy, there was a contract between the 
bank and Wrights and Fieldings. Finally, a duty of care was held to be owed by Mr. 
Boinville and Mr. Deer, which could be irrelevant between the parties. The reason for 
the decision was that “an insurance broker owed a duty o f care to the specific person 
who he knew to become an assignee o f the policies ” 103. So, the brokers were liable to 
the bank, because they knew that the policies were to be assigned.
Another case, which was mentioned in the Henderson case judgement was 
Youell v Bland Welch 104. In this case the plaintiffs were Lloyd’s underwriters and 
companies who actually placed insurance for three gas-carrying vessels. These 
vessels, which were still under construction, were reinsured as well and the seventh 
and eighth defendants were Lloyd’s underwriters, who had actually subscribed to it. It 
must be stated that the reinsurance contract made provision for the coverage of the 
potential liability of the plaintiffs. When the vessels became a constructive total loss, 
the plaintiffs paid a sum of money under the original insurance cover and submitted 
that the reinsurance contract was still in force. It must be explained at this point that 
the two insurance policies were actually supposed to cover the risk for the same 
period of time. Hence, the negligence on the part of the brokers was that they failed to 
extend the period of the cover under the reinsurance. The contract contained a clause, 
which stated that the cover in respect of the vessels was up to 48 months. It was held 
by the Commercial Court that (I) the submission by the defendants that the court was
102 Ibid Pages 7-8.
103 Ibid.
104 (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 423.
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entitled to look at the slip in order to resolve any areas o f doubt that arose on the 
wording o f the policy would be rejected. (2) A period must be specified under an 
obligatory excess o f loss reinsurance contract during which the risks, which would be 
ceded, should be defined. (3) The “Period o f Termination and Reinsurance ” clause 
must make provision for the period during which the reinsurance cover must remain 
open. (4) The words “whilst under construction” meant that “in respect o f 
vessels... whilst under construction”. (5) The phrase “for periods as original (up to 
but not including 48 months), referred to the duration o f the reinsurance cover in 
respect o f the ceded risk and did not form part o f the definition o f the risks to be 
ceded”. Therefore, the plaintiffs claim failed 105.
8. 7 Spiral Business
I am going to move on now to another topic, which is interrelated with the 
potential liability of underwriters and brokers. This topic is the spiral business. Before 
analysing the cases, I will very briefly deal with what exactly is a spiral. I will use the 
definition of Lord Justice Phillips, as this was given in the case of Deenv v Gooda 
Walker 106: “many syndicates which wrote XL - Excess of Loss Cover - took out XL 
cover themselves. Those who reinsured them were thus writing XL on XL. They, in 
their turn, frequently took out their own XL cover 107. There thus developed among the 
syndicates and companies which write LMX 108 business a smaller group that was 
largely responsible for creating a complex intertwining network o f mutual 
reinsurance, which had been described as the spiral”109. The above case is one of the 
most significant cases that arose under because of the LMX spiral business. LMX 
actually stands for London Market Excess of Loss. The case had to do with years 
1988, 1989 and 1990. During these years, quite a few catastrophes occurred, which as 
a result caused a significant loss to underwriters at Lloyd’s. There were four 
syndicates, which were involved with the claims: syndicates 164, 290, 298 and 299.
105 Ibid. Page 423-424
106 (1996) Lloyd’s Reinsurance Law Reports 183.
107 Excess of Loss cover.
108 London Market Excess of Loss.
109 Deeny v Gooda Walker (1996) Lloyd’s Reinsurance Law Reports 183. Page 190. Per Lord Justice 
Phillips.
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The first defendants managed the first two syndicates and the second defendants the 
other two. The plaintiffs were most of the Names, who suffered the major loss. Their 
claim was based both in contract and tort for failure to exercise skill and care in the 
business of the underwriting by the defendants. The requirement of a balanced 
account was very important in respect of the claim that no due care and skill was 
exercised but this is anlysed in detail below.
Of course, the defendants raised their own argument. According to the 
judgement they contended that (a) Names at Lloyd’s knowingly accepted unlimited 
liability, (b) Underwriting was a risk business, (c) Underwriters assumed risk in 
consideration o f premium and it was no part o f their business to reinsure all the risks 
that they had assumed, (d) Lloyd’s Regulations had no requirements for recording 
aggregate exposure or calculating probable maximum loss; (e) in the late 1980’s the 
industry o f insurance was hit with a series o f unprecedented losses and the risk o f  
such a concentration o f catastrophes... could not reasonably have been anticipated or 
was too remote for a matter which a reasonably prudent underwriter would 
necessarily guard against” no.
I am going to refer to the actual decision of the court by analysing the 
judgement and the reasoning of Lord Justice Phillips. The first thing that he did was to 
refer to the two preliminary questions, which have already been answered. These were 
(a) Did Gooda Walker owe a duty of care in negligence to all the Names on their 
syndicates, whether or not they were in contractual relationship with them, (b) 
Are the members agents contractually liable to the Names for failure to exercise 
reasonable care and skill on the part of the Gooda Walker as managing agents? 
The Court of Appeal answered both these questions in the affirmative 1H. Then the 
position of the four syndicates that were involved in the claims was stated and 
whether or not the excess of loss insurance-, which caused the loss-, was the major 
part of their business. But, what about the issues of liability? Lord Justice Phillips said 
that the only question, which had to be answered in relation with liability, was 
whether or not the underwriters in question acted as reasonably competent 
underwriters? He said that a reasonable standard of skill expected by an underwriter 
involves activities such as planning and recording. The reason behind this is that with
110 Ibid. Pages 183-184. Per Lord Justice Phillips.
111 Ibid. Page 186. Per Lord Justice Phillips.
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proper monitoring it would have been perhaps possible for the Names to reduce their 
losses. The other thing that was mentioned was a number of circumstances where a 
competent underwriter should, instead of accepting, refuse the risks. One of these 
circumstances is where the cost of reinsurance would have deprived it of its 
commercial viability.
One of the first topics that Lord Justice Philips had to decide on was the 
requirement of a balanced account. Before dealing with the contentions of the judge, it 
must be said that the principles, which should apply to the excess of loss insurance, 
were decided in respect of the allegations that were made by the plaintiffs. Hence, that 
is why the need for the balanced account is mentioned first. According to Mr. Von
1 p
Eicken’s report this is a very important aspect of the underwriting business . But, 
what is a balanced account? The answer is really quite simple. A balanced account is 
one where the claims that an underwriter is responsible for and the premiums that he 
receives are capable of making him have a profit. He recognised two ways with which 
it is quite easy to achieve a balanced account. The first one is if the underwriter 
achieves a restriction to the exposure of his syndicates. If he does this it is afterwards 
very difficult even if a catastrophe occurs not to be able to meet his claims. The 
second way is the obtaining of adequate reinsurance. If, for example, he reinsures his 
Probable Maximum Loss- PML -  then it would be almost impossible for his net 
premiums to be exceeded, even as a result of a major catastrophe. Conclusively, Lord 
Justice Phillips’ decision in relation to exposure was in his own words: "the fact that 
a Name who joins Lloyd’s deliberately agrees to expose himself to unlimited liability 
does not mean that he anticipates or accepts that when he joins a syndicate, the active 
underwriter will deliberately expose him to the risk o f such liability. On the contrary, 
the Name will reasonably expect the underwriter to exercise due skill and care to 
prevent him from suffering losses...if, however, an underwriter is deliberately to 
expose him to suffering losses from time to time, he must make sure that the Names 
are aware o f this and o f the scale o f loss to which they will from time to time be 
exposed” 113.
112 Expert Evidence.
1,3 Deeny v Gooda Walker (1996) Lloyd’s Reinsurance Law Reports 183. Pages 185-197. Per Lord 
Justice Phillips.
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It is time now to move on to the requirement of planning that I talked about 
above. In relation with this, the evidence that was given by expert witnesses was quite 
controversial. Mr. Von Eicken argued that a competent underwriter must always plan 
his policy and his reinsurance protection in respect of his PML. Mr. Outwaite on his 
part did not have the same opinion. He thought that the only planning which had to be 
made had to do with the setting up of the syndicate. Afterwards, it is not a necessary 
factor. The only circumstance, which might make formal planning compulsory, is a 
major change that takes place from one year to the next one. And Mr. Jewell 
submitted that although it would be very helpful for underwriters to make such plans 
and he would expect them to do so, this did not mean that they were obliged to and 
that it would be strange if they did not. Again I will refer to Lord Phillips’ opinion: 
“in my judgement it was a fundamental principle o f excess o f loss that the underwriter 
should follow and formulate a plan as to the amount o f exposure that his syndicate 
would run ” 114. He referred afterwards to aggregates: “in order to monitor the 
exposure that results from the business he writes, the excess o f loss underwriter must 
be aware o f his aggregates. He has the advantage that each piece o f business he 
writes is subject to an express limit o f liability...he thus has to divide into different 
categories the covers that can aggregate...as I  have already explained, there will be 
some categories where it is unlikely, or indeed inconceivable that a single event will 
result in a claim on every cover. In respect o f these categories the true exposure will 
be, not the aggregate, but the PML” 115. So, in his opinion Lord Justice Phillips 
believed that planning was a necessary factor for a reasonable underwriter to perform 
his activities properly.
After that matters of reinsurance had to be solved. Mr. Vos actually submitted 
that there are some elements, which had to be followed in a reinsurance policy, if an 
underwriter wanted to be competent and quite positive that he will not have to face an 
exposure, that he will not be able to deal with. In summary, these elements were: the 
knowledge of the exact exposure of the Probable Maximum Loss of the underwriter’s 
syndicate, the knowledge also of the net exposure of the possible worse event, the 
effective reinsurance of the balance of account, the retention which must remain at the 
bottom and finally the fact that an underwriter should match the reinstatements on his
114 Ibid Pages 197-198.
115 Ibid.
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reinsurance to the percentage that he is allowed to do so 116. The court decided that in 
order to be able to ascertain whether these elements are correctly stated and if they are 
all critical, reference must be made both to the vertical and the horizontal exposure of 
a syndicate. For example, some of the elements -  the first two actually- were not even 
challenged. For the third one it was said that it could not be argued, since it must be 
the aim of a reasonable underwriter. Hence, the third and the fourth were the ones, 
which were really challenged. The general conclusion that Lord Justice Phillips 
arrived at was that “the competent excess o f loss underwriter had to give careful 
consideration not merely to his vertical but also to his horizontal exposure. This was 
true, whether he was writing high level catastrophe business in the spiral or low level 
reinsurance o f direct business and it is axiomatic that the underwriter had to plan his 
pattern o f reinsurance protection... they should- the Gooda Walker underwriters- have 
been following a policy o f matching reinstatements in relation to the catastrophe 
excess o f loss business that they were writing to the spiral ” 117. And in respect of the 
rating of the premium he said that “the experts were agreed that it is a fundamental 
principle applying to all insurance business that the underwriter must satisfy himself 
that the premium received is commensurate with the risk assumed” 118. So, this led 
him to the conclusion that the premium must reflect the risk in order to be correct.
The next significant issue that the court turned to was the nature of the spiral 
business, the position of Gooda Walker underwriters towards it and the general 
standard of care and skill that is required by an underwriter. The first thing that was 
mentioned in relation to all these was that in the spiral business, an irrational way of 
thinking has been developed. This led to the result that the premium rates fell below 
the real reflection of the risks. This was supported by the evidence also of experts and 
by a report called the Lyons report 119. What Lord Phillips did was that he accepted 
the experts’ opinion and submitted that “the Gooda Walker underwriters should have 
shared the appreciation o f the spiral enjoyed by Mr.Emney, by the Lyons report 
underwriter and by Mr. Outwaite. This was a business in which they chose to 
specialize and they should have given the most careful thought to its nature...no 
reason has been suggested by the defendants why Gooda Walker underwriters should
1,6 For more details see the judgement.
117 Deeny v Gooda Walker (1996) Lloyd’s Reinsurance Law Reports 183. Pages 198-201.
118 Ibid.
'19 For more details see the judgement.
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not have made the same appraisal o f spiral business as Mr. Outwaite and I  can think 
o f none ” 120. Finally what about the necessary standard of care and skill? Again quite 
a few allegations were made, in order to ascertain what an underwriter is expected to 
do. The first one was that the standard of care, which is expected, is that which is 
exercised by competent members of this job. The second one was that if a common 
practice was used in a particular, this could be strong evidence that the necessary 
standard has been achieved. Thirdly, if a choice, which was made by a professional, is 
proved to be wrong, this did not mean that he did not use reasonable care and skill. 
And the fourth one was that an error could be proved only if it was one, which could 
be made by an informed and reasonable underwriter. Lord Justice Phillips actually 
accepted these prepositions and stated that “the underwriters in this case were putting 
their Names at risk to the tune o f many millions o f pounds. The heavy responsibility 
that they entailed entitled those Names to expect that their underwriters would 
exercise an appropriate amount o f wisdom both before and during the underwriting 
that they transacted on behalf o f their Names” 121. The rest of the case was dedicated 
to the losses of each syndicate separately and to some technical aspects of the 
reinsurance business.
Another case which dealt with the spiral business was Arbuthnott v Feltrim 
Underwriting Agencies Ltd. 122 In this case the principles which were mentioned in 
relation with the Gooda Walker case applied and it was held thatalthough the Feltrim 
underwriters had been aware the gearing effect on losses of the LMX spiral, they had 
acted in a negligent way in failing to calculate adequately the true extent of the 
syndicates’ exposure to losses123.
8 .8  Damages
Finally, the last thing I want to focus on in this chapter is the question of 
damages. In the Gooda Walker case, the argument on behalf of the Names was that 
since the underwriting was considered to be negligent, then it would be logical for 
them to recover the amount of damages to which they were entitled in respect of all
120 Ibid
121 Ibid
122 (1995)2 A.C 145.
123 Ibid
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these years of losses. However, the court did not follow this contention. It was held 
that they were entitled only to the amount of damages, which would put them in the 
same position as if they had obtained effective reinsurance for their exposure 124. The 
same thing also applied in the Arbuthnott case.
8. 9 Pools and Fronting
This topic is again related more to reinsurance than directly to insurance 
brokers. However, its significance in respect of brokers lies on the fact that, many 
times, liabilities that arise under fronting agreements take place because a broker or an 
underwriter has failed, for example, to inform the fronting or the other pool members 
of their potential liabilities. So, it is quite important for a broker under these 
circumstances to exercise the standard of care and skill that is required by a competent 
and reasonable one.
I am going to start by referring to the meaning of the term “fronting”: “the 
meaning o f fronting is clear. When one insurer is willing to take a risk but either is 
unable to do so, not being licensed to do business in the territory in question, or is not 
acceptable to the assured, for part or all o f the risk, either for commercial reasons or 
perhaps on political grounds, then another insurer may be able to front for him, by 
underwriting the insurance in full and then reinsuring part o f or all the risk with him. 
There may be standing arrangements to that effect when a number o f insurers belong 
to a group or pool and for whatever reason the insurance is accepted by one or more 
insurers but the risk is shared by them with others under built-in reinsurance 
agreements ” 125. This definition is taken from the case of Sedwick v P.T Reinsuransi 
Umum Indonesia 126. This case demonstrates how the mechanism of fronting actually 
works. The facts were as follows: the first plaintiffs were brokers who had done 
business in Vancouver. They held some open covers, which were issued by the second 
defendants in the name of the first defendants. The object of insurance was a number 
of fishing vessels and the parties, which were insured under the insurance agreements, 
were the 2nd to the 70th plaintiffs. The controversial point of this case was the binding
124 For more details see the judgement.
125 O’Neil P.T & Woloniecki J.W. The Law of Reinsurance, lrst edition. Sweet & Maxwell.(1998). 
Pages 432-433.
126 (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 334.
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authorities that the second defendants held from the first defendants. I am going to 
refer to the vital clauses of the agreement: (2) Classes o f risk: ...(b) marine (hulls and 
cargo), (c) fire and allied perils. (3) Territory: Worldwide, excluding U.S.A and 
Canada. (4) Limits: U.S $50.000for each class o f the risk... (12) Other particulars: 
Whenever require fronting may be arranged”111. In the end claims arose in respect of 
a large number o f vessels. The argument on behalf of the plaintiffs was twofold. They 
submitted that either the first defendants were liable for the contracts that were 
formulated by the second defendants or that if it was accepted that the second 
defendants acted outside the scope of their authority, then, they were liable for the 
breach of their authority. On the other hand, the allegations for the first defendants 
were first of all that since everything happened in Canada, this was excluded by 
clause 3 of the binding authority. However, the second defendant argued that there 
was a variation in the binding authority in order to include Canada. Also, the first 
defendants argued that the financial limit had been exceeded 128. Finally, the second 
defendants said that under the second the fronting arrangement they were entitled to 
front for the first defendants even outside the territorial limits, but only if there was a 
reduction by the reinsurance to the retention of the plaintiffs in order for it to be 
within the amount of their contractual limit. The decision of the court was first of all 
concentrated on the territorial limits. It was held that a variation was really included 
so as to include Canada. In respect of the limits of the risk, it was decided that the 
limit of $50,000 applied to each insurance which was accepted by the second 
defendants on behalf of the first defendants. Thirdly, in relation with the fronting 
arrangement it was submitted that actually the second defendants were not authorised 
to accept insurance on behalf of the first defendants, if the insurance was beyond the 
agreed limit. And fourthly, the second defendants did not have authority to act under 
open covers. Hence, “there was a judgement for the first plaintiffs and the other 
plaintiffs against the first defendants for the balance o f a claim and against the 
second defendants for the amount o f damages ” 129.
One of the main reasons that pools and fronting arrangements exist is because 
many times lower rates than usual are used and this gives new companies in the 
market the opportunity to establish themselves. The other question is that of when an
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authority to front exists. The case in point is Suncorp v Milano 13°. In this case, an 
underwriter used a member of a pool as a front without his actual authority. However 
the decision of the court was that because Milano -  the member of the pool- “had 
become aware o f the fact that their agent had exceeded his authority, took no steps 
within a reasonable time to bring that fact to the notice o f third parties. So, the 
conclusion was “that Milano did adopt and intended to adopt the contracts at least to 
some extent” 131. One quite common issue, which is also, more related to our chapter 
here is the legal liability o f the pool members. It must be understood that because they 
are the members of the same pool, this does not mean that they have any kind of 
partnership. They are more or less severally liable for their liabilities 132. It works as if 
it is an original insurance. However, there is one more thing that needs to be cited 
down. There is a difference between the principal who is unnamed and the principal 
and the one who is undisclosed. In the first situation, it is possible for the agent not to 
be personally liable. In the second one, the agent is always responsible and liable in 
respect of his contractual position. Another element that is quite important is what is 
called the cross-liability clause. The effect of this clause is very significant because 
what it does is that even if only one member is liable for the agreement, with this 
clause it happens that the other members become additionally liable for the same 
amount 133. This clause can also work progressively, because as the members become 
unable to pay, the more the amount is spread 134.
8.10 Exclusion Clauses
I will move on to the possible effect of an exclusion clause that a broker can 
use in respect of his duties and liabilities. I am going to refer to the case of Sharp & 
Another v Sphere Drake Insurance Pic & Others 135. In this case S, in order to 
comply with some tax requirements bought a yacht by means of an off-the-shelf 
company. A company called Roarer Investments Ltd., which was incorporated in
130 (1993) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 225.
131 Ibid. Page 241.
132 Ibid.
133 A clause like that existed in the ACC Pool case study.
134 O’Neil P.T & Woloniecki J.W. The Law of Reinsurance, lrst edition. Sweet & Maxwell.(1998). 
Pages 432-433.
135 (1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 501.
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Gibraltar asked his insurance brokers, D3, who actually had insured earlier vessels to 
obtain cover. Underwriters D1 and D2 provided for the insurance. During the second 
year of insurance, the vessel became a total loss because of fire and the underwriters 
raised quite a few defences in order to avoid the claim: (a) S had no insurable interest 
in the boat, (b) The exclusion clause was based on the fact that if the yacht was used 
as a houseboat by any member of the crew, then the policy would not be valid, (c) 
When the policy was renewed S failed to disclose that a crew lived on board, (d) Also, 
the theft of a radio was not disclosed, (e) Non-disclosure also existed as to the fact 
that the proposal form was not signed by S, but by an employee of the brokers, D3. (f) 
Hence, a number of misrepresentations existed, namely, that the vessel was not used 
as a houseboat, that it had to be sealed in six months and finally that the proposal form 
was not signed by S. 136. As a result S joined the brokers as third defendants and made 
a number of allegations that he was not aware of the exact meaning of the “house­
boat” exclusion clause, that he was not informed about the theft of the radio and that 
the brokers should have said to the underwriters that the signature was not S’s, in 
order to avoid the problem of insurable interest.
In respect of the allegation that there was a lack of insurable interest by S, the 
court rejected this argument: “ once one can establish the existence at the time o f the 
loss o f the rights enjoyed by the assured in respect o f the insured property and that if  
it is lost or damaged such right will or may be less beneficial, an insurable interest 
exists regardless o f the precise nature o f the rights or the means by which they have 
been acquired” 137'. Secondly, in relation to the false signature that was used it was 
held, under the old test -  before the Pan Atlantic case 138 that “given the width o f the 
general principle o f the utmost good faith...provided that it is established that such 
circumstances would influence the mind o f the prudent insurer in deciding whether to 
take the risk they ought to have been disclosed and i f  they were not the insurer can 
avoid the policy. In the light o f these findings, the first plaintiff’s claim against the 
insurers failed” 139.
136 Insurance Brokers Exclusion Clauses...Brokers negligence and other matters. Insurance Law & 
Practice, Vol.3, No 1, 1993. Pages 22-23.
137 Ibid.
138 (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496, (1995) 1 A.C 501 (H.L).
139 Insurance Brokers Exclusion Clauses...Brokers negligence and other matters. Insurance Law &
Practice, Vol.3, No 1, 1993. Pages 22-23.
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Finally, there was a claim against the brokers. The first plaintiffs argued that 
the brokers actually failed to exercise their professional duty. According to the court, 
the question, which had to be asked, was if the people who exercise the same 
profession would reach the same conclusion. It was decided that the brokers fell 
below that standard for both the meaning of the exclusion clause and for the signing 
by another person. The last contention was if the plaintiff could be held to be 
contributorily negligent. The court rejected this kind of argument and no reference 
was made to the Youell case where this kind of argument was successfully raised. 
This case shows more or less how exclusion clauses work and how easy it is to 
complicate the situation in reality 140.
140 Ibid.
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Conclusion
9.1 Conclusion
I have examined throughout this research the operation of the insurance 
industry in respect of brokers. It is obvious that brokers have been in many instances 
subject to criticism for not doing their job properly. The main problem most of the 
times was who is the broker acting for? For example, when a retrocession cover is 
obtained the broker becomes automatically the agent of the insurer. These agency 
problems create quite serious implications and the broker finds himself in a position 
where there is a conflict of interest between the duty of care that he owes to his 
original principal and the one that he owes to the insurer under the retrocession cover. 
The courts seem to impose on the broker quite a very heavy burden as to what he must 
do in order to act with reasonable care and skill.
Something else that needs to be said is that a broker is responsible for so many 
activities throughout the whole transaction. First of all, he needs to obtain the cover 
and be able to place it. This is the stage where many times problems arise between the 
parties of the contract. In many cases, the insurer argues that he entered in the contract 
because there was an alleged non-disclosure on the part of the broker. Again, the 
question that may arise is whose fault it is for the alleged non-disclosure. However, 
this matter is resolved only if someone examines thoroughly the relevant case law. 
Also, a broker owes a duty of care to his principal and perhaps other parties even after 
the insurance cover is obtained and placed. An obvious example is that of retention of 
documents. A broker was held liable for not keeping the relevant records after thirty 
years \  This shows that the duty of care that can be owed by the broker can be very 
wide and a broker can be liable long time after the conclusion of the insurance 
contract. My effort in this research was to try and deal with all the aspects of a 
broker’s activities. My analysis of case law leads to e opinion that in recent years the 
courts have seen it fit to impose more onerous duties on brokers. If someone examines 
the FNCB case 2, the Zephyr case 3, the Aneco case 4 or the Henderson case 5, it
1 Grace v Leslie & Godwin Financial Services Ltd. (1995) L.R.L.R 472.
2 FNCB Ltd (Formerly First National Commercial Bank pic.) v Barnet Devanney (Harrow) Ltd. 
(formerly Barnet Devanney & Co. Ltd.) 1/7/1999.
http://www.casetrack.com
3 The Zephyr, General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation and Others, Peter William Tanter 
and Other. (1985) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 529.
4 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd (in liquidation) v Johnson & Higgins Ltd. 30/7/1999. 
(Unreported) htlpVAvw w .easelrack.com
5 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd. (1994) 2 A. C 145
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will be obvious that onerous duties are imposed on brokers in respect of many of their 
activities as for example of a signing indication 6.
As I have already mentioned the whole regulatory aspect under which brokers 
are governed changed with the introduction of the Insurance Brokers Registration 
Act 1977. It was actually the first serious effort that was made in order to regulate 
brokers. The development of Lloyd’s also had a vital effect for the whole regulatory 
regime to be improved through for example the Lloyd’s Byelaws. However, the 
position of brokers is again a changing environment. As I have submitted in the 
introduction of this research the General Insurance Standards Council will be the 
new regulatory body in respect of brokers. I have mentioned in the relevant chapter a 
few details about the new system. Its activities are governed by a Commercial 
Customer Code and a Private Customer Code. A very important aspect is that 
everything will be regulated from branches in the United Kingdom irrespective of the 
location of the risk. The problems that the insurance industry has faced before and 
after the introduction of the Insurance Brokers Regulation Act 1977 made it 
essential for a reform to be introduced. However, as I have already mentioned in 
many instances the vital issue now will be how the insurance industry will react to 
these changes. Anyway, the regulatory regime is not the only factor that will influence 
the position of the brokers. Of course, it will be the most important but other factors 
like public policy and fairness will always be decisive for a court in order to reach a 
decision. The examination of case law in this research made it clear that the position 
of brokers is such a complex issue and it will not be easy for the problems to be 
resolved. However, perhaps this latest reform will improve the situation. The position 
of a broker is not clear to be defined and a better theoretical background and 
regulation that is aimed by the General Insurance Standards Council may prove to 
be decisive. However, quite a long time must pass in order for everybody to be able to 
discuss about the advantages and disadvantages of the reform and assess the position 
of insurance brokers in respect of it.
6 This is what happened in the Zephyr.
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